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A B S T R A C T  
 
 
The aim of this thesis is to defend a reading of Descartes’ theory of sensory perception in 
which, against a widespread interpretation, the mind is not a passive receiver of inputs from 
the environment, but an active decoder of neural information that contributes to the 
representational content of ideas. I call this the ‘mental activity thesis’ and, in the overall 
picture, I identify it as one of the philosophical implications of the seventeenth-century 
scientific revolution.  
 
Within Descartes’ dualism, to offer a theory of sensory perception amounts to describing the 
interplay between the natural world, the brain, and the mind. Given his mechanistic, micro-
corpuscular conception of matter, Descartes developed detailed physiological descriptions of 
the interaction between external objects and the brain. He envisaged it as an isomorphic 
relation in which the characteristics of objects are transmitted through the nerves to the brain 
as patterns of geometrically reduced properties. This process is often read as culminating with 
the mind being passively affected by a corporeal isomorph. Descartes’ doctrine becomes 
elusive in its mental phase, but the passivity reading, so I contend, remains inadequate. I argue 
for the mental activity thesis through four claims.  
 
First, I subscribe the known view that Descartes is concerned about a version of the mind-
body problem that is not equivalent to the problem of substance interaction. It is rather a 
problem of dissimilarity between mental representations and mechanistic explanations. The 
question is how the qualitative character of sensory experiences can arise from the quantitative 
notions of physical science. As a way of emphasising the weight that the problem of 
dissimilarity has for Descartes’ philosophical decisions, I show that it motivates a 




Second, I defend the position that, despite not holding a perfectly unambiguous doctrine, 
Descartes’ introduction of natural signs is the closest that he got to formulating a full-fledged 
theory of sensory perception. The appeal to natural signs has been normally deemed as 
metaphorical in the literature. I argue that, on the contrary, it is possible to reconstruct a 
causal story for brain-mind interaction along the lines of a semantic model based on Descartes’ 
identification of neural events with natural signs. A causal-semantic model emerges as a 
charitable, plausible reading that reveals the mind as an active interpreter.  
 
Third, in light of the mental activity thesis, I read Descartes’ late appeal to the innateness of 
all ideas (notably in the Comments on a Certain Broadsheet) as a strategy to account for a type 
of representational content needed for sensory ideas that, while produced by the mind, is 
different from that of his paradigmatic innate ideas. I assist Descartes in exploring how the 
category of innateness captures mental activity within a causal-semantic theory.  
 
Fourth, in the course of this argumentation, and for further support, I address the role of the 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities in Descartes’ theory. I tackle a pervasive 
objection stemming from his alleged association of the perception of primary qualities with 
the intellect. By reassessing Descartes’ views on mental activity, this interpretation aims at a 
lucid description of sensory perception that goes beyond the rigid rationalism that is often 
credited to him.  
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I N T R O D U C T I O N  
 
 
Philosophy is written in this grand book, the 
universe, which stands continually open to our 
gaze 
 
— Galileo, The Assayer  
 
 
Early modern theories of sensory perception are shaped by a remarkable confluence 
between science and philosophy at the rise of the seventeen-century scientific revolution. In 
line with the division of disciplines at the time, we can say that Descartes’ views on sensory 
perception are the product of an understanding of natural philosophy as an experimental 
mathematical science, together with a progressive renovation of the metaphysical map of 
reality. The general aim of this dissertation is to put forward a reading of Descartes’ theory 
that lives up to this integrative challenge.  
 
Mechanism was at the core of the new scientific and philosophical image of the natural world 
emerging in seventeenth-century Europe. Although the mechanistic standpoint allowed for a 
variety of scientific theories, its pre-Newtonian version is generally defined as the view that all 
natural phenomena can be explained by appealing to a small range of quantifiable 
characteristics of micro-particles of homogeneous matter. In the Cartesian theory, these 
features are the shape, size, and motion of micro-corpuscles. Certainly, the methods and 
discoveries of the seventeenth-century scientific revolution shaped decisively the development 
of science, but the revolution was more than an especially prolific time for material 
innovation. Descartes’ natural philosophy allows us to see that a fundamental aspect of this 
paradigm shift was, in fact, a change in the nature of explanation. Descartes’ constitutes an 
exemplary case of this change due to his emphatic rejection of the metaphysical assumptions 
of Aristotelian-inspired natural philosophy. A new science needed a new conceptual 
framework and (following the tree analogy from the preface to the French edition of the 
Principles), Descartes was set to ensure the fruitfulness of the new natural philosophy by means 






In this context, an explanation of sensory perception constituted a particularly intricate 
challenge. A mechanistic image of nature opened a gap between appearance and reality that 
rendered the senses inadequate sources for achieving truths about the world. For a rationalist 
like Descartes, the new theory of matter showed with special force that the ontologically 
loaded empiricism of his Scholastic teachers had to be overturned. According to a standard 
version of the Aristotelian-Scholastic doctrine of sensory perception that Descartes explicitly 
opposed, we have the senses that we do precisely because they are suited for truthful 
perception. This teleological stance (that preserved similarity between objects and ideas) 
generated an account of perception that required the actual transmission of a ‘form’, without 
‘matter’, of the object to the perceiver’s mind. Generally speaking, Descartes and other natural 
philosophers at the time were set to change the direction of fit of such accounts —dissimilarity 
between objects and ideas was a fact, and a theory of perception had to be built upon it.    
 
Within Descartes’ dualism, sensory perception is equivalent to the interplay between the 
natural world, the brain, and the mind. His detailed mechanistic physiology accounted for 
the transmission of sensory information between external objects and the brain. It was 
depicted as an isomorphic relation in which the characteristics of objects are transmitted 
through the nerves as the motion patterns of its geometrically reduced properties. This process 
is often read as culminating with the mind being passively affected by the isomorphic (or 
structural) representation formed in the brain. It cannot be denied that Descartes’ doctrine 
becomes elusive in its mental phase, but the passivity reading, so I contend, remains 
inadequate. The objective of this dissertation is to defend a reading of Descartes’ theory of 
sensory perception in which, against a widespread interpretation, the mind is not a passive 
receiver of inputs from the environment, but an active decoder of neural information that 
contributes to the representational content of ideas. This reconstruction of the process of 
sensory perception receives the name of ‘causal-semantic model’. Additionally, I identify a 
specific concern, labelled by Rozemond (1999) as the ‘problem of dissimilarity’, as the 
dominant motivation for Descartes’ theory. An outline of this problem is as follows.   
 
Descartes begins The World —his most ambitious systematic work concerning the principles 





perception. He writes: ‘the first thing that I want to draw to your attention is that it is possible 
for there to be a difference between the sensation that we have, that is, the idea that we form 
of it in our imagination through the intermediary of our eyes, and what it is in the objects 
that produces the sensation in us’ (AT XI 3/G 3). This statement is at the core of Descartes’ 
views on sensation and it poses a problem that, I suggest, determined his whole theory. This 
is the ‘problem of dissimilarity’ (PD), which constitutes the refined version of the mind-body 
problem that Descartes was concerned about. Note that the (PD) is not equivalent to the 
alleged problem of interaction between finite substances and that, in contemporary terms, it 
amounts to the question of how the qualitative character of sensory experience can arise from 
the quantitative notions of physical science.  
 
For Descartes, the (PD) highlights a causal fact. Namely, the representational content of 
sensory ideas cannot be identified, in any intelligible way, with their corresponding brain 
states, and therefore, it cannot arise from them. As a solution for this complexity, Descartes 
seems to consider, in many occasions and in different ways, that the mind actively supplies 
the representational content of sensory ideas. The thesis that the mind has a substantial role 
in the way in which we perceive the world has not been traditionally attributed to Descartes. 
Rather, he is typically associated with an unrefined substance dualism that is accompanied by 
a passivity reading of sensory perception. In this regard, many authors within the diverse 
contemporary Cartesian scholarship have challenged certain recalcitrant inadequate readings 
of Descartes’ philosophy. However, the mental activity thesis is still often resisted, with the 
notable exceptions of the (widely different) proposals by Schmaltz (1997), Rozemond (1999), 
Simmons (2003), Machamer and McGuire (2009), and Chignell (2009). While relying on 





 In CHAPTER ONE, I subscribe the known view that Descartes is concerned about a 
refined version of the mind-body problem that is not equivalent to the problem of interaction 
between finite substances. It is rather a problem of dissimilarity between the representational 





a metaphysically interesting distinction between the types of causes that operate in the 
interaction between brain and mind in sensory perception. An analysis of Descartes’ choice of 
terminology for depicting brain-mind interaction will reveal a consistent and carefully 
established balance between the denial of efficient causation and the appeal to genuine causal 
powers. This analysis constitutes simply the first step in ruling out interpretations of 
Descartes’ doctrine of sensation which either hold that brain-mind interaction is a non-causal 
transaction; or which explain brain-mind interaction by resorting to causal powers that cannot 
emanate, to some extent, from the human brain and the human mind.  
 
In CHAPTER TWO, I supply the content for the theoretical frame created in Chapter One. 
That is to say, I reconstruct a model for sensory perception that includes a causal transaction 
that, while being equally genuine, is not of the same type as the efficient causes operating 
amongst bodies. I contend that, despite not offering a perfectly unambiguous doctrine, 
Descartes’ identification of brain states with ‘natural signs’ (AT XI 4/G 4) constitutes his most 
refined attempt at an alternative causation model, as well as the closest that he got to 
formulating a fully-fledged theory of sensory perception. This alternative model has received 
the name of ‘semantic’ as well as ‘causal-semantic’ (Marion 1981, Yolton 1984, 2000, 
Gaukroger 2002, Chignell 2009). I shall use only the latter formulation, since it highlights 
the notion that a semantic relation is also a proper causal relation. In the Cartesian context, a 
causal-semantic model integrates the whole process of sensory perception in a triadic relation 
between the external object, the brain, and the mind. Within Descartes’ mechanistic 
physiology, a motion pattern of the geometrically reduced properties of external objects is 
transmitted through the nerves to the internal cavities of the brain, where a structural 
representation of it is formed. In a causal-semantic model, this structural representation has 
the role of a sign that, by virtue of its being instituted by nature, signifies the external object 
to the mind. As a result, the mind acts as a decoder of natural semantic correlations between 
brain states and external objects. The result of this decoding activity is an idea of the external 
object, the representational content of which counts as a product of the mind’s own causal 
efficacy. The argumentation in favour of this reading of Descartes’ views on sensation 






(1) In the first stage I reconstruct Descartes’ taxonomy of signs. It is important, for 
justifying the plausibility of a causal-semantic model, that Descartes employed a stable 
notion of ‘sign’ for explaining two other phenomena aside from sensory perception. 
He introduced the category of ‘external signs’ for explaining the external movements 
of the passions (PS XI 411/CSM I 367), and the category of ‘conventional signs’ for 
developing his theory of language (DM AT 56/CSM I 139). A stable taxonomy of 
signs will show that a semantic narrative is not foreign to Descartes’ thought. In turn, 
this conclusion will counter claims about natural signs being a one-off figure of 
speech, and about the causal-semantic model being over-speculative.  
 
(2) Then, as a second stage, I offer an interpretation of the textual occurrences of natural 
signs throughout Descartes’ works as well as a brief study of the philosophical 
precedents of a causal-semantic model. I identify the late Scholastic distinction 
between ‘formal’ and ‘instrumental’ signs as a vital component of Descartes’ way of 
thinking about semantic relations. In particular, the notion of a formal sign assists in 
the task of accounting for the type of pre-cognitive interpretative activity carried out 
by the mind in sensory perception.  
 
(3) Finally, in the third stage, I complete the characterisation of a causal-semantic model 
by putting forward one explanatory advantage that has been called ‘Qualified 
Explanatory Naturalism’ (QEN). This part of the argumentation follows closely the 
contribution of Chignell (2009) to the debate. (QEN) refers to a methodological 
approach that is in line with Descartes’ goals as a rationalist natural philosopher, and 
it is defined as the policy of not resorting to supernaturalistic solutions until 
naturalistic explanations have been exhausted. Amongst the main rival causal theories, 
the causal-semantic model emerges as the one that provides a causal story for brain-
mind interaction that is as much of a naturalistic explanation as it can be. This means 
that, in doing so, it postpones the inevitable final appeal to God’s ordination as much 
as possible.  
 
After presenting the causal-semantic model, I turn my attention in CHAPTER THREE to an 





semantic or of any other type) whereby the mind is not a passive receiver of sensory inputs. 
This aspect is the thesis that all ideas are innate, and it appears notably in the Comments on a 
Certain Broadsheet, although it is also foreshadowed in other texts. In the literature, this thesis 
is commonly labelled as ‘hyper-nativism’ or ‘universal innateness’. Hyper-nativist statements 
come across in the Cartesian texts as a way of dealing with the (PD). In a nutshell, the 
reasoning seems to be that, since the representational content of sensory ideas cannot be 
identified with its physical causes, and cannot be produced directly by them, it must be 
produced innately. Thus, an active role for the mind in sensory perception appears again —
in this case under the designation of innateness.  
 
On the face of it, this is an immediately problematic addition to the Cartesian theory of ideas 
for a number of reasons. First, hyper-nativism is at odds with the sharp and seemingly 
authoritative classification of ideas laid out in the Meditations (between adventitious, 
factitious, and innate ideas, AT VII 37-8/CSM II 26). Under the lens of this classification, 
innate ideas include only our ideas of God, of eternal truths, and of fundamental logical 
axioms (i.e. ‘simple natures’). Second (and closely connected), hyper-nativism clashes with 
Descartes’ fundamental claim that sensory ideas come somewhat passively from external 
objects and thus also conflicts, overall, with his proof for the existence of body. In Descartes’ 
thought, this amounts to a rather formidable tension. Namely, if sensory ideas are not caused 
by external objects (as they seem to be), the critical point about the benevolent, all-powerful 
nature of God is compromised. He expresses this with clarity in the well-known passage of 
Meditation Six: ‘I do not see how God could be understood to be anything but a deceiver if 
the ideas were transmitted from a source other than corporeal things’ (AT VII 80/CSM II 
55).  
 
In this chapter I intend to show, first of all, that it is possible for Descartes to hold hyper-
nativism while retaining a non-trivial sense in which bodies cause sensory ideas. In doing that 
I join a group of diverse reconciling responses in the literature (amongst others, Jolley 1990, 
Schmaltz 1997, Rozemond 1999, Nelson 2008, Boyle 2009). At the same time, I take a 
slightly different argumentative route, and I emphasise the importance of hyper-nativism for 
the thesis that the mind is active in sensory perception. This leads to my main point. Namely, 





Descartes’ strategy to account for a type of mental content needed for the production of 
sensory ideas. While being the product of the mind’s own causal efficacy too, this type of 
mental content is different from that of his paradigmatic innate ideas. 
 
In order to reach this conclusion, I identify a difference between the rationale behind the 
three-fold classification of ideas in the Meditations and the one behind hyper-nativism. 
Whereas both categorisations are shaped by a causal question about ideas, the question behind 
them is not the same. Consequently, neither is the result. In brief, on one hand, the 
classification in the Meditations enquires about the causal origin of ideas in the sense of 
determining the faculty that sets off their production process. The question that underpins 
Descartes’ hyper-nativist claims, on the other hand, seeks the source of the representational 
content of those ideas. Ultimately, this distinction makes the sufficient theoretical room in 
Descartes’ theory for two types of innate ideas: the purely innate, and the innate yet 
adventitiously conditioned. The usage of a category of the ‘purely innate’, I should add, is not 
to be read as the mark of a hierarchy of ‘first-rate’ and ‘second-rate’ innateness. It simply refers 
to innate ideas that are fully accounted for the faculty of mind that Descartes calls ‘pure 
intellect’. All in all, the hyper-nativist strategy counts as Descartes’ formulation of the activity 
of the mind in sensory perception within his theory of ideas.  
 
In CHAPTER FOUR, I complete the picture of Descartes’ thesis of the activity of the mind in 
sensory perception by shifting the focus of the discussion towards the topic of sensible 
qualities. Descartes did not employ the terms ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities, but a similar 
distinction arises from his texts: some sensible qualities of objects (such as size or shape) are 
intrinsic properties of matter, whereas others are products of the interaction of objects with a 
perceiver (for example, colour or smell). Throughout the dissertation, I shall use the common 
terms ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities for convenience, while clarifying their meaning in 
the Cartesian system. Now, significantly for this project, Descartes’ treatment of sensible 
qualities poses an important textual challenge for a unified theory of sensory perception that 
is motivated by the (PD) and incorporates the activity of the mind. This complexity runs 
schematically as follows: Descartes often describes ideas of primary qualities as ‘clear and 
distinct’ and ideas of secondary qualities as ‘obscure and confused’. The former kind seem to 





nature of matter). The latter kind seem to be perceived by the senses, and they are deemed as 
misrepresentations of the properties of matter. The view that Descartes splits cognition 
between the clear and distinct intellectual perception of primary qualities and the obscure and 
confused sensory perception of secondary qualities has been opposed by Simmons (2003), 
who has named it the ‘bifurcation reading’. I will side with her view in rejecting such a reading. 
 
The problem with this division of labour is that, when we look at the Cartesian theory of 
sensory perception from the perspective of specific sensible qualities, the (PD) vanishes for 
the case of primary qualities and, consequently, mental activity does not appear to be required 
for their perception. As a result, we are left with a theory of sensory perception that, on one 
hand, exhibits an awkward cognitive fragmentation in the perception of the different qualities 
that a single specific object possesses. On the other hand, the active role of the mind in sensory 
perception takes the air of an ad hoc solution that is devised only for dealing with the 
perplexing nature of secondary qualities. In order to rule out the bifurcation reading (and its 
unpromising conclusion for this project), I will offer an argumentation in three steps, for 
which I will provide ample textual support: 
 
1. First, I clarify that when Descartes’ refers to the ‘obscurity and confusion’ of ideas 
of secondary qualities he is making a point that goes beyond a standard version of 
perceptual error. Rather, the terms obscurity and confusion are connected to the 
misrepresentation of what he calls the ‘true nature of bodies’ at a micro-corpuscular 
level (Pr I 73, AT VIIIA 37/CSM I 220). Crucially, this misrepresentation happens 
for both primary and secondary qualities. 
 
2. Second, the instances where Descartes attributes ‘clarity and distinctness’ to ideas 
of primary qualities refer exclusively to matter considered abstractly, and do not 
bear on cases of specific objects in particular acts of perception. This difference 
between specific and general characterisations of matter in Descartes relies on an 
argument by Wilson (1991). The weight of this distinction, I believe, has not been 






3. Third, I re-examine the rationale behind Descartes’ classification of types of 
sensible qualities, and I determine that it does not concern their similarity or 
dissimilarity with external causes. In summary, these points yield the conclusion 
that the (PD) is a phenomenon that is constitutive of the perception of both 
primary and secondary qualities. The activity of the mind, therefore, remains in a 
non-fragmented process of sensory perception across the board. 
  
In conclusion, this dissertation pursues a charitable and textually robust interpretation of 
Descartes’ theory of sensory perception in which the mind has a substantial role. In doing so, 
it aims to revise a specific aspect of the history of ideas. On one hand, it confirms the Cartesian 
theory as a strong naturalistic view emerging from the seventeenth-century scientific 
revolution. On the other, and despite Descartes’ own uncertainties, it reads his theory of mind 
as a sophisticated piece both in the progression towards the Kantian shift, as well as in the 





 Finally, here I sketch the methodological approach taken, and I address some choices 
in my treatment of the topic.  
 
Use of the texts — My methodology is an examination of the descriptions of sensory perception 
in the entirety of the Cartesian corpus. As in any project in the history of philosophy, primary 
sources occupy centre stage.  At the same time, I am careful to devote attention to the context 
of passages and to the aims of specific works. For example, an assessment of Descartes’ claims 
in the Rules considers its status as an early work whose epistemological structure is not still 
permeated by a mature natural philosophy. As a further example, in the case of the 
Meditations, its closed context as a methodological exercise might lead to certain naturalistic 
explanations being abbreviated. I will add considerations of this sort throughout my textual 
analyses. Besides, I shall also be wary of not creating, whenever the texts allow it, an artificial 





was his objective, and I attempt to preserve, whenever possible, the integrative nature of his 
system.  
 
Early Modern terminology — Overall, the technical terms that I employ follow Early Modern 
designations. I will notify the reader whenever I use a homologous contemporary term for the 
purpose of clarifying an idea, or for establishing a connection with a topic in contemporary 
philosophy. For clarificatory purposes, I add here two terminological facts about Descartes’ 
writings:  
 
(1) First, within his dualism, ‘mind’ are ‘soul’ are used interchangeably for referring to 
the thinking substance. I have used the former in line with the name of the 
discipline at stake, that is, early modern philosophy of mind. 
  
(2) Second, Descartes employed the terms ‘sensory perception’, ‘sensation’, and 
‘sensory ideas’ almost as complete synonyms. One can detect some nuances, such 
as the use of ‘sensation’ in more instances concerning ideas of secondary qualities, 
or in the case of the passions. At any rate, this never amounts to an exclusive 
association. Finally, it is important to note, as Simmons (2003) has pointed out, 
that ‘sensory perception’ and ‘sensation’ are not equivalent to representational and 
non-representational mental states respectively. Descartes’ texts do not provide 
evidence for this contemporary reading of the terms.  
 
Choice of topics — This dissertation aims to give an interpretive treatment of the hypothesis 
that the mind is active in Descartes’ causal-semantic model of sensory perception. At the same 
time, some topics will be inevitably prioritised over others. As I see it, there are two issues that 
are fundamental to any reading of Descartes’ that proposes that the mind is active in sensory 
perception: on one hand, a reconstruction of a causal model that Descartes could have held (I 
provide it in Chapter Two), on the other, an assessment of Cartesian hyper-nativism (as I 
present in Chapter Three). A number of points of contention arise from these two issues, 
including some strong objections regarding internal consistency. Defences of the possibility 
of mental activity tend to focus on countering a couple of them. The first objection is the 





reception of inputs from the environment. The second objection is the thesis of the 
transparency of the mind i.e. the view that, for Descartes, the mind is aware of any mental 
state that it has.  
 
I have incorporated a few claims against these two objections in several sections of the 
dissertation. At any rate, this dissertation, as whole, is a continuous answer to the passivity 
reading. I have also chosen to examine in finer detail a different challenge coming from his 
treatment of sensible qualities. As specified in the overview, this will appear in Chapter Four. 
The tension between Descartes’ alleged distinction of qualities and his depiction of the (PD) 
has not been often explored in the literature. I believe, however, that it poses a challenge that 
is more pervasive than the issue of the transparency of the mind mentioned above. I take this 
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 0. INTRODUCTION 
 
Descartes begins The Treatise on Light by drawing our attention to one main point 
concerning sensory perception. Namely, that ‘it is possible for there to be a difference between 
the sensation that we have of it (light), that is, the idea that we form of it in our imagination 
through the intermediary of our eyes, and what it is in the objects that produces the sensation 
in us’ (AT XI 3/G3, clarification added).1 This thesis regarding dissimilarity between our 
sensory ideas and their physical causes arises from fundamental aspects of Descartes’ natural 
philosophy, and it determines to a great extent the causal story for his theory of sensory 
                                            
1 The title of the first chapter of the Treatise on Light is precisely a general statement of the same thesis: 
‘The difference between our sensations and the things that produce them’. In any case, as Gaukroger 
notes, the chapter headings might have been a later addition by Claude Clerselier for the (posthumous) 
1677 edition of The World (G3). Descartes abandoned the project of The World upon knowing about 
Galileo’s condemnation by the Holy Office of the Inquisition in 1633. He wrote forthrightly to 
Mersenne about his frustration and about Galileo’s Copernicanism ‘I was told that it had indeed been 
published (Galileo’s Dialogue Concerning Two World Systems) but that all the copies had immediately 
been burnt at Rome, and that Galileo had been convicted and fined. I was so astonished at this that I 
almost decided to burn all my papers or at least to let no one see them. For I could not imagine that 
he —an Italian and, as I understand, in the good graces of the Pope— could have been made a criminal 
for any other reason than that he tried, as he no doubt did, to establish that the earth moves (…) I 
must admit that if the view is false, so too are the entire foundations of my philosophy’ (November 
1633, AT III 270-1/CSMK III 40-1, clarification added). 






Within Descartes’ dualism, an explanation of sensory perception amounts to elucidating the 
interplay between an external object, the brain, and the mind. By means of his mechanistic 
physiology, he elaborated on a complex system of motion correspondences that transmit 
information in the form of the geometrically reduced properties of objects through the nerves 
and up to the internal cavities of the brain, where the pineal gland is located. As a result, a 
structural (or ‘isomorphic’) representation of the object is formed on the surface of the gland. 
From there, the process of sensory perception gets more complicated. How do we get from a 
structural representation in the brain constituted by motion patterns to a sensory idea as we 
know it? Before becoming a puzzle about causation, this scenario poses the problem that 
Descartes identified in the excerpt from the Treatise on Light above. That is to say, there is a 
seemingly inscrutable dissimilarity between the quantitative nature of physical states (states of 
objects and brains) and the qualitative character of the mental states that invariably correspond 
to them in our sensory experience. This is, in a nutshell, what has been called the ‘Problem of 
Dissimilarity’ (hereafter referred as PD). This problem has been identified notably by 
Rozemond (1999) as the refined version of the mind-body problem that Descartes is 
concerned about.  
 
This chapter starts with an exploration of why Descartes considered the (PD) as a troubling 
feature of sensory perception. In §1, I offer an overview of the problem against the background 
of the standard version of Aristotelian-Scholastic natural philosophy that Descartes was 
reacting to. First, I outline his motivations for putting forth a new theory of sensory perception 
that rejects the ontological underpinnings of some of the Scholastics. Second, I sharpen the 
characterisation of the (PD) as a product of Descartes’ micro-corpuscularian mechanism. I 
contrast it with the alleged problem of interaction between the finite substances (mind and 
body), which is the worry that is commonly associated with Cartesian dualism. This section 
is mainly explanatory and it sets the stage for the reading of Descartes’ theory of sensory 
perception that I will develop throughout this dissertation. In §2 I examine Descartes’ 
descriptions of the interaction between brain and mind in sensory perception. This textual 
analysis will be a platform for the rest of the chapters of the dissertation. The purpose of the 
textual analysis is to show that there is in Descartes a manifest effort to elucidate how the 




interaction between brain and mind happens, as well as to ground it on the powers and 
dispositions of the human brain and mind. More specifically, I will concentrate on the claim 
that Descartes indisputably conceived of the interaction between brain and mind in causal 
terms, and that instead of leading him towards several sorts of dualist predicaments, his claims 
and intuitions point to a metaphysically interesting distinction between types of causes. This 
means that this section will (at least partly) counter readings of Descartes’ theory that consider 
that the (PD) forces him to endorse a non-causal model of sensory perception, i.e. a model in 
which external objects (and the brain, by proxy) cause sensory ideas in either a very minimal 
way, or not at all. Finally, the textual analysis will show that Descartes’ terminology allows for 
a rather natural reading of sensory perception in which, as a result of the (PD), the mind is 
active somehow.  
 
Within the structure of the dissertation, the overall aim of this chapter is to locate the starting 
point of the claim that Descartes held a causal model for sensory perception, and that the 
mind has a substantial role in this causal model. This role, I anticipate here, will be that of 
contributing to the representational content of sensory ideas. This hypothesis will be spelled 
out by means of different arguments throughout this work. For now, let us look in finer detail 




 SECTION 1. THE PROBLEM OF DISSIMILARITY 
 
In this section I outline the (PD). I start with a brief preliminary on the framework of 
mechanism and then I focus on characterising the (PD) following the Cartesian texts.  
 
 
1.1. PRELIMINARY: DESCARTES’ THEORY OF MATTER 
 
Descartes’ mechanism as presented in The Treatise on Light sets forth a picture of the 
physical world in which all phenomena can be explained via a theory of matter according to 
which: (1) matter is homogeneous, that is, there are no qualitative distinctions between types 




of matter, (2) matter is inert, that is, there are no forces or activities internal to matter, and 
(3) the properties of natural objects can be explained by appealing to a small range of 
quantifiable characteristics of micro-particles. In the Cartesian theory, these features are the 
shape, size, and motion of micro-corpuscles.2 As other natural philosophers at the rise of the 
seventeenth-century scientific revolution (such as Galileo, Bacon, and Beeckman, amongst 
others), Descartes aimed to replace the Aristotelian-inspired theory of matter of the 
Scholastics. Broadly, their natural philosophy was characterised as empiricism loaded with the 
ontology stemming from hylomorphism. In this regard, a specific target of Descartes’ theory 
of matter was to eliminate an allusion to the Aristotelian-Scholastic notions of ‘substantial 
form’ and ‘real quality’ in scientific explanation.3 
 
In this new picture of the physical world, what the Scholastics had called ‘real qualities’ are 
reduced to quantitative notions. This is a view that appears as early as in the Treatise on Light 
as well as in mature works like the Principles:  
 
If you find it strange that, in explaining these elements, I do not use the qualities 
called ‘heat’, ‘cold’, ‘moistness’, and ‘dryness’, as the Philosophers do, I shall say 
that these qualities appear to me to be themselves in need of explanation (…) not 
only these four qualities but all the others as well, including the forms of 
inanimate bodies, can be explained without the need to suppose anything in their 
matter other than motion, size, shape, and arrangement of its parts (TL AT XI 
                                            
2 For an explication of these three characteristics, see Gaukroger (2000). A more complete outline of 
Descartes’ physics should include not only the characteristics of matter, but also the basic motion 
principles. Gaukroger (2000:384) identifies two of them: the principle of centrifugal force and the 
principle of rectilinear inertia. I won’t elaborate on that because it is a matter of debate within the 
literature on Cartesian physics and it surpasses the aim of the chapter. Cottingham (1993:61), for 
instance, points out that it can be doubted whether everything that Descartes wants to attribute to 
matter can be reduced to the size and behaviour of micro-corpuscles. For example, he conceived of 
motion as a ‘mode of extension’, but it is not clear how exactly motion is derivable in such a way. The 
notion of force runs into similar problems.  
3 Broadly, the notion of substantial form refers to the fundamental group of the essential properties of 
a thing. In this sense, a substantial form is what underlies ‘real qualities’ that are accidental to it. These 
accidents, however, are ‘real’ in the etymological sense of being a proper ‘res’ (Latin for ‘thing’). 
Although Scholasticism included variations from one author to another, we can say, in general, that 
real qualities are independent traits of objects that exist over and above matter. I expand on this issue 
in Chapter Four. There, I offer the details of Descartes’ rejection of real qualities for elucidating his 
views on ideas of secondary qualities.  




25-6/G 18)  
 
I recognise no matter in corporeal things apart from what the geometers call 
quantity (…) i.e. that to which every kind of division, shape and motion is 
applicable (Pr II 64, AT VIII 78/CSM I 274) 
 
The conception of matter as extension4 and its description in terms of its geometrically 
reduced properties (shape, size, position, and motion) constituted one the hallmarks of 
Cartesian physics5  and, consequently, determined physiological descriptions as well. The 
Treatise on Man, the Optics, the Passions, and the Description of the Human Body contain 
remarkably detailed accounts of mechanistic physiology. Within the domain of physiology, 
mechanism allowed Descartes to eliminate the Aristotelian-Scholastic talk about different 
souls in order to account for the bodily functions: ‘to explain these functions, then, it is not 
necessary to conceive of any vegetative or sensitive soul, or any other principle of movement 
or life’ (TL AT XI 202/G 169). Just like substantial forms and real qualities, the vegetative 
and sensitive souls are notions that do not have a place in scientific explanation.6 To be 
precise, Descartes claimed in the Treatise on Light that the terms that the ‘philosophers’ (the 
Scholastics) used for describing qualities seemed ‘in need of explanation’ (AT XI 26/G 18) 
because he considered them obscure, redundant, and, consequently, explanatorily powerless. 
They are obscure because when we speak of these notions we don’t have any specific idea by 
which to conceive them (Hattab 2009:19). To this effect, Descartes writes to Mersenne: ‘my 
principal reason for rejecting these real qualities is that I do not see that the human mind has 
                                            
4 As a paradigmatic definition of matter as extension, let us take the one from the Principles: ‘The 
nature of matter, or body considered in general, consists not in its being something which is hard, or 
heavy, or coloured, or which affects the senses in any way, but simply in its being something which is 
extended in length, breadth and depth’ (Pr II 4 AT VIIIA 42 /CSM I 224). 
5 Note, at the same time, that ‘extension’ does not occupy the place that ‘prime matter’ had in Ancient 
and Medieval theories. What takes the position of ‘substance’ is not ‘extension’, but the particular 
arrangements of shapes, sizes, and motions of micro-particles making up a specific body. As Hattab 
(2009) puts it, ‘Physically speaking matter is not pure extension, but delimited extension, in the sense 
that God has attributed to it the basic divisions, proportions, motions, and relations that give rise to 
the particular shapes and motions we observe. The starting point for physics is thus not extension in 
general but the physical forms of the different types of simple and mixed bodies’ (2009:148). 
6 As Gaukroger points out, ‘the postulation of a hierarchy of souls does not actually explain anything: 
it does nothing more than label the stages at which various differences are considered to emerge, while 
giving the impression that the cause of the difference has been identified’ (2000:385). 




any notion, or particular idea, to conceive them by; so that when we talk about them and 
assert their existence, we are asserting something we do not conceive and do not ourselves 
understand (AT III 649/CSMK III 216). They are redundant, within Descartes’ micro-
corpuscularianism, because what they purport to explain can be captured (more simply) by 
appealing to a small range of properties of micro-particles. There is no need, therefore, to 
posit entities over and above matter. As a result, those Scholastic notions (at least as Descartes 
understands them) cannot explain natural phenomena properly. In fact, the notions 
themselves seem to be in need of explanation. In this scenario, mechanism was meant to 
increase the explanatory power of physical explanations in general and physiological 
explanations in particular. 
 
In the case of sensory perception, the target of Descartes’s criticism was a standard version of 
the Scholastic theory of sensory perception whose appeal to the notion of ‘sensible species’ 
was to be deemed unintelligible within the new quantitative framework of mechanism. More 
particularly, Descartes’ aim was to put forward a theory of sensory perception that eliminated 
the species (‘flitting images’, as he irreverently wrote in the Optics, AT VI 85/CSM I 154)7 by 
introducing a system of motion correspondences transmitted from the object, through the 
nervous system by means of the animal spirits, and up to the brain.8 There, a structural 
representation of the geometrically reduced properties transmitted from the object is formed. 
Importantly, this process gives up the assumption of resemblance between objects, brain 
states, and ideas. In this respect, we can refer to it as a variety of ‘isomorphism’. This is, indeed, 
different to the Scholastic theory that Descartes criticises. According to it, sensory 
representations resemble the properties of objects. When perceiving an object, a sensible 
species of their qualities (a ‘form’ without ‘matter’) is transmitted as a likeness to the perceiver. 
Given the transfer of this type of form from the object to the subject, resemblance was the 
                                            
7 Descartes ridiculed such a doctrine while presenting a mechanistic approach that was meant to 
increase the intelligibility of the process of sensory perception. This is the passage from the Optics: 
‘Hence you will have reason to conclude that there is no need to suppose that something material 
passes from objects to our eyes to make us see colours and light, or even that there is something in the 
objects which resembles the ideas or sensations that we have of them (…) By this means, your mind 
will be delivered from all those little images flitting through the air, called 'intentional forms', which 
so exercise the imagination of the philosophers’ (AT VI 85/CSM I 153-4).  
8 I elaborate on this model in the upcoming sections. 




condition and indication of sensory perception. Descartes devoted most of Discourse Four of 
the Optics to refute such an account by showing its obscurity and lack of explanatory power, 
and he recommends to be careful not to assume, ‘as our philosophers commonly do’, that to 
perceive something means that the soul contemplates images transmitted by the object (AT 
VI 112/CSM I 165). Being aware that his own isomorphism involves a minimal notion of 
resemblance of a quantitative kind (a one-to-one mapping of the object between object and 
brain in terms of its geometrically reduced properties), he qualifies his criticism of the 
Scholastic conception by adding that, in any case, our understanding of the notion of neural 
image is what needs to change: ‘at any rate we must conceive the nature of these images in an 
entirely different manner from that of the philosophers’ (ibid.).9  
 
The interaction between the external object and the brain constitutes the first phase within 
the simultaneous process of sensory perception. This is a purely corporeal phase. Once the 
mind enters the picture, a problem of dissimilarity appears. How can sensory ideas be 




1.2. THE CARTESIAN QUALITATIVE GAP 
 
The problem of dissimilarity (PD) is commonly described as the lack of similarity 
between physical and mental states. On one hand, given the mechanistic, micro-
corpuscularian framework of Descartes’ natural philosophy, the physical state includes (1) the 
arrangements and motions of particles of matter constituting an external object and (2) what 
is transmitted from these to the brain, thus forming an isomorph (i.e. a structural 
representation) of the object. These two instances relate to each other by means of an 
isomorphic relation than can be explained by the principles of Descartes’ mechanism. On the 
                                            
9 The criticism continues with Descartes’ assessment of the wrong direction of fit of the standard 
Scholastic account: ‘For since their conception of the images is confined to the requirement that they 
should resemble the objects they represent, the philosophers cannot possibly show us how the images 
can be formed by the objects, or how they can be received by the external sense organs and transmitted 
by the nerves to the brain (Op AT VI 112/CSM I 165) 




other hand, the mental state is, in this picture, the sensory idea formed in the mind. Note 
that, for Descartes, there is a first instance of varying dissimilarity between the external object 
and the isomorph in the brain (1 and 2). This instance is not problematic because of an 
available mechanistic explanation provided by a micro-corpuscularian theory of matter and 
spelled out in terms of motion correspondences carried though the nerves to the brain by the 
action of the animal spirits. The same one-to-one mapping mechanism, however, is not 
available for the interaction between the brain and the mind. 
 
Within the Cartesian system, the (PD) arises only insofar as sensory perception involves a 
second instance of ‘representation’ that is dissimilar in a different way. The second instance 
constitutes the ‘mental phase’ of the simultaneous process of sensory perception and it refers 
to the translation of the corporeal isomorph into an idea formed in the mind. The idea of the 
external object that is formed in the mind is qualitatively different from its bodily causes. It is 
different from the arrangements and motions of micro-corpuscles of matter constituting the 
external object,10 and it is different from the structural representation formed in the brain that 
corresponds to those. We can say, therefore, that there is a ‘qualitative gap’ between physical 
and mental states (understanding this pair of terms under Descartes’ characterisation as 
presented). We can put forward the following first working characterisation of the problem:  
 
(PD) The lack of similarity between (1) the arrangements and motions of micro-
corpuscles constituting material bodies, together with their transmitted structural 
representation formed in the brain and (2) the idea of the material body that it 
is formed in the mind.  
 
The question, in more contemporary terms, would be how the qualitative character of our 
sensory experiences can be captured by, or can arise from, the categories of physical science 
                                            
10 Descartes also refers to the arrangements and motions of particles constituting objects as the ‘true 
nature’ and the ‘essential nature’ of bodies (see Pr I 73, AT VIIIA 37/CSM I 220 and MM, AT VII 
83/CSM II 57-8). Our sensory perceptions, certainly, do not have a content that reflects the essential 
constitution of bodies. I will delve into this topic in Chapter Four, where I analyse Descartes’ theory 
of sensory perception from the perspective of a distinction between primary and secondary qualities.  




(Cottingham 1993:149).11 Let us now look at the way in which Descartes himself expresses 
this qualitative gap. In the Fourth Discourse of the Optics, in the context of an analogy 
between the structural representation formed in the brain and an engraving, Descartes 
summarises his programme as follows: 
 
Now we must think of the images formed in our brain in just the same way, and 
note that the problem is to know simply how they can enable the soul (donner 
moyen) to have sensory perceptions of all the various qualities of the objects to 
which they correspond - not to know how they can resemble these objects (AT 
VI 113-14/CSM I 166, Latin terms added).  
 
Note that what Descartes describes in this passage as not problematic is the corporeal phase 
of sensory perception: the problem is not whether the structural representation resembles the 
object, of how it might do that (‘the problem is (…) not to know how they can resemble these 
objects’). The problem lies in the mental phase of sensory perception, that is, in determining 
how a structural representation that is of quantitative character can give rise to a qualitative 
outcome in the mind. This is the (PD) in Descartes’ words. 
 
Before going any further, let us recapitulate the process briefly. According to Descartes, the 
micro-corpuscles constituting an external object make actual contact with our senses and 
transmit a pattern of their arrangement and motion. This pattern is transmitted to the brain 
through the nerves by the action of neural information carriers that Descartes called ‘animal 
spirits’. The animal spirits are minuscule physical bodies that operate as information carriers 
through the nervous system. Such information about the external object results in a structural 
representation formed in pineal gland, which is located in the internal part of the brain and 
where, as we shall see, the soul ‘exercises its functions’ (PS II 31, AT XI 351/CSM I 340). 
Insofar as the structural representation is a one-to-one mapping of the arrangement and 
motion of micro-corpuscles constituting a particular material object, it can be explained by 
appealing to the quantitative notions of physical science.  
 
                                            
11 Interestingly, the (PD) presents a worry that is very much alive in contemporary philosophy of mind, 
and that translates well into an early modern version of what has been called the ‘explanatory gap’, 
following the term coined by J. Levine (1983) 




As an example of Descartes’ development of an intricate physiological system of motion 
correspondences, take the following description case of close vision from the Treatise on Man 
(in reference to the figure below, reproduced from the treatise): 
 
Thus, owing to the different ways in which the rays exert pressure on the points 
1, 3, and 5, to trace a figure on the back of the eye corresponding to that of object 
ABC (…) it is evident that the different ways in which the tiny tubes 2, 4, 6, and 
so on are opened by the fibres 12, 34, 56, etc., must also trace it on the inside 
surface of the brain. Suppose next that the spirits that tend to enter each of the 
tiny tubes 2,4,6 and so on do not come indifferently from all points on the 
surface of gland H (the pineal gland) but each from one particular point: those 
coming from point a on this surface for example tend to enter tube 2 (…) and 
so on with others (AT X 175/G 148-9 clarification added) 
 
Figure 1. Physiology of close vision12 
 
However, when our senses get acquainted with these different properties, our mind does not 
get acquainted with the particular arrangement and motion of micro-corpuscles bringing our 
very ideas of them. Instead, we experience an object qualitatively. The content of our sensory 
experience, Descartes insists, does not exist in objects as such. It is clear from the texts that 
‘Cartesian sensations constitute the qualitative character or what-it-is-like-ness, of human 
experience’ (Simmons 1999:347).13 Dissimilarity between the isomorph and the outcome 
                                            
12 This is the drawing that figures in the AT edition of the Works of Descartes. Although probably 
based on Descartes’ own sketches, the illustrations that appear in The World are not his. This one 
appeared in the first edition of the Treatise on Man, published posthumously in 1662, edited by 
Florentino Schuyl.   
13 I am aware that a question might arise here about a distinction between ideas of primary and 
secondary qualities. This topic is addressed in Chapter Four.  




formed in the mind is perplexing because of the absence of an immediately intelligible 
explanation for the fact that ideas of external objects exhibit a representational content that is 
dissimilar to its own cause (Rozemond 1999:450). Descartes restates the (PD) frequently, 
including everyday examples in his exposition of the phenomenon in The Treatise on Light. 
He offers an example involving the sense of hearing and another involving the sense of touch: 
 
A man opens his mouth, moves his tongue, and breathes out: I see nothing in all 
these actions which is in any way similar to the idea of the sound that they can 
cause us to imagine (…) if the sense of hearing transmitted to our thought the 
true image of its object, then instead of making us think of the sound, it would 
have to make us think about the motion of the parts of the air that are vibrating 
against our ears (AT XI 5/G 5). 
 
After having presented a first working definition of the (PD), as well as a general overview of 
the corporeal phase of sensory perception, a question appears: what is it exactly that makes 
dissimilarity a problem for Descartes? As we will see, he did not seem concerned about 
interaction between substances as such, but he insisted on the (PD) frequently. In the 
following section I tackle this question.  
 
 
1.2.1. What makes dissimilarity a problem? 
 
I mentioned above in passing that Descartes’ formulation of the (PD) shares some features 
with the contemporary problem of the explanatory gap in the philosophy of mind. At this 
point, it seems to share at least a consideration about intelligibility. A standard introduction 
to the explanatory gap presumes that even after getting to know everything that science can 
tell us about the conscious mind and the brain, there is something about their relationship 
that still remains inscrutable (Papineau 2010).14 Descartes’ (PD) expresses a similar perplexity, 
in his case arising from the scientific framework of early modern mechanism. He was 
                                            
14 I am aware of the fact that Papineau defends the position that such a standard characterisation of 
the explanatory gap only appears within frameworks that are already dualist (2010). However, to 
engage in the contemporary debate of the formulations of the explanatory gap is beyond the aim of 
this dissertation.   




particularly straightforward about it towards the end of Part Four of the Principles, where he 
dealt with issues regarding mind-body interaction:  
 
But there is no way of understanding how these same attributes (size, shape and 
motion) can produce something else whose nature is quite different from their 
own (…) Not only is all this unintelligible, but we know that the nature of our 
soul is such that different local motions are quite sufficient to produce all the 
sensations in the soul (…) we do not find that anything reaches the brain from 
the external sense organs except for motions of this kind (Pr IV 198, AT VIII 
322/CSM I 285, emphases added)15 
 
Now, I agree with Rozemond’s important point that the (PD) is not reducible to the 
Heterogeneity Problem, that is, the so-called problem of interaction between different finite 
substances: ‘res extensa’ and ‘res cogitans’ (hereafter referred as HP)16. Descartes is certainly 
not concerned in the same way about both of them (Rozemond 1999). In fact, whereas 
Descartes dismissed on several grounds and with more or less vehemence the alleged problem 
of interaction between substances, the (PD) is what commonly drives many of his 
descriptions, examples, and worries concerning sensory perception. As Rozemond puts it: 
‘although he speaks of the dissimilarity between ideas and the bodily states that cause them, 
he is not concerned with the fact that they are ideas. Rather he is concerned with the 
representational content of sensory ideas: such ideas appear to represent things that do not 
resemble their bodily causes’ (1999:450). In order to distance Descartes from the (HP) and 
show the importance of the (PD), Rozemond introduces a helpful analysis of the two 
problems. While the (HP) arises from the difference in nature between the cause (body) and 
the patient (mind), the (PD) points to a difference between cause (particular bodily motions) 
and effect (a particular idea). Whereas Descartes did not regard the first difference as 
problematic, he did worry about the second.  
 
                                            
15 In this passage Descartes displays a rather hopeless tone. It is important to note, at the same time, 
that the effort that he put into discerning this process shows that such perplexities did not stop his 
philosophical endeavour. I will show this in the textual analysis of §2. 
16 To my knowledge, the term ‘Heterogeneity Problem’ was first used in this sense by Richardson in 
‘The “Scandal” of Cartesian Interactionism’ (1982). It has become common terminology in the 
literature since then.  




Crucially, for Descartes the (PD) is not reducible to the (HP) because the former problem 
does not lie in the fact that a mode of body cannot cause a mode of mind. For him, interaction 
between finite substances is a given fact. More technically, he treated it as a ‘primitive notion’, 
a given fact about the constitution of a human being that can’t be scrutinised by reasoning. 
He answered the concerns of Elizabeth of Bohemia about substance interaction by appealing 
to three primitive notions and the way they are grasped. First, the soul is conceived by the 
pure understanding. Second, the body can be understood by the understanding alone, but it 
is better known when the imagination helps the understanding. Finally, the union of soul and 
body is better understood when staying away from philosophy, perhaps as a given common 
sense fact. It seems that Descartes is saying that philosophical reasoning cannot account but 
obscurely for the unquestionable union of the finite substances in the human being.17 As we 
shall see in Section 2, this statement is also reflected in Descartes’ several reactions to the 
charge of endorsing an impossible interaction between different substances. 
 
One could object at this point that Descartes is not being too clear about what exactly makes 
dissimilarity a problem. If it is only a matter of unintelligibility, perhaps he could have resorted 
to the primitive notions again, and claim that the correspondences between structural 
representations and ideas are simply non-analysable in the same way in which the union of 
the mind and body is. Nevertheless, his numerous treatments of the whole process of sensory 
perception show otherwise. He made a clear effort of discerning how the qualitative gap could 
be bridged, even though he did not provide a perfectly unambiguous doctrine (To start with, 
however, we can find in this narrative some terminological patterns that point to Descartes’ 
doctrine, as I shall show in §2).  
 
                                            
17 ‘After having distinguished three sorts of ideas or primitive notions which are each known in a 
particular way and not by a comparison of the one with the other –that is, the notion that we have of 
the soul, that of the body, and the union which is between the soul and the body- I ought to have 
explained the difference between these three sorts of notions (…) The soul is conceived only by the 
pure understanding, the body, that is to say, extension, shapes, and motions, can also be known by the 
understanding alone, but it is much better known by the understanding aided by the imagination; and 
finally, those things which pertain to the union of the soul and the body are known only obscurely by 
the understanding alone, or even by the understanding aided by the imagination; but they are known 
very clearly by the senses. From which it follows that those who never philosophize and who use only 
their senses do not doubt in the least that the soul moves the body and that the body acts on the soul…’ 
(AT III 691-692/S 69). 




Now, these considerations might prompt the conclusion that for Descartes, the (PD) arises 
primarily for a reason other than unintelligibility. Rozemond (1999) has suggested —
correctly, I believe— that it has to do with the issue of arbitrariness. The point is that what 
makes the explanatory gap a Cartesian problem is the fact that the elusive character of the 
translation from the isomorph to the idea gives to the production of the representational 
content of sensory ideas an air of arbitrariness. Arbitrariness is simply an undesirable feature 
in a world in which natural mechanisms exhibit perfect nomological behaviour and, most 
importantly, in a world that is the creation of an all-powerful, omniscient, and benevolent 
God. I believe, as a consequence, that Descartes’ concern about the (PD) is incidentally about 
unintelligibility and primarily about arbitrariness. 
 
Again, for Descartes it is a given that the brain acts on the mind. Interaction is a fact. There 
is simply, no other way of being human. However, the reductionist mechanistic explanation 
that linked the two modes of extension is not available for connecting the structural 
representation formed in the brain with the idea that, as a matter of fact, is formed in the 
mind as a simultaneous outcome. We are left with sets of correspondences between isomorphs 
and ideas that seem arbitrary even though they exhibit nomological regularity. Why does a 
specific arrangement and motions of micro-corpuscles consistently gives rise to, for instance, 
my seeing an apple as round or green, or as tasting crisp? Again, in Descartes own words ‘if 
the sense of hearing transmitted to our thought the true image of its object, then instead of 
making us think of the sound, it would have to make us think about the motion of the parts 
of the air that are vibrating against our ears’ (AT XI 5/G 4). At this point we can put forward 
the following qualified characterisation of the (PD): 
 
(PD)* The lack of similarity between (1) the arrangements and motions of micro-
corpuscles constituting material bodies, together with their transmitted structural 
representation formed in the brain and (2) the idea of the material body that it 
is formed in the mind. This is problematic because the fact that the 
representational content exhibited by a sensory idea does not resemble the cause 
of the idea gives to the process of sensory perception an air of arbitrariness.  
 
Descartes made a patent effort in emphasising the law-like behaviour of the interaction 
between brain and mind. Given the (PD), the difficult part will be to defend an account (as I 
think Descartes attempted to do) that manages to avoid two extremes. The first is a 




mechanisation of the mind, that is, an explanation of mental processes by appealing only to 
the properties of matter. On the other hand, given the qualitative gap between physical and 
mental states, Descartes’ account should clarify how this gap is bridged without introducing 
occasionalism (at least, strong occasionalism à la Malebranche).18 The reason for this view is 
that as far as Descartes’ ontology goes, and given his depictions of the process of sensory 
perception (that I present in more detail in the following section), it is clear that he envisaged 
it as a process grounded on the powers of the human brain and the human mind while 
preserving the different essential attributes of each substance. Furthermore, Descartes seems 
to generally identify the relation between physical and mental states (sensory perceptions) as 
representational, but I think that he is at pains to describe exactly how this happens.19 There 
is ultimately an appeal to God’s ordination and benevolent nature, but to reduce to that all 
Descartes has to say about the interaction between brain and mind in sensory perception 
would be uncharitable, and it would place him closer to a version of occasionalism that I do 
not think he wanted to endorse.  
 
At any rate, a close analysis of the texts will show whether he succeeded in these endeavours. 
To start with, a good part of Descartes’ (sometimes rather perplexing) claims, as well as his 
choice of words can be explained by placing the (PD) at the background. It is both a 
                                            
18 Briefly, strong occasionalism is a view about causation in which what explains the concurrence of 
certain physical states with certain mental states is the causal activity of God. In Malebranchian 
occasionalism, a physical state is an ‘occasion’ for God to exert ‘his’ own causal efficacy. I explore a few 
more details of occasionalism in Chapter Two, in the context of defending a causal-semantic model 
against rival causal theories (§4.2). 
19  There is, of course, the further question of what makes, for Descartes, an idea a representation in 
the first place. Although I do not engage with this issue here, I am aware that several answers are 
available in the literature. Most recently, De Rosa (2010) has defended a descriptivist-causal account, 
especially in dialogue with Simmons’ teleofunctional account (2003, 1999). For the purposes of this 
chapter, however, it will be sufficient to point out that the texts effectively show Descartes as conceiving 
the relation in terms of representation. In this sense, I agree with De Rosa in that a non-
representationalist interpretation is untenable (2010:5). Textual evidence appears succinctly as early as 
in the Rules: ‘the thing itself which this idea is to represent should be displayed to the external senses’ 
(AT X 417/CSM I 43/, together with the rest of Rule 12). It becomes more sophisticated in the Optics 
(see, for instance AT VI 113/CSM I 165, for an analogy with the representational character of an 
engraving), the Principles (for instance Part I 17 & 68 ‘…one idea represents one thing and another 
represents another…), and the Passions (I 43, 47, AT XI 361, 365/CSM I 344, 346 ‘...the pores of the 
brain whose opening enables the thing to be represented’). The World also contains claims about 
representation that will be dealt with in Chapter Two because of their connection with the issue of 
natural signs.  




phenomenon that he aims to capture in describing the process of sensory perception, as well 
as a pressing problem for him to solve. I explore the textual grounds for this claim in the next 
section. 
 
In this section, I have sharpened the definition of the Cartesian problem of dissimilarity 
between physical and mental states (PD). After presenting a short overview of his theory of 
matter in general, and his mechanistic physiology in particular, I have claimed that the (PD) 
is not equivalent to the (alleged) problem of interaction between the finite substances. The 
pressing issue for Descartes is to determine the elusive workings of the (guaranteed) interplay 
between the three elements: the external object, the structural representation in the brain, and 
the sensory idea. Following Rozemond’s reasoning (1999), I have identified the threat of 
arbitrariness as Descartes’ main worry regarding the phenomenon of dissimilarity. Taking all 
these points into consideration, in the next section I examine Descartes’ descriptions of brain-
mind interaction in sensory perception. The objective of this textual analysis is to show that 
Descartes understood interaction between brain and mind in causal terms. My contribution 
will be to single out in Descartes’ narrative a carefully established balance between the appeal 




 SECTION 2. A CAUSAL NARRATIVE FOR BRAIN-MIND INTERACTION 
 
In this section, I will focus more narrowly on the passages in which Descartes attempts 
to describe the brain-mind stage of sensory perception. This exegesis will serve three purposes. 
(1) First, I intend to counter a few interpretations in the literature that, for different reasons, 
regard the interaction between brain and mind as a non-causal one (for example, Yolton 1984, 
1996, 2000, Broughton 1986, Gorham 2000). (2) Second, I provide an insight into the 
structure of Descartes’ narrative so as to discover in it a terminological balance between the 
way of depicting efficient and non-efficient causation. I will defend the claim that Descartes 
contemplated the involvement of a peculiar type of cause for brain-mind interaction in sensory 
perception. The texts show Descartes as concerned with the type of cause, and not with the 




absence of it. (3), Third, this textual analysis will prepare the basic grounds for the semantic 
and causal interpretation that I will develop in Chapter Two.  
 
We have already seen that, if we are to break down the simultaneous process of sensory 
perception as Descartes conceived it, the first phase (the physical one) involves micro-
corpuscles of matter impacting on the relevant sense organ, where a pattern of these motions 
is formed and carried through the nerves and to the brain by means of the animal spirits. The 
outcome of the physical process is a structural representation (or isomorph) of the object. The 
second phase of the process (where the mind enters the picture) involves the pineal gland as 
the particular place in the brain where the pattern of the external object is ready for the 
‘consideration’ of the mind, although that is, indeed, a rather obscure notion. The following 
passage is from the Treatise on Man. Note that, whereas Descartes explains the first phase by 
means of a chain of efficient causes activated by actual physical contact, I think that he is 
carefully vague in describing the production of the idea in the mind: 
 
Only these (the structural representations located in the pineal gland) should be 
taken as the forms or images which, when united to this machine, the rational 
soul will consider directly when it imagines some object or senses it (AT XI 176-
7/G 149, clarification added) 
 
Before going any further, I add here a terminological caveat about the notion of ‘efficient 
cause’ that will serve not only for this section, but for the rest of the dissertation. By efficient 
cause, I refer here to causation by contact. That is to say, efficient causation is the variety of 
causation that does all the work in a mechanistic picture of the natural world. In opposition 
to an Aristotelian natural philosophy, Descartes’ mechanism rules out final causes for 
explaining the natural world. The ‘aimless efficient causation’ of impact is necessary and 
sufficient for accounting for all physical phenomena (Hatfield 1992:260). I will use the notion 
in this sense, which is how it is commonly employed in the Cartesian scholarship.  
 




Before starting the textual analysis of Descartes’ descriptions of sensory perception, I offer 
here a short assessment of a few aspects of Yolton’s view as a token example of a non-causal 
reading of the interaction between brain and mind in sensory perception.20  
 
Yolton rightly identifies the fact that body-to-mind interaction encompasses two interactions 
of a different kind: the purely physical interaction between external bodies and the perceiver’s 
body, and the interaction that happens when the external bodies affect the mind by means of 
‘disturbances in the brain’ (2000:577). Given Descartes’ appeal to certain signs instituted by 
nature ‘to make us have the sensation of light’ (AT XI 4/G 4), Yolton offers an insightful 
conceptualisation according to which the structural representation plays a double role: it is a 
physical (neural) event produced by the external object, and it is also a sign of the external 
object in relation to the mind, in the sense of producing (somehow) cognitive events in the 
mind. I believe that such a conceptualisation is a correct one, but from there Yolton goes on 
to conclude that the two instances of interaction are different in that one is causal (the purely 
physical one) and the other is semantic and thus non-causal (the brain-mind stage of the 
process). Yolton seems to assume that the only causation model that there is, or (more 
charitably) the only causation model that Descartes could have considered, is the one provided 
by the mechanistic picture of efficient causes. That leads him to a clear-cut distinction between 
‘signifying and causing’ (2000:579). He regards it as having more explanatory power than a 
distinction between types of causes: ‘mind and cognition are thus connected with the world, 
but the connection is precisely that which is proper to cognition: significatory, not 
resemblance or causal’ (1984:30). The main problem with Yolton’s reading is that there aren’t 
any a priori reasons for considering a semantic relation as non-causal. Rather, signification 
could perhaps be a form of causation.  
 
It is particularly interesting to note that the way in which Yolton outlines how the external 
object relates to the brain state and at the same time (and in a different way) to the 
correspondent idea formed in the mind, mirrors quite well one way in which Descartes 
                                            
20 The consideration of Yolton’s view is cursory here because it will appear again in Chapter Two, given 
that he endorses a semantic reading of sensory perception. I will briefly present the non-causal 
interpretation of Gorham (2000) in Chapter Three because of its bearing to the issue of the innateness 
of all ideas. 




described a distinction between types of causes in the Comments. Now, even if vague in some 
respects, it seems that Descartes contemplated a model for distinguishing how an event can 
causally relate to another. An event can be a ‘proximate and primary’ cause (A is the sufficient 
condition for B to exist) or a ‘remote and accidental’ one (A is the remote cause of E by 
inciting B to proximately cause E). Crucially, both relations are labelled as ‘causes’: 
 
…something can be said to derive its being from something else for two different 
reasons: either the other thing is its proximate and primary cause, without which 
it cannot exist, or it is a remote and merely accidental cause, which gives the 
primary cause occasion to produce its effect at one moment rather than another 
(AT VIIIB 360/CSM I 305, emphases added) 
 
In what follows, I will provide textual grounds for the claim that, for Descartes, the brain 
states resulting from sensory perception operate as causes for the production of the 
correspondent adventitious idea in the mind. I will first briefly turn my attention to the 
passages in which Descartes deals with the general notion of interaction between finite 
substances (irrespective of whether this is body-to-body or body-to-mind). By showing that 
Descartes regarded substance interaction as an intelligible causal relation in the following 
preliminary section, I will reinforce the main claim that, being attentive to Descartes’ use of 
the terminology, one cannot but defend a view in which brain states relate causally to the 
mind during sensory perception.  
 
 
2.1. PRELIMINARY: SUBSTANCE INTERACTION AS AN  
 INTELLIGIBLE CAUSAL RELATION 
 
First of all, some of the crucial passages that I take as favouring a causal reading of brain-
mind interaction target the problem of heterogeneity (PH). These passages involve the general 
notion of interaction between finite substances in general, of which the interaction between 
brain and mind constitutes only one species. Consequently, some of these passages on their 
own are not decisive for advancing a causal reading of brain-mind interaction, but they 
provide the preliminary for the interpretation to follow, insofar as they reveal Descartes as 
conceiving substance interaction as a non-problematic feature of his system and, presumably, 




as a causal transaction of a peculiar kind. This kind is one that differs fundamentally from the 
causal transaction operating in interaction between bodies (i.e. efficient causation). 
 
For describing a non-efficient causal transaction, Descartes tends to employ words with strong 
connotations of activity, such as ‘power’ or ‘action’. Again, these textual occurrences appear 
mainly in his responses to the alleged problem of heterogeneity — a challenge notably raised 
by Gassendi in 1641 and by Elizabeth in 1643. For instance, in his objections to Meditation 
Six, Gassendi charges Descartes with inconsistency given his simultaneous commitment to 
the existence of two intrinsically different finite substances (mind and body) and to 
interactionism at the same time (the view that body and mind causally influence each other 
somehow): 
 
You still have to explain how that 'joining and, as it were, intermingling' or 
'confusion' can apply to you if you are incorporeal, unextended and indivisible 
(…) How can something corporeal take hold of something incorporeal so as to 
keep it joined to itself? And how can the incorporeal grasp the corporeal to keep 
it reciprocally bound to itself, if it has nothing at all to enable it to grasp or be 
grasped? (AT VII 343-4/CSM II 328-9/) 
 
Elizabeth expressed the same concern with a more detailed description of the causal 
requirements for interaction to obtain. As well as Gassendi’s, her criticism reveals a 
commitment to a purely mechanistic model of causation i.e. one in which efficient causes 
bring about their effects by contact and ultimately by virtue of a series of physical micro-
events. Within such a framework, mind-to-body and body-to-mind causal transactions appear 
to be impossible given the immateriality of the mind: 
 
So I ask you please to tell me how the soul of a human being (it being only a 
thinking substance) can determine the bodily spirits and so bring about voluntary 
actions. For it seems that all determination of movement is made either by the 
impulsion of the thing moved, or it is pushed either by that which moves it or 
else by the particular qualities and shape of the surface of the latter. Physical 
contact is required for the first two conditions, extension for the third. You 
entirely exclude the one from the notion that you have of the soul, and the other 
appears to me incompatible with an immaterial thing (AT III 661/ S.62) 
 




In his responses to these criticisms, Descartes highlights what he takes to be a 
misunderstanding concerning the causation model at stake. Essentially, he considers that 
those charging him with this sort of inconsistencies erroneously assume the interaction 
between mind and body involves the same type of cause as interaction between bodies. His 
reply to Gassendi is rather dismissive and consists mainly of a denial of the problem with 
emphasis on the fact that mind and body interaction should not be assimilated to interaction 
between bodies : ‘Thus when you try to compare the intermingling of mind and body with 
the intermingling of two bodies, it is enough for me to reply that we should not set up any 
comparison between such things’ (Sixth Set of Objections, AT VII 390/CSM II 266).  
 
If we are to defend a different, but still causal, story for brain-mind interaction, however, we 
should find Descartes employing a more straightforward causal language, while being more 
precise in how exactly the two types of causal interaction differ. Crucially, he described the 
interaction in terms of ‘powers’ (force in the original French) in in his response to Elizabeth, 
although only mentioning the case of mind-to-body interaction: 
 
Thus I believe that we have heretofore confused the notion of power with which 
the soul acts on the body with the power one body has to act on another (AT III 
667/S.66) 
 
The issue reappears in a letter to Clerselier included as an appendix in the Fifth Replies. This 
time he characterises the relation in terms of ‘action’ and, crucially, making no distinction in 
the treatment of the two directions of interaction:  
 
…the whole problem contained in such questions arises simply from a 
supposition that is false and cannot in any way be proved, namely that, if the 
soul and the body are two substances whose nature is different, this prevents them 
from being able to act on each other. (AT IX 213/CSM II 275, emphasis added). 
 
Descartes then goes on to make an insightful point about the intelligibility of interaction 
between substances stemming from his ontology. Namely, that there is a more serious threat 
to intelligibility in acknowledging the existence of ‘real qualities’ or ‘accidents’ like heat or 
weight as acting on bodies, since that presupposes a more fundamental difference between the 
two entities involved in interaction. This fundamental difference is, presumably, an 




ontological asymmetry. While mind-body interaction postulates interaction amongst entities 
in the same ontological rank (finite substance), the action of a quality like heat on a body 
postulates an asymmetrical causal transaction between an accident and a substance (Phemister 
2011:88).21  
 
So much for Descartes’ remarks about the causal description of substance interaction in 
general. These passages have just provided us with the framework for a more philosophically 
interesting exegesis concerning a causal reading of brain-mind interaction in particular. Let us 
turn now to the passages in which Descartes deals specifically with this relation, which is the 
process of sensory perception. In what follows, I will show that, while not being explicit about 
the particular type of cause at stake, Descartes’ narrative when describing the process of 
sensory perception reveals a delicate balance between the dismissal of efficient causation and 
the evoking of other type of genuine causal powers. These powers emerge from the very 
configuration of the brain and the mind.  
 
 
2.2. A DELICATE EQUILIBRIUM: THE CAUSAL NARRATIVE OF  
 BRAIN-MIND INTERACTION 
 
Causal language is prevalent when Descartes is describing brain-mind interaction, and 
in order to elucidate the metaphysical import of his choice of words, we have to reconstruct 
the process of sensory perception from the beginning. That is, we have to start with the 
corporeal phase involving body-to-body interaction, and then move on to brain-mind 
interaction while assessing whether a textual pattern can be identified for each of them. 
 
                                            
21  This reasoning by Descartes relies here implicitly on one of the causal requirements that he 
introduces elsewhere. Namely, there must be at least as much formal reality in the cause as it is in the 
effect (‘…that what is more perfect –that is, contains in itself more reality- cannot arise from what is 
less perfect’ MM AT VII 40/CSM II 28). Given that accidents have less formal reality (less ontological 
status) than substances, their interaction is regarded as problematic: ‘And yet, those who admit the 
existence of real accidents like heat, weight and so on, have no doubt that these accidents can act on 
the body; but there is much more of a difference between them and it, i.e. between accidents and a 
substance, than there is between two substances.’ (ibid. 213/275). 




Descartes’ most detailed descriptions of (especially the corporeal phase of) the process of 
sensory perception are found in the Treatise on Man, and the Optics. First of all, Descartes 
presents there with great detail the first phase of sensory perception, that is, his mechanistic 
physiology, a description of the human body in which all biological processes are explained, 
as if the body were a machine, by appealing to the arrangement of the parts of the body.22 
Again, the mechanistic approach to scientific explanation applied to the human body allowed 
Descartes to eliminate the appeal to unintelligible principles or powers that weren’t reducible 
to law-like interactions between the physical parts of bodies and ultimately traceable to the 
interactions amongst the micro-particles constituting matter. 
 
In the case of human beings, however, a mind or soul will be present as well in order to explain 
cognition, which encompasses the phenomena of thought and language. For Descartes, 
cognition marks the difference between human and non-human animals.23 That is to say, the 
presence of a mind or soul joined to the ‘machine’ of the body cannot be assimilated to what 
Descartes regarded as the non-informative Scholastic account of the different souls, because 
the functions attributed to those can be, in fact, explained by the properties of matter. 
However, the attribute of thought and its different modes escape mechanistic explanations. 
This is where complexities begin.  
 
These complexities are reflected in the fact that, in order to describe the brain-mind stage of 
the process of sensory perception, Descartes employs a plethora of expressions that, at least in 
some cases, seem to serve the purpose of circumventing the core of brain-mind interaction. 
The first step in the exercise of disentangling Descartes’ description of brain-mind interaction 
                                            
22 ‘These functions (digestion of food, beating of the heart and the arteries, the nourishment and 
growth of the bodily parts, respiration, waking and sleeping, the reception of lights, sounds, etc.) follow 
in this machine from simply from the disposition of the organs as wholly naturally as the movements 
of a clock or other automaton follow from the disposition of its counterweights and wheels. To explain 
these functions, then it is not necessary to conceive of any vegetative or sensitive soul’ (TM, AT XI 
202/G 169, clarification added). 
23 For Descartes, the kind of language that non-human animals can develop is without ‘reference’ (AT 
III 574-5/CSMK III 303), and the difference between human beings and automata is that the latter 
only use ‘word or sign by chance (par hasard) (AT III 40/CSMK III 99). He also develops this point 
at more length in the Discourse on the Method (AT VI 56-7/CSM 140). The topic of language will be 
treated in Chapter Two, in the context of a comparison between conventional and natural signs.  




is to show that he conceived it as a causal relation, and he displayed a noticeable terminological 
effort in describing brain-mind interaction so as to preserve a rather fragile equilibrium 
between the evoking of causal activity and the dismissal of efficient causation.  
 
In the Treatise on Man, the Optics, the Principles, and the Passions, Descartes describes brain-
mind interaction with terms such as ‘make the soul sense’ (faire sentir, TM, AT XI 146,176, 
similarly in Op AT VI 131), ‘affect the soul’ (afficiunt, Pr IV 189 AT VIIIA 316), ‘give means 
to the soul’ (donner moyen, TM AT XI 159 and Op VI 113), and ‘give occasion to the soul’ 
(donner occasion, TM AT XI 144, 151, 176). In all cases, what occurs in the soul as a 
consequence of brain activity is an idea of an external object. More precisely, expressions such 
as ‘affect’, ‘give means’, and ‘give occasion’ suggest that the soul does something as a result of 
brain activity. That something amounts to forming an idea of an external object. To begin 
with, some of these expressions exhibit an air of periphrasis that did not occur in Descartes’ 
forthright descriptions of purely physiological processes. By using different expressions, 
Descartes seems to avoid a commitment to a concrete production process. And by frequently 
using multiple-word expressions, he seems to be reporting what happens superficially in the 
brain-mind relation, instead of identifying the causation model by virtue of which it happens. 
As I sketched before, I think that the types of expressions that Descartes uses are a reflection 
of some uncertainties concerning the core of brain-mind interaction. This does not entail, 
however, that he did not have a picture for it at all. I do think that the expressions that he 
uses point to several features that he considered as key to sensory perception.  
 
There is a particularly interesting passage in Part IV of the Principles, constituting the title 
and opening sentence of Principle 197, in which the brain-mind transaction is defined in 
terms of ‘excite’ and ‘stimulate’: 
 
The nature of the mind is such that various sensations can be excited in it simply 
by motions in the body (…) the mere occurrence of certain motions in the body 
can stimulate it to have all manner of thoughts which have no likeness to the 
movements in question (AT VIIIA 320, CSM I 284, emphases added) 
 
It is worth noticing that for the first sentence of the passage, the CSM translation reads 
‘various sensations can be produced’, whereas Descartes uses the Latin verb ‘excitari’. I have 




thus altered the English translation, given that there is a closer word, etymologically speaking 
(the English verb ‘excite’). Most importantly, this word might capture a type of relation 
between the brain and the mind that is closer to stimulation than to efficient causation. At 
the same time, it is difficult to conceive of ‘stimulate’ and ‘excite’ in non-causal terms. We 
can say that to stimulate something is to prompt its occurrence, and to stimulate someone is 
to encourage a certain activity on their part. I think that, in Descartes’ case, such verbs seem 
to suggest a productive activity that is neither expressed in the physical terms belonging to 
efficient causation nor described straightforwardly as the absence of a cause.  
 
This is an example of what I take to be the delicate balance that Descartes maintains in the 
narrative for two purposes. (1) First, the narrative is intended at avoiding physical terms that 
could evoke some sort of actual contact between (the material) brain and (the immaterial) 
mind. (2) The narrative is constructed as to capture a cause of a different sort that acts in an 
equally law-like manner. For accomplishing this, Descartes frequently changes the 
terminology that refers to brain-mind interaction. This does not mean, however, that his 
choice of words is somewhat erratic. 
 
The term ‘excite’ in restated a few sentences ahead in the same passage of the Principles for the 
same purpose: ‘the sensation of pain in excited is us merely by the local motion of some parts 
of our body in contact with another body’ (ibid. 321/284).24 Again, ‘motion’ and ‘contact’ —
as hallmarks of efficient causation— are used in the passage for characterising the instances of 
interaction between bodies. For the instance of interaction between the brain and the mind, 
however, ‘excite’ seems to be more pertinent. One can detect here, once more, the 
terminological balance in the description of the two types of interaction as well as Descartes’ 
attempt to convey a certain activity (excitation) that can hardly be read along occasionalist 
lines. I do believe that the most natural reading of a model for sensory perception that involves 
                                            
24 The original reads: ‘Atque ideo, cum clare videamus, doloris sensum in nobis excitari ab eo solo, 
quod aliquæ corporis nostri partes contactu alicujus alterius corporis localiter moveantur’ (emphasis 
added) 




terms such as ‘excite’ and ‘stimulate’ is one that aims at grounding causal activity in the very 
configuration and causal powers of the brain and the mind.25  
 
The terminological balance in Descartes’ narrative can be also seen in a crucial passage from 
the Treatise on Man, in which he succinctly outlined interaction as follows: 
 
The movement that they (the tiny fibres that make up the marrow of the nerves) 
will then cause in the brain, whose location must remain the same, will give 
occasion to the soul to have the sensation of pain (AT X 144/G 119, clarification 
and emphasis added) 
 
Once more, it is important to note that I have altered Gaukroger’s translation, which reads 
‘will cause the soul to have the sensation of pain’. In the original French, the word employed 
is ‘occasion’. It is important to notice Descartes’ change of narrative in the context of this 
passage. He is, again, describing a single process (sensation) with the two instances of different 
interaction that I have outlined in several places of this chapter: one is from body to body 
(from the external object to the brain), and the other is from body to mind. Note in the 
passage that for the first instance he uses the French verb ‘causer’ (‘ils causeront un mouvement 
dans le cerveau’) in order to capture the operation of efficient causes as conceived by 
mechanistic explanations. For the second one, however, he uses a more vague expression 
(‘donner occasion’) presumably pointing to a different sort of causal transaction.26   
 
The change of terminology is significant for Descartes’ concern about the types of causes and 
for his effort in presenting sensory perception as an intelligible and peculiar causal transaction 
between brain and mind that happens in a law-like way. It is worth restating, at the same 
time, that while he makes that terminological distinction in the type of operation, he does not 
describe it as the absence or denial of a cause. To my knowledge, nowhere in the texts we find 
such an explicit statement.  
 
                                            
25 I remind the reader that this is, at this point, a mere textual hypothesis. The materials for justifying 
this position will be given in the following chapters.  
26 The original reads: ‘donnera occasion à l'âme, à qui il importe que le lieu de sa demeure se conserve, 
d'avoir le sentiment de la douleur’ (AT X 144) 




At this point, it could be objected to this reading that Descartes uses once the word ‘causer’ 
in the Treatise on Man: 
 
For it is easy to understand that tube 2 (one of the tiny fibres constituting the 
optic nerve), for example, will be opened differently as the action causing it 
differs, whether this action is that causing sensory perception of the colour red, 
or of pleasure, or the action that I said causes sensory perception of the colour 
white, or of pain… (AT XI 176/G 149, clarification added) 
 
Although it is certainly used for characterising sensory perception, the context is to some 
degree more general. Descartes is not referring precisely or exclusively to the point of brain-
mind transaction as in the other passages, but rather he seems to be outlining the general 
theory of sensory perception conceived as a causal chain that begins in the ‘action’ of an 
external object. When Descartes mentions ‘action’ in the passage, he is referring to the 
arrangement of micro-corpuscles of matter constituting the external object, which sets off the 
physiological process involved in sensory perception. Strictly speaking, it is not this ‘action’ 
of the external object, but rather the brain motions occurring in a particular place in the brain 
(the pineal gland) that ‘makes the soul sense’, that ‘gives occasion’ or ‘means to the soul’, and 
that ‘affects the soul’. I take this passage to be an endorsement of a causal theory of sensory 
perception that encompasses a series of efficient causes and a brain-mind transaction that is 
frequently described by Descartes with verbs that carry significant connotations of causal 
activity. The usage of ‘excite’ and ‘stimulate’ for portraying the way in which the brain acts 
upon the mind are particularly noteworthy and seem to be in line with the connotations of a 
causal-semantic model for sensory perception, as I will explore in Chapter Two. 
 
 
2.2.1. Initial implications of a causal reading 
 
After having introduced Descartes ‘terminological equilibrium’, I sketch here a few 
initial implications of this textual analysis. These implications are, at this point, tentative. 
They will be appropriately argued for in subsequent chapters.  
 




To begin with, rather than offering many unfinished and even contrary models, I read 
Descartes as presenting a complex causation process involving a chain of efficient causes that 
explain interaction between bodies and another type of cause that is described in terms of 
peculiar action (stimulation, excitation) and exhibits law-like stability. Also, as I see it, 
Descartes displays an effort in constructing a narrative that departs from strong occasionalism. 
The choice of words reveals he is attempting to ground sensory perception on the 
configuration and powers of the human brain and the human mind. When Descartes employs 
expressions with the word ‘occasion’ in them, it is clear that the agent that is triggered to act 
is not God, but the perceiver’s mind.27 Take, for example, the following passage from the 
Treatise on Man, where he singles out the structural representation of the external object (the 
‘figure’ in the passage) as that which gives the soul occasion to ‘sense’ different qualities. There 
is no allusion to any other causal agent:  
 
By figure I mean not only things that somehow represent the position of the 
edges and surfaces of objects, but also anything which, as I said above, can give 
the soul occasion to sense movement, size, distance, colours, sounds, smells, and 
other such qualities (AT X 176/G 149 emphasis added) 
 
Similar passages are found in the Optics (‘occasion the soul to have sensory perception of just 
as many qualities in these bodies…’ AT VI 114/CSM I 66) and in the Comments on a Certain 
Broadsheet, where the causal efficacy of the mind transpires rather clearly. The external objects, 
he writes: 
 
…transmit something which, at exactly that moment, gives the mind occasion 
to form these ideas by means of the faculty innate to it (AT VIIIB 359/CSM I 
304) 
 
                                            
27 For a compelling rejection of an occasionalist reading of Descartes, see Nadler (1994). He reads 
Descartes as endorsing a species of occasionalism that he calls ‘occasional causation’, in which the agent 
that is triggered to act is a finite substance (the mind) instead of the infinite one (God). This reading 
certainly fits with Descartes’ use of ‘occasion’, but I think that it downplays Descartes’ effort for 
providing a description of what actually happens when the mind perceives/senses as a result of its 
interaction with a particular brain state. I elaborate on this view in Chapter Two.  




I do not elaborate here on a specific causal model. For the textual purposes of this section, it 
has been sufficient to point out that the texts provide a picture of sensory perception in which 
the human brain and mind appear to be endowed with the configuration for a self-sufficient 
production of sensory ideas. In this regard, and additional support, consider the following 
extract from the Treatise on Man.  There, Descartes seems to be suggesting that God already 
creates the brain and the mind with the necessary equipment (‘will make its nature’) for being 
able to sense: 
 
When God unites a rational soul to this machine, as I intend to explain later on, 
He will place its principal seat in the brain and will make its nature such that the 
soul will have different sensations depending on the different ways in which the 
nerves open the entrances to the pores in the internal surface of the brain (AT X 
143/G 119, emphasis added) 
 
Certainly, God’s ordination ultimately enters the picture, but not for ensuring the actual 
production process of sensory ideas. Rather, God’s role is located in a more fundamental 
plane. God appears to give to correspondences between physical and mental states their 
necessary nature.28 I believe that in Descartes’ descriptions of sensory perception one can read 
an attempt to postpone the appeal to God’s ordination as long as possible in order to 
emphasise the self-sufficiency of the production of sensory ideas. God makes an appearance 
in Descartes’ model of sensory perception for dealing with the threat of arbitrariness. To this 
effect, in the Optics and the Passions, Descartes resorts to the notion of the ‘ordination of 
nature’ for explaining the occurrence of sensory perception (Op AT VI 130/CSM I 167, 
similarly in PS I 36, AT XI 357/CSM I 342). 
 
All in all, I think it is difficult to defend the claim that the brain-mind transaction in sensory 
perception amounts to a denial of causation. It is being described as stimulation, excitation, 
sign giving, occasioning, acting, and making, and an explicit denial of causation is nowhere 
to be found in the texts. Note that the importance of the absence of such denial is also assisted 
by the passages advanced in the preliminary section about substance interaction as a whole, 
                                            
28 I focus on this issue in Chapter Two, in the context of analysing Descartes’ argument for natural 
signs.  




where we saw a Descartes concerned about the different workings of two processes (body-




 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 In this first chapter, I have provided a textual platform for a causal reading of sensory 
perception that leaves some room for the causal efficacy of the mind. I started by presenting 
the problem of dissimilarity between physical and mental states as the refined version of the 
mind-body problem that Descartes is concerned about. Dissimilarity between the physical 
causes and the representational content of sensory ideas is precisely Descartes’ primary 
motivation for contemplating a different type of causation for brain-mind interaction.  
 
To this effect, I have offered evidence of a terminological equilibrium in Descartes’ depictions 
of brain-mind interaction that sometimes has been overlooked in English translations of his 
works. It cannot be denied that Descartes did not employ the same terminology throughout. 
At the same time, however, this is not equivalent to the claim that his choice of terms is erratic 
or that it shows little more than hesitation about the theory of sensory perception. Finally, I 
have singled out a few initial implications of a reading of sensory perception along the lines 
of a peculiar, non-efficient type of cause. Two stand out amongst them. The first is Descartes’ 
patent effort in describing sensory perception as a self-sufficient process grounded on the 
powers of the human brain and the human brain. The second is the possibility of the causal 
activity of the mind in sensory perception. Considering these points, I move on to Chapter 
Two, where I will contend that this peculiar cause, that Descartes suggests, is better 
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 0. INTRODUCTION 
 
In Chapter 1, we looked at an overarching characterisation of the interaction between 
the brain and the mind that constitutes sensory perception. According to this 
characterisation, the action of the brain upon the mind can be described as a causal 
transaction of a peculiar kind. This means that, for Descartes, the cause operating in brain-
mind interaction, while being equally genuine, is not of the same type as the efficient cause 
operating in interactions between bodies. I have defended the position that the careful 
terminology that Descartes employs for describing brain-mind interaction does not indicate 
a denial of genuine causal efficacy, but it rather points to a complex model of sensory 
perception in which the mind has a significant role. I have also identified the Problem of 
Dissimilarity (PD) as the key motivation for the formulation of this model. Taking these 
points into consideration, now it is time to supply the materials for furnishing this 
conceptual frame. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to put forward a model for sensory perception that has received 
the name of ‘semantic’ or ‘linguistic’ (Marion 1981, Yolton 1984, 2000, Gaukroger 1995, 




2002, Chignell 2009)1. I argue for the claim that, despite the fact that Descartes did not 
offer a comprehensive, unequivocal treatment of a single theory of sensory perception, the 
semantic model is his favoured solution to the (PD), as well as the closest that he got to 
formulating a fully-fledged doctrine.  
 
As an initial formulation, we can say that, in the Cartesian context, a semantic model 
describes the process of sensory perception as a triadic relation between object, brain, and 
mind. Recall that, within Descartes’ mechanistic physiology, a pattern of the geometrically 
reduced properties of the objects of sensory perception is transmitted through the nerves to 
the internal cavities of the brain, where a structural representation (i.e. an isomorph) is 
formed. In a semantic model, this structural representation is understood as a sign of the 
external object, which is then considered the referent, or significatum. Then, the structural 
representation in the brain signifies something other than itself (the external object), while 
also having a signifying role for the mind. This role is to operate as an occasion for 
prompting the mind’s own activity. As a result, the mind acts as an interpreter, and the 
outcome of this activity is a sensory idea, which then counts as an effect of the mind’s own 
causal efficacy. Amongst other explanatory advantages (that I will present in the upcoming 
sections), note that a crucial feature of this model is that the phenomenon of dissimilarity, 
which is one of Descartes’ chief concerns, is built into the theory in a rather natural, fitting 
way. By means of dissimilarity is, precisely, how signs successfully signify things. This 
formulation of the semantic model will be unpacked throughout the chapter.  
 
One might wonder, at this point, where the textual basis for a semantic model comes from 
in the texts. The main source to consider is the Treatise on Light, where Descartes identifies 
brain states with ‘natural signs’ or ‘signs instituted by Nature’ (AT XI 4/G 4). Further direct 
and indirect textual support also comes from the Treatise on Man, the Optics, the 
Meditations, and some of his correspondence, as we shall see. Right after the opening 
statement of the Treatise on Light (‘The difference between our sensations and the things 
                                            
1 These authors have held, from different perspectives, readings that favour a semantic model. Other 
commentators have referred to a semantic model while objecting to it. In §1 of the present chapter I 
will offer the details of these interpretations.  




that produce them’, AT XI 3/G 3), Descartes contends, against a standard Scholastic theory 
of sensory perception, that similarity between external objects and ideas is not a necessary 
requirement for the perception of those objects. Initially, he illustrates this by means of an 
ordinary example concerning language. His point is that, despite the fact that conventional 
signs such as words do not resemble the things that they signify, they have the capacity to 
successfully make us think of their appropriate referents (ibid. 4/3). It is on the basis of this 
example that Descartes then mounts a crucial question: could nature be operating in a 
similar way? He puts it as thus: 
 
Now if words, which signify something only through human convention, are 
sufficient to make us think of things to which they bear no resemblance, why 
could not Nature also have established some sign which would make us have 
the sensation of light, even if that sign had in it nothing that resembled this 
sensation? (ibid. 4/4). 
 
The weight of this question within Descartes’ theory of sensory perception is a matter of 
discussion. Some commentators have been inclined to downplay its metaphysical import 
given that it appears in the context of an analogy (De Rosa 2010, Clarke 2003, Bennett 
2001, Wilson 1991). In this chapter I join the opposite side of the debate. I contend that 
Descartes’ allusion to natural signs (in the Treatise on Light and elsewhere, and together with 
further interpretative support) should not be considered either as just an analogy, or as a 
one-off textual incident. On the contrary, I believe that it provides materials for 
reconstructing a cogent causal model for sensory perception and that it reveals fundamental 
features of how Descartes envisaged the interaction between the brain and the mind. One of 
these features, so I will argue, is a non-trivial sense in which the mind is not passive within 
the process of sensory perception.  
 
In this chapter, my argumentation will proceed in four stages. In §1, I review the state of the 
question. The topic of natural signs in Descartes has not received as much attention as other 
aspects of his work, but it has nevertheless created an interesting area of connection between 
the Francophone and the Anglophone scholarships. I present an overview of the different 
treatments of the topic while indicating where my reading stands amongst these. 
 




In §2, I reconstruct Descartes’ taxonomy of signs. It is significant, for the purposes of the 
line of argument presented, that Descartes refers to the notion of sign in other contexts 
throughout his works. He uses the category of ‘external signs’ for explaining the external 
movements of the passions (PS XI 411,478/CSM I 367, 399), as well as the category of 
‘conventional signs’ (that is, words and letters) for unfolding his theory of language (TL XI 
4/G 4, DM AT VI 56/CSM I 139). All in all, I intend to show that a semantic narrative is 
not foreign to Descartes’ explanations.  
 
After presenting the taxonomy, I focus, in §3, on the scheme underlying natural signs (i.e. 
what fulfils the roles of sign, referent, interpreter, and outcome in the Cartesian picture). 
Descartes’ knowledge and use (even if modified) of contemporaneous semantic accounts will 
constitute further grounds for the claim that, when introducing natural signs, Descartes is 
not offering a metaphorical remark about sensory perception, but a legitimate one that is 
meant to fit well with the rest of his system of philosophy. 
 
Finally, in § 4, I develop the implications of a semantic model for sensory perception. This 
includes, on one hand, an assessment of the activity of the mind as interpreter of signs. The 
question becomes whether Descartes provided a theory (even if a minimal one) for 
understanding this peculiar sort of mental activity, and whether his system of philosophy 
can allow for it. On the other hand, I consider some explanatory advantages of the semantic 
model concerning the notion of natural ordination, as well as its integrative capacity for the 
varying terminology of the texts.  
 
Overall, a semantic model for sensory perception will emerge as a consistent and plausible 
reading of Descartes in the sense of exhibiting the following explanatory advantages:2 (a) it is 
directly supported by a number of texts and consistent with the majority of texts, (b) it is 
particularly integrative of disperse terminology, (c) it incorporates a notion (natural signs) 
that was not unusual at the time, and (d) it is, in tune with the goals of Cartesian natural 
philosophy, as much of a naturalistic explanation of sensory perception as it can be.   
 
                                            
2 An enumeration of explanatory advantages has been inspired by Chignell (2009). 





 SECTION 1. NATURAL SIGNS. STATE OF THE QUESTION 
 
Some attention has been given, from different perspectives, to Descartes’ introduction 
of natural signs as a strategy for explaining sensory perception given the (PD). However, a 
comprehensive treatment of the topic is almost non-existent. In this section I offer a short 
overview of the treatments of natural signs in the Cartesian scholarship while indicating 
where my interpretation stands amongst those.3 
 
The topic of signs (natural and other) in Descartes has only recently gained some 
prominence in the Anglophone scholarship, while it has been present in the French 
scholarship for a few decades. Although her work is (somewhat surprisingly) not referred 
very often within the topic, no other than Geneviève Rodis-Lewis was, to my knowledge, 
the first contemporary philosopher to engage with the issue of signs in Descartes.4 In ‘Le 
domaine propre de l’homme chez les cartésiens’ (1964), Rodis-Lewis explores the distinction 
between human and non-human animals with the purpose of defending the originality of 
Cartesian anthropology as grounded on the substantial union of mind and body as a notion 
entirely intended by Descartes and crucial to his system. This means, for her, that the 
notion of the union is not an ad hoc addition to avoid the alleged consequence of splitting 
the human in two. Figuring predominantly within the doctrine of the union, we find the 
theory of sensory perception which, as she notes, ‘is extended by a general theory of signs in 
which those of nature announce those which men institute in language’ (1964:159, my 
translation).5 Although she insists on the analogical value of the theory, and her focus 
ultimately leans towards the signs of the passions and towards linguistic signs (as elements of 
Cartesian anthropology), her treatment has the merit of reconstructing, even if briefly, 
                                            
3 Some of the points relevant to a semantic account will be only sketched here and developed 
properly in the upcoming sections of the chapter. 
4 Her work is more commonly referenced for biographical remarks, given her renowned Descartes. 
Biographie (1995) and Le Développement de la Pensée de Descartes (1997). 
5 The original reads: ‘se prolonge par une théorie générale des signes où ceux de la nature annoncent 
ceux que l’homme institue dans le langage’ (1964:159). Hereafter, and except when stated otherwise, 
translations of French secondary literature are mine.  




Descartes’ taxonomy of signs. She also identifies the introduction of natural signs (even if as 
an analogy) as a strategy for explaining dissimilarity, and not substance heterogeneity as 
such: ‘natural signs correspond, then, both to feelings or sensations, and to the external 
manifestations of the passions; and the emphasis is on the dissimilarity between the 
mechanical excitation and its effect on us’ (1964:159).6  
 
Also within the French scholarship, Jean-Luc Marion provides an example of a complex 
interpretation of Descartes on signs, albeit one that extends ultimately in a direction that 
does not fall under the scope of this dissertation. Briefly, in La théologie blanche de Descartes 
(1981), Marion elaborates on the notion of ‘code’ as underpinning the whole of Descartes’ 
metaphysics, of which a semantic interpretation of sensory perception is just an aspect. 
Fundamentally, the objective of Marion’s reading is to show the weight of the theory of the 
creation of eternal truths in Descartes’ system, and how an essential part in their discovery is 
a two-step movement of the intellect that he articulates through the notion of our 
interpretation of a code. Marion calls this the process of figuration and (dé)-figuration, 
referring roughly to the construction and deconstruction (dis-figuration) of figures (from the 
expression verae figurae that Descartes employs in Rule XII referring to the true nature of 
objects).7 The activity of (dé)-figuration consists of a further interpretative activity beyond 
the first decoding (figuration) of the qualitative character of our perceptual experience into 
the notions of mathematics. The human image of the world, which is qualitatively different 
from the verae figurae, could be understood as a further coded version of something even 
more fundamental.8 Under this lens, perceptions are dis-figurations of the mathematical 
representation of truth, while being essential to the discovery of eternal truths.  
 
                                            
6 ‘Les signes naturels correspondent donc à la fois aux sentiments ou sensations, et aux manifestations 
extérieures des passions; et l’accent est mis sur la dissemblance entre l’excitation mécanique et son 
effet en nous’ (ibid.). 
7 R, AT X 423, translated as the ‘true shapes of things’ (CSM I 47). 
8 Marion puts it as follows: ‘If Nature decodes according to the same code that human science uses 
for coding, then the initial figures could become intelligible again as they are discovered and covered 
by the latter figures…’ (‘Si la Nature décode suivant le même code dont use la science humaine pour 
coder, alors les figures initiales pourront redevenir intelligibles à mesure que les découvriront et 
recouvriront les figures dernières…’ (1981:254) 




An in-depth examination of Marion’s theory surpasses the aim of this project. Nevertheless, 
it is worth emphasising a couple points from his treatment of the process of sensory 
perception (even if in his view it ends up being subordinated to a further coding activity). 
Despite the difference in approach, these are aspects that will become relevant in my reading 
of Descartes. (1) First, one core notion within a semantic model for sensory perception is 
the notion of transmission of information, and Marion uses it to reject mere associationism 
as a way of understanding the causal story of Descartes’ theory. Rather than ‘needlessly 
disrupting the simplicity’ of the theory (1981:254)9, the presence of a code (and thus a 
coding activity) is precisely what captures better Descartes’ way of thinking about ideas and 
(I would add) the causal efficiency of the mind. I believe that this is, indeed, a crucial aspect 
of the Cartesian model, and I will assess it in the upcoming sections. (2) Second, it is 
relatively rare to find within the literature an account of Descartes’ theory of sensory 
perception that endows the phenomenon of dissimilarity with such metaphysical import. 
Certainly, the qualitative character of our perceptual experience does not enter into the 
descriptions of physical science in the Cartesian picture, but it reveals, nonetheless, 
something truthful about the dual entity that is the human being.10 
 
Moving on to the Anglophone debate, much of it has been prompted by the analysis of 
John Yolton in Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid (1984). Yolton’s approach is, 
from a methodological point of view, similar to the one I am taking. He starts with a brief 
reconstruction of the corporeal phase of sensory perception, and he goes on to examine a 
few textual occurrences that could support a non-metaphorical reading of natural signs. 
Yolton’s thesis is that Descartes envisaged the interaction between brain and mind as a 
‘significatory’, non-causal relation in which ideas of external objects are ‘semantic responses’ 
to physical motions (1984:19). In taking seriously the introduction of natural signs and the 
                                            
9 ‘Car unne objection s’impose (…) l’introduction du code perturbe inutilement la simplicité au 
bénéfice d’une instance encore confuse…’ (1981:254). 
10 Ultimately, for Marion, this is enabled by the ‘semiotic unity’ (‘unité semiotique’) between the sign 
and the thing signified. I am sympathetic to this aspect of Marion’s reading, which is also connected 
with Rozemond’s view (1999) about the rightful status of the qualitative character of sensory 
perceptions. With her emphasis on the problem of dissimilarity, she has also made a compelling case 
for its genuine space in Descartes’ true ontology of reality. This topic will reappear in chapters Three 
and Four.  




relevance of the (PD), Yolton’s reading has the merit of showing in a compelling manner 
some of the finesse of Descartes’ account of sensory perception. However, the interpretation 
displays a couple of misconceptions.  
 
(1) The first one is his idea that a semantic model implies that the relation between the 
brain and the mind is not causal: ‘we should pay special attention to Descartes’ rejection of 
any causal relation between the physical activity of objects on our sense and the perceptual 
ideas in our minds (…) motion in body does not cause but it signifies our sensations’ 
(1984:18, 25). It is not clear why Yolton thinks that these two relations exclude each other, 
and he gives no further explanation of his assumption. On one hand, Descartes’ alleged 
rejection of a causal relation is nowhere in the texts. As we have seen in Chapter One, his 
terminology changes for the mental phase of sensory perception, but a rejection of causation 
is far from being the most plausible motivation. On the other hand, even intuitively at this 
stage, a sign could be considered as a type of cause, rather than as something entirely 
different from a cause, particularly given a sign’s capacity for bringing about something 
different from itself (which could be labelled as an ‘effect’). I will expand these issues in my 
own treatment of the topic in the sections to follow. At any rate, it does seem as if Yolton is 
making the same assumption as some of Descartes’ interlocutors. Namely, it is only an 
efficient-transeunt cause that counts as a genuine cause. 
 
(2) The second misconception that I notice in Yolton’s analysis concerns the way in which 
he cashes out a difference between ‘signifying’ and ‘representing’ that he identifies in the 
Cartesian texts. If I have read Yolton correctly, he bases this distinction on a link between 
representation and similarity on one hand, and between signification and dissimilarity on 
the other (1984:30)11. I find this division odd because the notion that a sign signifies 
something other than itself does not exclude, a priori, that it also represents it. 12  It might 
                                            
11 Yolton also concludes, rather cryptically, with a three-fold distinction between ways in which mind 
and body (brain and external objects) can be connected: by signification, by resemblance, or by 
causation. ‘Mind and cognition are thus connected with the world, but the connection is precisely 
that which is proper to cognition: significatory, not resemblance or causal’ (1984:30). It is not clear 
what are the differences between the three, and why they are mutually exclusive.  
12 For example, in general terms, a mental state is representational if it provides the mind some sort 
of information about something existing in extramental reality (Simmons 1999:347). Specific 
 




not represent it by means of resemblance, but that appears to be Descartes’ very point 
throughout the texts, figuring predominantly in his critique of the Aristotelian-Scholastic 
theory of sensory perception. Charitably, a distinction between signifying and representing 
could stand, but certainly not on the grounds of attributing dissimilarity to the former and 
similarity to the latter as a way of delineating their way of operating.  
 
A similar objection has been made by David Behan (2000) in his commentary of Yolton’s 
reading. Behan, as Yolton, takes for granted that a semantic reading excludes a causal 
reading. He does not, in any case, engage at length with the Cartesian theory. Rather, what 
is important about his response is that it provides historical and philosophical context for 
Descartes’ appeal to natural signs. Behan shows that, upon Aristotelian and Augustinian 
influences,13 a complex theory of signs had been developed during medieval times. Descartes 
could have been drawing for his own theory on a late Scholastic distinction between ‘formal’ 
and ‘instrumental’ signs that was commonplace at the time (2000:528-9). I will come back 
to this possible influence on Descartes in my own treatment of signs. 
 
Moving on to a different side of the discussion, in his extensive treatments of Descartes’ 
natural philosophy, Gaukroger (2002, 1995) has devoted some attention to what he calls a 
‘linguistic model’ of cognition emerging from the analogy between language and perception 
in the Treatise on Light. In this case the expression ‘linguistic model’ is to be understood as 
roughly equivalent to what the rest of commentators call a ‘semantic model’ i.e. a model for 
sensory perception in Descartes that is understood as an interpretative reaction by the mind 
to a certain brain state that operates as a sign of an external object.  
 
Gaukroger claims that the appearance of natural signs marks a shift in focus in Descartes’ 
theory of sensory perception. The shift, he argues, is from a pictorial theory of perception in 
                                                                                                                            
theories concerning the representational nature of mental states might argue from there, for example, 
whether this involves resemblance between the mental state and the extramental reality, or whether a 
successful tracking of the latter is sufficient for the mental state to count as representational. In any 
case, the point here is that a semantic characterisation of sensory perception does not provide a priori 
reasons for thinking that signification is non-representational.  
13 For Aristotle, the work at stake is the Posterior Analytics, within the Organon (the Logic). For 
Augustine’s work on signs, Behan refers to De Dialectica and to De Doctrina Cristiana. 




the Rules that focuses on solving the issue of how perceptual information is conveyed, to 
linguistic (non-pictorial) considerations that are intended at solving the issue of how 
perceptual information is represented (1995:284). A causal-mechanical approach, Gaukroger 
rightly states, is able to account for the physical processes that need to occur for perceptual 
cognition to take place, whereas a linguistic model attempts to capture what such perceptual 
cognition consists in (2000:207). He considers these as two ‘complementary levels of 
description’ (1995:286) and he expresses the shift as follows: 
 
Simplifying somewhat, in the Regulae his account focuses on getting the 
‘perceptual’ part of perceptual cognition right, whereas here (in The World) he 
concentrates on the ‘cognition’ side of the question. The account of cognition 
in the Regulae is little more than a mechanist reworking of medieval faculty 
psychology (…) The account presented in the first chapter of Le Monde is quite 
different. Perceptual cognition is not thought of in causal terms, and it is not 
thought of as a multi-stage process. Rather, the treatment focuses on the 
question of how we are able to respond to certain properties or events as 
information (Gaukroger 1995: 282, clarification added) 
 
Briefly, I agree with Gaukroger in that there is a change of approach between the ‘faculty 
psychology’ of the Rules and the more sophisticated theory that appears in The World. I also 
agree with the main point that, for the purposes of a theory of perception, Descartes’ 
mechanistic physiology has the task of accounting in causal terms for transmission of 
information. Indeed, natural signs enter the picture when Descartes needs to describe the 
occurrence of the particular qualitative character of human sensory perception (that is, what 
it is for the mind to perceive something, not how the information gets there). In this respect, 
the mental phase of the process of sensory perception can certainly be labelled as a response 
to certain physical properties or events as informing us about the world. At the same time, 
however, I have a couple of reservations about Gaukroger’s assessment.  
 
(1) First, the claim that ‘perceptual cognition is not thought of in causal terms’ (because of 
the introduction of natural signs) seems to stand on a rather ill-defined notion of causation. 
Charitably, Gaukroger elaborates on an interesting distinction between causation and 
signification on the basis that causes do not depend on our identification of them as such in 
order to operate as causes. Signs, on the other hand, require our ability to recognise them as 




such in order to bring about an effect (2000:207). While this is an interesting point (and 
one that should be explored in itself independently)14, I believe that it misses, at least in the 
case of Descartes, the very point that he is trying to make about signs being precisely 
natural. In the Cartesian picture, what he calls ‘natural ordination’ ensures that certain signs 
will always be met with certain responses. The point of an analogy with linguistic signs is to 
provide information about a natural process that will operate in a similar way with the 
necessary changes having been made. Given the differences that will necessarily appear when 
the linguistic model makes us understand the workings of nature, to claim that signs are not 
causes because they depend on our recognition of them seems to fall into an equivocation of 
what it is to ‘recognise’ a sign when that sign is natural. 
 
(2) Second, Gaukroger ultimately considers the formulation of natural signs as an analogy 
(1995:287). To be precise, he identifies it as an explanatory device that Descartes employs 
for shedding some light on what perceptual understanding consists in, given the limitations 
of a mechanical approach. Furthermore, in his reading, the motivation behind this 
explanatory device is to mark a distinction between ‘sentience and non-sentience’ that is, 
between perception in human and non-human animals (2000:207). I think that to limit the 
import of Descartes’ natural signs as that of an analogy is to downplay the scope of his 
theory (as I will show in the following sections). Most importantly, though, Gaukroger’s 
reading leaves an incredibly small amount of tasks for the mind to carry out, with the 
consequent mechanisation of the majority of the processes of human perception.15 For some 
of these, such as the case of colour perception, Gaukroger’s mechanisation relies on an 
identification of non-conscious processes with processes that can be fully accounted by the 
in-built capacities of the brain, and not of the mind (2000:208-9). In cases such as colour 
perception, I do not find in the texts grounds for this assumption.16  
                                            
14 Such an examination goes beyond the purposes of this project. I am concerned here only with an 
overview of the literature that serves as a prelude to my own reading of Descartes on natural signs.  
15 I am aware that this has become precisely Gaukroger’s well-known overall position on the 
Cartesian theory. 
16 In Chapter Four I will explore at length the role of a distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities in Descartes’ theory of sensory perception. There, I examine, amongst others, the case of 
colour perception.  





Let us now focus on one of the latest contributions to the discussion on Descartes and 
natural signs. To my knowledge, the only defence of a causal and semantic model for 
Descartes’ theory of sensory perception has been offered by Andrew Chignell (2009) on the 
grounds of its having a number of theoretical advantages over rival interpretations. Amongst 
those, it is worth mentioning here a couple of them. (1) First, a causal and semantic model 
is able to combine under a single framework textual occurrences that would otherwise be 
seen as belonging to different theories for the interaction of brain and mind. In certain 
passages, Descartes speaks of the mind as ‘attending’ or ‘inspecting’ brain states, in others he 
describes the brain as ‘presenting’ or ‘exhibiting’ something to the mind, and he also refers 
to brain states as ‘occasions’ for the mind to produce ideas. These textual occurrences are 
well integrated within a causal-semantic model (which is, itself, also explicitly supported by 
the introduction of natural signs). For instance, within this model, the signifying role 
attributed to brain states makes them act as occasions for the interpretative activity of the 
mind without necessarily turning the theory into a strong occasionalist one (Chignell 
2009:6-10). I will expand on this integrative ability of the causal-semantic model in my own 
treatment.  
 
Closely connected to this advantage, the second one arises. (2) Chignell identifies (rightly, I 
believe) a policy behind Descartes’ theory of sensory perception that he names ‘qualified 
explanatory naturalism’, and that fits well with the objectives that might be expected from a 
natural philosopher that champions mechanistic explanation like Descartes did. ‘Qualified 
explanatory naturalism’ is the ‘policy of not resorting to supernaturalistic appeals until 
naturalistic explanations have been exhausted’ (Chignell 2009:16). With the term 
‘supernaturalistic’ Chignell is referring here to instances such as God’s intermediary action 
in strong occasionalism, to the minimal explanatory power of brute associationism, and even 
to premature appeals to natural ordination. In other words, a causal-semantic model 
captures Descartes’ effort to portray sensory perception as a process that is fully grounded on 
the powers and dispositions of the human brain and the human mind, and it does that by 
adding a further explanatory level that delays the introduction of natural (and divine, for 




Descartes) ordination as much as possible within his system (2009:15). I will go back to this 
point later on.17 
 
Finally, shorter, relatively favourable treatments of the semantic model include the ones by 
Wilson (1991) and Rozemond (1999). Wilson held a different proposal for the Cartesian 
model of sensory perception —what she calls the ‘presentation model’— and she reads the 
appearance of natural signs as an analogy used in order to establish the point of the lack of 
resemblance between the brain state and the idea (1991:296). Tad Schmaltz (1997) has also 
followed this diagnosis overall. Despite offering a different interpretation, Wilson does 
remark, directly against readings such as Yolton’s (1984), that the sign terminology could be 
incorporated as subordinated to the presentation model without preventing a causal reading 
of brain-mind interaction. Rozemond has taken an initially similar interpretative route in 
denying that the allusion to natural signs should count as an anomaly or a ‘harmless façon de 
parler’ (1999:466). In her reading, she takes seriously Descartes’ introduction of natural 
signs in the sense that it reveals some features of just one aspect of the theory of sensory 
perception. Namely, it captures the fact that brain states have a causal role in the production 
of ideas insofar as they explain their occurrence, while the mind counts as the source of the 
representational content of those ideas (ibid. 463). This means, for Rozemond, that talking 
about signs clarifies one aspect of Descartes’ causal story but, all in all, it cannot stand as a 
wholesale model for sensory perception. She claims that the texts point to a broader 
‘complex model’ of which natural signs are partial manifestation, and she declares that the 
notion of natural signs cannot deal properly with certain objections (ibid. 464-6). Now, 
while I consider Rozemond’s reconstruction of the causal story of brain-mind interaction 
the most plausible, I disagree with her claims about the semantic model not informing us 
about other features of the theory, as I intend to show.  
                                            
17 Chignell’s is an extremely clear proposal that also includes a brief analysis of types of causes as well 
as a good collection of textual evidence for a non-metaphorical reading of the introduction of natural 
signs. He eventually fails to acknowledge some significant textual occurrences in The World (he 
claims, for instance, that the talk of ‘occasions’ belongs only to later works), and he does not provide 
the context of Descartes’ taxonomy of signs, which I take to be crucial for increasing the plausibility 
of the model. As I will explain in what follows, the fact that Descartes held, as a matter of fact, a 
theory of signs as an explanation for other phenomena (conventional signs for language and external 
signs for the passions) could make us think that the third type of signs (natural signs) is to be taken as 
seriously (non-metaphorically) as the other two.  





To my knowledge, a meticulous, charitable rejection of the semantic model has not been 
offered in any of the literature. The potential significance of natural signs is often ignored 
altogether, and sometimes it is simply dismissed with extraordinary brevity. For instance, 
Bennett (2001:107) settles the matter by declaring that Descartes ‘has little if any theory’ 
about ‘how ideas represent things outside us’, and that seeing natural signs as assisting in 
that task is ‘overloading the text’. He gives no further grounds for this statement. In her 
monograph on Descartes and sensory representation, De Rosa (2010:176-7) simply takes 
the passage in the Optics in which Descartes ridicules the view that the mind inspects the 
brain ‘as if there were yet other eyes within our brain’ (AT VI 130/CSM I 167) to be 
sufficient evidence for ruling out a semantic model.  
 
All in all, I believe that dismissals of the semantic model have been too rushed, especially 
given the peculiarity of a notion such as natural signs. As I see it, its peculiarity should at 
least make us think twice about the potential for such a model. Why would Descartes allude 
to such an intriguing notion (a notion, as we shall see, with a rather stable meaning in the 
period) without telling us that it is meant as a literary recourse? In the following pages, I 
delve into the semantic model as a genuine possibility. I will start with a reconstruction of 
Descartes’ taxonomy of signs for the purpose of showing that a semantic narrative was not 




 SECTION 2. A TAXONOMY OF SIGNS 
 
Descartes did not devote a specific work to develop a comprehensive doctrine of 
semiotics, but he did make use of the notion of sign in order to describe three phenomena: 
language, the external movements of the passions, and sensory perception. For these 
purposes, he appealed to conventional, external, and natural signs respectively, although 
only the last ones are often taken simply as metaphorical talk. In this section I start with a 
brief reconstruction of Descartes’ taxonomy of signs. The objective of this reconstruction is 
to establish a useful comparison between types of signs for understanding how Descartes 




conceived semantic relations and the motivations that he had for bringing them into play. 
After presenting the taxonomy, I will provide a more in-depth analysis of natural signs.  
  
 
2.1. CONVENTIONAL SIGNS 
 
Let us begin with conventional signs. As the term itself indicates, these are signs that 
denote certain other things by means of human convention. For Descartes, the paradigmatic 
example of a system of conventional signs is language. He did not write extensively about 
language, but a rather clear doctrine transpires from Part 5 of the Discourse, from remarks in 
the Treatise on Light, and from his correspondence. Admittedly, the absence of an extensive 
treatment of language can at least be partially explained by the philosophical context of that 
time. The Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition to which Descartes was reacting relied heavily on 
language. Medieval philosophy was often dependent on questions of linguistic meaning and 
discussed through the framework of logic (Maat 2011:273). Although the notions and 
methods of Scholastic philosophy permeated well into the seventeenth century (it was, as we 
know, the tradition in which Descartes himself was educated by the Jesuits at La Flèche and 
a source of concepts for his philosophy), a number of diverse responses to it also started to 
emerge at the time, in tune with the reforming goals of the natural philosophers at the turn 
of the century.18 Amongst them, Descartes championed the view that the pure ideas of the 
mind do not need language and that, consequently, language is subordinated to thought and 
                                            
18 Authors as diverse in their philosophical standpoints as Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, and 
Locke voiced, for instance, how language can have a pernicious effect on thinking (Maat 2011:273). 
In the philosophical context of that time, language became progressively subordinated to thought. 
For Descartes’ view on this particular ‘source of error’, see Principles IV 197 (AT VIIIA 320-21/CSM 
I 284). On a similar note, Descartes’ criticism of traditional (Aristotelian-Scholastic) logic and 
method in general figures already in the Rules: ‘Our principal concern here is thus to guard against 
our reason’s taking a holiday while we are investigating the truth about some issue (…) to make it 
even clearer that the aforementioned art of reasoning contributes nothing whatever to knowledge of 
the truth, we should realise that, on the basis of their method, dialecticians are unable to formulate a 
syllogism with a true conclusion unless they are already in possession of the substance of the 
conclusion, i.e. unless they have previous knowledge of the very truth deduced in the syllogism. It is 
obvious therefore that they themselves can learn nothing new from such forms of reasoning, and 
hence that ordinary dialectic is of no use whatever to those who wish to investigate the truth of 
things’ (R, AT X 406/CSM I 36-7) 




it is relevant only for the need for communication.19 This position can be seen as a natural 
product of the Cartesian thesis regarding the obscurity and confusion attributed to the 
senses. The problem then, is that the ordinary meanings of words have assimilated the 
wrong opinions that are formed particularly during childhood.20 As Clarke puts it, ‘human 
language is fundamentally compromised by the lack of the clarity and distinctness of the 
senses. The unique path to scientific knowledge, on his account, requires the purification or 
turning away from the senses that is recommended in the Meditations’ (2003:159). As 
mentioned above, Descartes’ treatment of language is often developed through the notion of 
conventional signs. It revolves around two main points that will help us in understanding 
his account of signification: 
 
First, for the case of conventional signs, Descartes puts forward what we could call a 
‘nominalist stance’. This means that there is no intrinsic, natural connection between a 
word (the sign) and its significatum (the thing it signifies): ‘when I see the sky or the earth, 
this does not oblige me to name them in one way rather than another, and I believe that it 
would be the same even if we were in the state of original justice’ (To Mersenne, 18th 
December 1629, AT I 103).21 In a system of conventional signs, this type of (human-made) 
arbitrariness is accompanied by dissimilarity between the sign and the significatum. This is, 
for Descartes, the hallmark of semantic relations, namely, that despite the fact that there 
might be dissimilarity between the two (as there is in the vast majority of these cases), our 
                                            
19 This idea became well-known and specifically a mark of the Cartesian doctrine through the Port-
Royal Logic (Antoine Arnauld’s and Pierre Nicole’s Logic or the Art of Thinking). 
20 In the Principles, for instance, Descartes cautions against the focus on ordinary words rather than 
the things that they are meant to signify. He identifies this as the ‘fourth cause of error’ concerning 
the judgments that we make about objects of sensory perception: ‘Because of the use of language, we 
tie all our concepts to the words used to express them; and when we store the concepts in our 
memory we always simultaneously store the corresponding words. Later on we find the words easier 
to recall than the things; and because of this it is very seldom that our concept of a thing is so distinct 
that we can separate it totally from our concept of the words involved. The thoughts of almost all 
people are more concerned with words than with things…’ (Pr I 74, VIIIA 37-8/CSM I 220).  
21 This is my translation, given that this part of the letter is not included in the CSMK edition. The 
original reads: ‘Mais lorsque je vois le ciel ou la terre, cela ne m’oblige point à les nommer plutôt 
d'une façon que d'une autre, et je crois que ce serait le même, encore que nous eussions la justice 
originelle’. ‘Original justice’ refers here to the paradigmatic state of innocence (and lack of experience 
of the world): the ‘Adamic' innocence before the committing of the Original Sin.   




thought is consistently compelled to form an idea of the significatum. In other words, this 
means that, even if there was similarity between sign and significatum, that fact would not 
play a part in bringing about the appropriate idea in our mind. As we shall see, this is what 
makes the analogy between words and brain states in the Treatise on Light such a pertinent 
one.  
 
Recall at this point the first chapter of the Treatise on Light: ‘words, which signify something 
only through human convention, are sufficient to make us think of things to which they 
bear no resemblance’ (AT XI 4/G 4). This suggests a straightforward scheme, in which 
words (and letters in turn) are ‘signs’, the object (broadly conceived) that those words refer 
to is the ‘significatum’, the human being is the ‘interpreter’ of the relation between the two, 
and an idea of the significatum the is the ‘outcome’ of the process.  
 
Second, Descartes sees the creation and interpretation of the conventional signs that 
constitute language as that which sets apart human from non-human animals. His most 
extended treatment of the topic of semiotics is to be found precisely in his analysis of the 
human capacity for what he calls a ‘meaningful’ use of language (DM AT VI 57/CSM I 
140). This is connected to Descartes’ views on the limitations of mechanistic physiology. In 
contemporary terms, this would be a matter of whether neural mechanisms are capable of 
generating all the responses and have sufficient complexity to capture linguistic behaviour 
(Cottingham 1993:105). In the Cartesian picture, the semantic relation realized in the case 
of language is not the kind of phenomenon that can be captured by arrangement and 
motion of micro-particles of matter. In other words, it is the type of phenomenon that 
requires a mind.22 
                                            
22 Cottingham (1993:120) expresses it as thus, maintaining the focus on the notion of sign: ‘the gap 
between the sign and the significatum is not of the kind that can be bridged by the causal laws of 
physics’. Descartes dualism has been sometimes considered, particularly from the viewpoint of 
contemporary philosophy, as immature or ill-justified, and it is interesting to observe how not only 
the Problem of Dissimilarity, but also his considerations about the genuine use of language provide 
rather sophisticated material for a dualist standpoint. Here, his argument for dualism (spelled out in 
this case as the essential difference between animals and non-human animals) can certainly be seen as 
a precedent of the argument that Leibniz puts forward concerning (partly) the limitations of 
mechanistic/materialist explanation in the Monadology and elsewhere, and that is commonly referred 
to as ‘Leibniz’s Mill’ (M17). Of course, Leibniz’s account of the limitations of mechanism has a 
 





Descartes is aware that, as a matter of fact, non-human animals do employ language in 
several ways. In order to deal with such occurrence, he distinguishes between a meaningful 
and a meaningless use of language. In Part 5 of the Discourse, he devises a thought 
experiment for establishing this distinction. If there were some sort of machines (a type of 
automaton) that ‘bore resemblance to our bodies and imitated our actions as closely as 
possible’ (AT VI 56/CSM I 139), we could still assert that they are not human beings 
(beings with a mind) in two ways. First, those machines would utter words, but those words 
would not be used in any meaningful way. Second, they would eventually fail in performing 
linguistic acts, thus revealing that the semantic relations that they seemed to be employing 
were a result of entirely physical stimulus-response mechanisms.23 Insofar as it requires a 
mind, a meaningful use of conventional signs is then essentially different from a meaningless 
one, even though their external manifestations could be equivalent. 24  Note that the 
machines figuring in the thought experiment are, no doubt, equivalent to non-human 
animals for Descartes: ‘we see that magpies and parrots can utter words as we do, and yet 
they cannot speak as we do: that is, they cannot show that they are thinking what they are 
saying’ (ibid. 57/140). While some non-human animals are able to mimic human speech, 
the distinctive feature of a meaningful use of language is ‘the intentional aspect of semantic 
competence’ (Di Bella 2015:437). In other words, it is the capacity of the human being —as 
stemming from the versatility of reason— for using interpreted conventional signs.25  
                                                                                                                            
further, different aim than Descartes’, which is to show that perception can only be explained by the 
presence of a simple substance.  
23 ‘For we can certainly conceive of a machine so constructed that it utters words, and even utters 
words which correspond to bodily actions causing a change in its organs (e.g. if you touch it in one 
spot it asks what you want of it, if you touch it in another it cries out that you are hurting it, and so 
on). But it is not conceivable that such a machine should produce different arrangements of words 
so as to give an appropriately meaningful answer to whatever is said in its presence, as the dullest of 
men can do. Secondly, even though such machines might do some things as well as we do them, or 
perhaps even better, they would inevitably fail in others, which would reveal that they were acting 
not through understanding but only from the disposition of their organs’ (DM, AT VI 56-7/CSM I 
140) 
24 Maat (2011:288) has appropriately described Descartes’ thought experiment as a ‘reverse Turing 
test’.  
25 Descartes restates his view rather clearly in his correspondence with the Marquess of Newcastle: ‘I 
cannot share the opinion of Montaigne and others who attribute understanding or thought to 
 





For accomplishing this task, Descartes summons ‘intellectual memory’, a type of memory 
that is exclusive to humans. He establishes a distinction between ‘corporeal’ and 
‘intellectual’ memory and, although a detailed assessment of the distinction cannot be 
provided here, for the purposes of this project it is at least worth clarifying that corporeal 
memory is shared by human and non-human animals and is entirely dependent on brain 
states (it is useful, for instance, for learning about threats to survival, such as the presence of 
a predator). On the contrary, intellectual memory is a power exclusive to the mind and it is 
associated with concept recognition.26 It makes sense, then, that Descartes attributes the 
meaningful use of language to the intellectual memory, which stores meanings of 
conventional signs and realizes the interpretation of the significatum on the basis of them.27  
 
Note briefly, at this point, that a meaningful use of conventional signs seems to involve a 
purely mental activity that is not necessarily carried out consciously. Certainly, the mind 
needs to be familiarised with the conventional correspondences between certain words and 
their referents in order to interpret them successfully. However, this is not the same as 
stating that the mind needs to be aware of those correspondences at all times, not even when 
they are being employed. This is no other than the knotty issue of the transparency of the 
                                                                                                                            
animals (…) In fact, none of our external actions can show anyone who examines them that our 
body is not just a self-moving machine but contains a soul with thoughts, with the exception of 
spoken words, or other signs that have reference to particular topics without expressing any passion 
(…) This seems to me a very strong argument to prove that the reason why animals do not speak as 
we do is not that they lack the organs but that they have no thoughts’ (23rd November 1646, AT IV 
573-75/CSMK 302-3).  
26 Descartes expresses this succinctly in a letter to Mersenne: ‘But besides this memory, which 
depends on the body, I believe there is also another one, entirely intellectual, which depends on the 
soul alone’ (1st April 1640, AT III 48/CSMK 146). 
27 This is covered in the Conversation with Burman: ‘When, for example, hearing that the word ‘K-I-
N-G’ (R-E-X) signifies supreme power, I commit this to my memory and then subsequently recall 
the meaning by means of my memory, it must be the intellectual memory that makes this possible. 
For there is certainly no relationship between the four letters (K-I-N-G) and their meaning, which 
would enable me to derive the meaning from the letters. It is the intellectual memory that enables me 
to recall what the letters stand for’ (AT V 150/CSMK 336-7 Latin clarification added). It should be 
noted that, although the Conversation with Burman does not present the kind of inconsistencies that 
would make commentators sceptical about its value, it is in a way a less authoritative source. It 
consists of the notes that Frans Burman took of a conversation with Descartes in 1648.  








2.2. EXTERNAL SIGNS 
 
After having presented Descartes’ account of conventional signs, let us move on to 
external signs, which are the ‘signs of the passions’ (PS II 112, III 200, AT XI 411, 
478/CSM I 367, 399). In Cartesian language (and in general, in early modern vocabulary) 
‘passions’ refer broadly to what nowadays we catalogue as emotions. As coming from the 
Latin passio —a rendering of the ancient Greek πάθος (pathos)— the notion of ‘passion’ was 
contrasted with that of ‘action’. While the former refers to the mind’s passivity in receiving 
certain inputs from the body, the latter captures the mental operations that are initiated by 
the faculty of the will. Descartes call the latter ‘volitions’. What we find in the Passions, then, 
is an exhaustive taxonomy of the kind of actions of the body upon the mind that we call 
emotions. He identifies six fundamental kinds of passions (wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy, 
and sadness), while the rest are ‘composed from some of these six or they are species of 
them’ (ibid. II 69, 380/353). A key feature of this account is the degree to which, for 
Descartes, emotions are dependent on physiological states and responses. He devotes a 
significant part of the Passions to draw detailed explanations of the changes in the circulatory 
and nervous system that explain the occurrence of each emotion.28  
 
The signs of the passions are called ‘external’ due to the distinction that Descartes makes 
between the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ movements of the passions as the two corporeal 
manifestations of a passion in the soul. Interestingly, this classification figures already within 
                                            
28 For instance, these are excerpts of his descriptions of the physiological changes that bring about 
sadness and joy in the mind: ‘In sadness, by contrast, the openings in the heart are severely restricted 
by the small nerve with surrounds them, and the blood in the veins is not agitated at all, so that very 
little of it goes to the heart’ (PS II 105, AT XI 406/CSM I 365). ‘It has also happened at the 
beginning of our life that the blood contained in the veins was quite suitable for nourishing and 
maintaining the heat of the heart (…) this produced the passion of joy in the soul. At the same time 
it caused the orifices of the heart to be opened wider than usual; and it made the spirits flow 
abundantly from the brain…’ (ibid. II 109, 409/366). 




the anatomical studies in Treatise on Man (AT XI 193-4/G 163-4), written (though not 
published) approximately seventeen years before the Passions. For instance, in the case of one 
of the ways in which the passion of joy occurs, the internal movements would correspond 
(in the Cartesian theory) to an abundant flow of animal spirits from the brain into those 
nerves which have the function of opening the orifices of the heart (PS II 109, AT XI 
409/CSM I 366). The external movements of passions can be diverse, and they correspond 
to their external visible expression. These are what Descartes calls external signs of the 
passions. In the case of joy, its external signs would be, for instance, laughter and/or 
blushing (ibid. II 115, 126, 413/368, 420/371). The external movements of the passions are 
called ‘signs’, then, insofar as they signify, or ‘bear witness to’ (‘témoignent’) the passions 
(TM, AT XI 193/G 163).  
 
As we have seen above in the case of conventional signs, the semantic scheme that Descartes 
offers here is also rather straightforward. The external expression of the passion is the sign, 
and the passion in the soul is the significatum. The interpreter of this correspondence is, 
again, the human being, and the result of interpreting a given sign is the creation of an idea 
of the significatum. Upon observing laughter in a friend, for instance, one goes beyond this 
physical manifestation as such and interprets, all things considered, the presence of joy.  
 
I have added the qualification ‘all things considered’ because it seems to be peculiar to 
external signs that they exhibit what we would call, in contemporary terms, ‘multiple 
realizability’ about the mental (in short, the thesis that a single mental state can be realized 
by a diversity of physical states).29 This fits well with two facts in the Cartesian account of 
the passions. On one hand, passions in the soul exhibit multiple realizability because a single 
passion can be produced by a variety of physical processes and thus can be manifested 
through a variety of external signs. For example, Descartes gives two slightly different 
accounts of the causes of joy (PS II 104, 109, AT XI 405, 409/CSM I 364, 366). On the 
other hand, (and looking at the process from the opposite direction), external signs can also 
                                            
29 The current debate on multiple realizability encompasses many nuances that are not discussed here 
(Bickle 2013). For the purposes of clarifying Descartes’ theory of external signs (and of signs in 
general, as we shall see), I simply provide a standard, working definition of the concept.  




signify a plurality of passions. Laughter can signify joy, but also perhaps nervousness, and 
even indignation (ibid. II 127, 421-2/372). A treatment of these phenomena can also be 
found in his correspondence with Elizabeth of Bohemia. She was the one to ask Descartes 
for a lengthier treatment of the passions after their exchange on the issue. It is not casual, 
then, that the topic of the external signs of the passions is foreshadowed in some of those 
letters. He writes to Elizabeth: 
 
Flushing of the face does not always come from shame, but it can also come 
from the heat of the fire, or even because one is exercising. The laughter called 
sardonic is nothing else but a convulsion of the nerves of the face. Similarly, 
one can sigh sometimes from custom, or from a malady, but this does not 
prevent sighs from being exterior signs of sadness or of desire, when passions 
cause them (May 1646, AT IV 410/S 136 emphasis added). 
 
Finally, there is something else worthy of mention within Descartes’ treatment of the 
passions —namely, that while a restricted meaning of the notion of passion referring only to 
the corporeal process is also attributed to non-human animals, the allusion to external signs 
only occurs when the human being enters the picture. This is certainly not a coincidence. 
The notion of signs is textually confined to human passions because it is meant to provide, 
as we have seen before, an intelligible story for the correlation between physical and mental 
states. In this case, external signs capture the dissimilarity between the visible expression of a 
physiological state and the resulting mental state that is the passion. In other words, we can 
see, in the case of external signs, how the notion appears again for explaining a fundamental 
phenomenon of dissimilarity that is unique to the very nature of embodied minds. 
 
 
2.3. TAXONOMY OF SIGNS: COROLLARY 
 
To conclude this section, let us summarise three significant points that this analysis of 
conventional and external signs has revealed about Descartes’ views on semantic relations.  
 
(1) First, for both conventional and external signs, he puts forward a scheme with the same 
components: a sign, a significatum, and an interpreter of the relation between the two. This 
interpretative activity brings about an idea of the significatum in the mind of the interpreter. 




We are presented, thus, with equivalent processes. For example, I read the word ‘oak’, which 
signifies a type of tree, and upon interpreting this correlation (what the letters o-a-k stand 
for), an idea is formed in the mind. If my knowledge of the correlation is appropriate, the 
content of this idea will be of a tree with green lobed leaves, perhaps brimming with acorns. 
Similarly, knowing that crying (and the internal, physiological changes associated with it, if 
one could access them on an ordinary basis) often signifies sadness, the idea of sadness is 
brought about in the mind upon seeing a tearful face.  
 
(2) Second, it is important to observe that a successful interpretation of the correlation 
between a sign and a significatum is, at least in principle, possible without any conscious 
activity of the mind. Certainly, success in the interpretation of signs requires knowledge of 
the correlations (what one could also call knowledge of a ‘code’). The acquisition of this 
knowledge can be a fully conscious activity —think, for instance, of an adult learning a new 
language (i.e. a new system of conventional signs). The activity of decoding, however, need 
not be conscious. Furthermore, it seems that, at least intuitively at this point, a feature that 
contributes to the success of the semantic relations that we have looked at is the fact that 
they are stored and recalled with precision in an unintentional and instantaneous manner. 
Consider, for the moment, how the operation is described for conventional signs: ‘the fact 
that words often bear no resemblance to the things that they signify does not prevent them 
from causing us to conceive those things, often without our paying attention to the sounds of 
the words or to their syllables’ (TL AT XI 4/G 3-4 emphasis added).  
 
(3) Third, a further shared feature of conventional and external signs is that they deal with 
instances of dissimilarity. Both for the case of language or for that of the passions, signs are 
invoked as a way of explaining the etiology of processes that are characterised by the 
fundamental dissimilarity between the mechanical explanations of the physical world, and 
the qualitative nature of mental states. Recall, as a paradigmatic instance, that Descartes 
makes linguistic competence (that is, ‘meaningful’ use of conventional signs) the ultimate 
evidence for the presence of a mind.  
 
In conclusion, I believe that the identification of common features of different signs can 
assist us in making sense of Descartes’ reason for employing semantic terminology across the 




board. Taking these points into consideration, I move on to examine the third component 
of this taxonomy: natural signs. In the upcoming sections, natural signs will appear as 
proper members of Descartes’ taxonomy of signs, and in agreement with his semantic 
narrative. This will counter interpretations that have deemed the appeal to natural signs as a 
figure of speech (Wilson 1991, Gaukroger 1995) or that consider the causal-semantic model 




 SECTION 3. NATURAL SIGNS IN CONTEXT 
 
In this section I examine the notion of natural signs, thus completing the picture of 
the Cartesian taxonomy of signs. Simply put, natural signs are those that appear in semantic 
relations established by natural ordination. Like other types of signs, a natural sign is also 
dissimilar from the thing it signifies (its significatum), but it is related to it in a non-
conventional way: in a natural way. Descartes makes use of natural signs (and natural 
signification) for describing the process of sensory perception. Regardless of whether one 
considers this notion a metaphor or a legitimate metaphysical concept, natural signs are 
identified in the texts with brain states, and they have the role of explaining the dissimilarity 
between external objects and ideas in the mind. That is to say, they are meant to make sense 
of the Problem of Dissimilarity (PD).  
 
In order to understand in more depth what are natural signs, what function do they have, 
and how they exercise it, we need to look at the texts. In what follows, I investigate the 
textual occurrences of natural signs and I reconstruct the scheme that underlies their 
operation (i.e. what fulfils the role of sign, significatum, interpreter, and outcome). An 
initial goal of this analysis is to show that Descartes’ introduction of natural signs is not to 
be deemed as metaphorical talk, nor as a one-off random textual occurrence. I believe that, 
after having determined the presence of a stable position by Descartes on conventional and 
external signs, as well as his motivations for employing them, one should be prepared to 
concede that the genuine allusion to a third type of sign is a serious possibility. Natural 
signs, so I contend, preserve a semantic narrative that is not foreign to Descartes’ thought.  






3.1. NATURAL SIGNS IN THE TREATISE ON LIGHT 
 
Let us begin with the analysis of the relevant passages. We are already familiar with 
the first one —it constitutes the opening paragraph of the Treatise on Light, and it 
introduces the lengthiest explicit description of natural signs. In it, Descartes offers an 
analogy with conventional signs that runs schematically as follows: even though they rely on 
human convention, conventional signs (such as words) are capable of directing our thought 
efficiently towards the things that they signify, to which they are entirely dissimilar. Upon 
this statement, a question emerges: could nature be operating in a similar way when it comes 




Now if words, which signify something only through human convention, are 
sufficient to make us think of things to which they bear no resemblance, why 
could not nature also have established some sign which would make us have a 
sensation of light, even if that sign had in it nothing that resembled this sensation? 
And is it not thus that Nature has established laughter and tears to make us 
read joy and sorrow in the faces of men? (TL AT XI 4/G 4 emphasis added) 
 
What it is most striking about this passage is the appearance of the intriguing notion of a 
sign established by nature. This natural sign, so we are told, would have the capacity of 
explaining the occurrence of sensory ideas despite the fundamental dissimilarity between 
them and their physical causes.  
 
Before going any further, something needs to be said about the general context of the 
passage. Once again, it is clear that Descartes is concerned here with accounting for the 
fundamental dissimilarity between our ideas of external objects and what it is in objects that 
causes them. The very first line of the Treatise on Light expresses precisely this issue: ‘the first 
thing that I want to draw to your attention is that it is possible for there to be a difference 
between the sensation we have of it (light), that is, the idea that we form of it (…) and what 
it is in the objects that produces the sensation in us’ (AT XI 3/G 3 clarification added). In a 




nutshell, this is the (PD). I have referred to this issue before as the explanatory gap between 
mechanistic explanations and mental representations.30 
 
This helps us put passage (A) in context. Descartes is arguing against a standard Aristotelian-
Scholastic theory of sensory perception in which the senses are reliable sources for getting us 
acquainted with truths about the natural world. In particular, he has been objecting to a 
doctrine of assimilation between external objects and the senses, according to which the 
senses receive a ‘likeness’ (‘similitude’) from the object by way of a ‘sensible form’ of the 
object without ‘matter’. Overall, Descartes aims at showing that similarity between objects 
and ideas is not necessary for sensory perception, and that a relatively simple exploration of 
the conditions of the natural world should suffice for ruling out a teleological model such as 
the Aristotelian-Scholastic one (that is, a model in which we have the senses that we do 
because they are fitted for an accurate perception of the true features of objects).  
 
Descartes also phrases the phenomenon of dissimilarity by appealing to the notion of the 
‘true nature’ or ‘true image’ of bodies (TL AT XI 5/G 5, also Pr I 73, II 5, AT VIIIA 37, 
42-3/CSM I 220, 225). When Descartes’ employs this expression, he refers to the structure 
of objects at a micro-corpuscular level, with which we are not acquainted in our ordinary 
sensory experience of the world.31 The micro-structure of objects, however, causes (at least 
partially) our (entirely dissimilar) ideas of those objects.32 In order to prepare the reader for 
                                            
30 Recall, as explained in Chapter One, that for Descartes the (PD) is not reducible to the problem of 
heterogeneity (i.e. the problem of interaction between the finite substances —mind and body). He 
regards substance interaction as a primitive fact beyond which there is, so to speak, ‘no asking why’. 
Consequently, the puzzle for Descartes is not to determine how the two substances interact qua 
different substances, but to account for the apparent arbitrariness existing between the nature of the 
cause (arrangement and motions of micro-particles conforming the external object, together with the 
isomorph formed in the brain) and the idea that is brought about in the mind as a result.  
31 This is a vital point for understanding Descartes’ derogatory claims about sensory as a source of 
information about the natural world. Sensory perception only ‘occasionally and accidentally show us 
what external bodies are like’ (Pr II 3, AT VIIIA 41-2/CSM 224) because it does not get us 
acquainted with the micro-corpuscular level. This suggests that Descartes’ doctrine of the obscurity 
and confusion of sensory perception is more fundamental than claims about the senses deceiving us 
now and then about the macroscopic features of objects. This topic will be examined in Chapter 
Four.  
32 Dissimilarity between ‘true nature’ of bodies and our ideas of those bodies is presented here by 
means of examples of what we standardly call secondary qualities. In this chapter, however, I do not 
 




his main thesis that the ideas of the objects that we perceive are different from the objects 
themselves, Descartes provides several examples of dissimilarity that he considers less 
controversial concerning the ‘true nature’ of bodies. For instance, in the case of words (that 
is, a case of conventional signs), he points to the fact that if we actually perceived the true 
nature of those words, the idea of them formed as a result would concern, amongst other 
things, air vibrating against our ears. Instead, what happens is rather different: ‘Thus if the 
sense of hearing transmitted to our thought is the true image of its object, then instead of 
making us think of the sound, it would have to make us think about the motion of the parts 
of the air that are vibrating against our ears’ (TL AT XI 5/G 5 emphasis added).   
 
In light of these considerations about context, we can read passage (A) as an alternative way 
of understanding sensory perception —a way that incorporates in a rather organic way the 
phenomenon of dissimilarity and attempts at explaining it. In other words, the passage 
presents a way of making sense of the (PD). Following the quotation, this alternative model 
of sensory perception includes that the mind receives a sign, this sign signifies (that is, stands 
for) the external object, and, by means of this semantic relation, an idea of the external 
object is formed in the mind. Finally, in this picture the mind seems to have the role of the 
interpreter. Crucially, a few lines ahead Descartes makes use of semantic terminology while 
suggesting that the mind might, indeed, not be passive in sensory perception by means of 
exercising its own causal efficacy: 
 
…it is our mind that represents to us the idea of light each time the action that 
signifies it touches our eye (ibid. 4-5/G 4 emphases added) 
 
A stronger expression of this notion appears in the Comments, including semantic terms as 
well: 
 
… strictly speaking, sight in itself presents nothing but pictures, and hearing 
nothing but utterances and sounds. So everything over and above these 
                                                                                                                            
focus on the distinction between types of qualities in Descartes. In Chapter 4 I will assess this issue 
and I will argue for the claim that the phenomenon of dissimilarity between the ‘true nature’ of 
bodies and our ideas of those bodies affects equally ideas of primary and secondary qualities.  




utterances and pictures which we think of as being signified by them is 
represented to us by means of ideas which come to us from no other source 
than our own faculty of thinking (CB AT VIIIB 360-1/CSM I 305) 
 
It is, at any rate, perhaps too soon to establish such a conclusion about the mind’s causal 
efficacy in sensory perception. A few more aspects of the passage above still need to be 
pointed out. For example, it cannot be denied that the passage contains an analogy between 
conventional and natural signs. The analogy serves the concrete purpose of dismantling the 
similarity policy that underpins a standard Aristotelian-Scholastic doctrine (Wilson 
1991:296). It is meant to ease the transition between two models of sensory perception, and 
it can be read as intended for a sceptical reader that will need some convincing. The 
question, however, is whether the analogy introduces something else that might count as a 
genuine aspect of the Cartesian theory of sensory perception. I argue for the claim that, 
apart from effectively ruling out a similarity assumption, the analogy has the capacity of 
offering a substitute for it. Passage (A), so I contend, is better understood as making initial 
use of an analogy for the further purpose of constructing an argument that functions by 
means of an a fortiori component. It can be reconstructed as follows: 
 
(P1) While being entirely dissimilar from its significatum, a sign has the ability 
of directing thought towards that which is being signified. 
 
(P2) Words (for instance) signify only through human convention, and that is 
nevertheless sufficient to direct our thought towards their referent. 
 
(P3) (Descartes’ assumption) A human convention is an imperfect version of a 
convention established by Nature (meaning that anything that humans can do, 
natural institution can do more perfectly) 
(C) Therefore, a fortiori, nothing prevents Nature from having established a 
semantic relation between quantitative notions (constituting the object and its 
isomorph in the brain) and qualitative notions (constituting the idea of the 
object formed in the mind). 
 
I now concentrate on two considerations about this argument:  
 




(I) The first one is what I have named ‘Descartes’ assumption’ in (P3), which is what 
makes the argument work (i.e. anything that humans can do, natural institution can 
do more perfectly). I believe that Descartes’ assumption amounts to an a fortiori 
postulation that makes of the analogy between conventional and natural signs 
something more than an analogy. If the introduction of the example of words was 
intended just as an analogy, and the introduction of natural signs just as 
metaphorical talk, the accent of the argument would not need to be on the 
reliability and the robustness of the correlation between the sign and the 
significatum (‘if words, which signify something only through human convention, 
are sufficient to make us think of things to which they bear no resemblance…’). If 
the passage was not meant to establish any further point about the workings of 
sensory perception, it could simply include an analogy the upshot of which would 
be that language functions like nature, or vice versa. What Descartes is telling us in 
passage (A), however, is that nature functions better than language. The analogy 
with conventional signs seems to serve the purpose of introducing the important 
point that nature works by means of a more sophisticated semantic scheme. 
Presumably, something that makes nature’s workings superior in this respect is the 
necessary character (that is, not subjected to human convention) of the correlation 
between sign and significatum. 
 
(II) The second consideration involves the phenomenon of dissimilarity. Before going 
any further, recall that dissimilarity is the shared feature that all of Descartes’ 
semantic schemes revolve around (as seen in §2). Natural signs are no different, 
given that they appear in the text as an explanatory device for sensory perception. 
Passage (A) advances the claim that, if human convention (being so counterfactually 
fragile in a nominalist picture, it could be added) is able to exert influence on our 
mind in such a consistent and effective manner (by always prompting the creation 
of the appropriate idea of the significatum in the mind), natural ordination is all the 
more capable of bridging the gap between physical and mental states (between the 
‘true nature’ of objects, the brain states, and the ideas of those objects in our mind). 
Dissimilarity plays an important part in this scheme, of course. The a fortiori 
component of ‘Descartes’ assumption’ (P3 in the argument) also encompasses this 




aspect: if something human-made (language) can operate despite of the presence of 
complete dissimilarity, something instituted by nature (sensory perception) can all 
the more bridge a dissimilarity gap mutatis mutandis. The result, after ‘all relevant 
changes have been made’, reveals that, in the case, of natural signs, the correlation 
between sign and significatum is in a way necessary. 
 
 
3.1.1. The necessity of an arbitrary correlation 
 
A question appears now: what does it mean that the connection between sign and 
significatum is ‘necessary’ in this context? To begin with, one could object at this point that 
natural ordination is in no way superior to human convention because both are recognised 
by Descartes as arbitrary. Certainly, Descartes asserts on several occasions that the particular 
correlations between physical states and mental states that we are familiar with could have 
been otherwise. A treatment of this topic appears notably in Meditation Six in the context of 
recounting the union of mind and body:  
 
God could have made the nature of man such that this particular motion in the 
brain indicated something else to the mind; it might, for example have made 
the mind aware of the actual motion occurring in the brain, or in the foot (…) 
or it might have indicated something else entirely (AT VII 88/CSM II 60-1)33 
 
The reason for concluding this, according to Descartes, is that there is no apparent 
intelligible connection in the correlations between physical and mental states (ibid. 76/53). 
From this, it cannot be denied that natural signs seem to be on a par with the rest of signs 
(conventional and external) when it comes to the arbitrary character of particular 
correlations. In other words, in this respect, correlations involving natural signs do not 
exhibit any special robustness. Yet this is not the whole story. The key for understanding 
Descartes’ position here is to qualify the reason he has for invoking arbitrariness. He invokes 
                                            
33 This idea is restated a few times throughout Meditation Six: ‘why should that curious sensation of 
pain give rise to a particular distress in the mind; or why should a certain kind of delight follow on a 
tickling sensation?’ (AT VII 76/CSM II 52-53, see also ibid. 83/57).    




it precisely due to the lack of an apparent intelligible connection. What Descartes is telling 
us here is that, upon the inspection of a sign (any kind of sign), one could never infer, a 
priori, the type of response that it will elicit in the mind. This will only be possible by 
gaining knowledge of a code (that is, knowledge of the particular correspondences and its 
expected outcomes). This is, certainly, a property that is common to external, conventional, 
and natural signs.34  
 
For example, if one could observe the isomorph that is ultimately formed in the brain as a 
result of the action of an external object on the senses, one could not derive, only from an 
inspection of it, which idea will be brought about in the mind. Similarly, by just scrutinising 
the physiological changes that lead to the passion of joy (following Cartesian terms), one 
could only acknowledge a certain discharge of animal spirits, an increased blood flow in the 
heart, and an external manifestation of those changes, for instance, in the form of blushing 
and laughter. It would not be possible to infer from that, however, the type of qualitative 
response that arises in the mind as ‘joy’. Finally, an example with conventional signs is 
similarly straightforward. An English speaker would not be able to gather anything from the 
Catalan word ‘roure’ by simply contemplating the letters that compose it —even if doing so 
conscientiously. With knowledge of the relevant code and its expected outcomes, she would 
come to know that it has the same referent as the English word ‘oak’ and the appropriate 
idea would be produced by the mind. 
 
All signs are arbitrary in this qualified sense. At the same time, nevertheless, natural signs 
seem to be endowed with a special counterfactual force. It is true that ‘God could have made 
                                            
34 In the case of conventional signs, this idea was accompanied by the nominalist stance that 
Descartes expressed, for instance, with a reference to Adamic innocence (as specified a few pages 
above). For the case of sensory perception, for instance, he writes: ‘There is simply no reason to 
suppose that there is something in fire whatever it might turn out to be, which produces in us the 
feelings of heat or pain’ (MM, AT VII 57/CSM 83). I am aware that Descartes is in this passage 
mainly taking issue with (what he identifies as) the Aristotelian-Scholastic thesis that sensation 
requires the existence of real qualities in the objects resembling our ideas of them. This confrontation 
of theories about sensory perception is explored in Chapter Four. In any case, regardless of the main 
aim of the passage, it can be seen as also illustrating the fact that without knowledge of the relevant 
correlations and outcomes, nothing about our idea/sensation of fire could be asserted by only 
examining the ‘true nature’ of fire (following Descartes’ expression).  




the nature of man’ so that, for instance, the touch of fire produces pleasure instead of pain 
(MM, AT VII 88/CSM II 60). But there is a sense in which brain states (as natural signs) 
are correlated with mental states in a more robust, stable way insofar as they are a product of 
natural institution instead of human will and, crucially, natural institution is identified in 
Descartes with an optimal divine order aimed at the preservation of the human being. In 
this sense, natural signs are to be considered arbitrary but not contingent because the order 
of nature, as stemming from God’s initial ordination via a principle of parsimony,35 grounds 
them as correlations that, in this precise sense, could not have been otherwise.36 Across 
Descartes’ taxonomy of signs, only natural signs present, despite their arbitrariness as 
qualified above, an advantage of such magnitude. The treatment of the topic in Meditation 
Six sketched above includes a conclusion to this effect:  
 
Any given movement occurring in the part of the brain that immediately affects 
the mind produces just one corresponding sensation; and hence the best system 
that could be devised is that it should produce the sensation which, of all 
possible sensations, is most specially and most frequently conducive to the 
preservation of the healthy man. And experience shows that the sensations 
which nature has given us are all of this kind; so there is absolutely nothing to 
be found in them that does not bear witness to the power and goodness of God 
(ibid. 87-8/60). 
 
Before finishing the section, it is worth recapitulating two implications of Descartes’ 
treatment of natural signs. First, the manner in which he conceives of natural institution as 
working ‘better’ than human convention in the analogy of the Treatise on Light refers to his 
particular way of making necessary the arbitrary correlations between physical and mental 
states. I contend that this idea is encapsulated by what I have called ‘Descartes’ assumption’ 
in the reconstruction of his argument, and that it is what suggests more forcefully that 
Descartes is not employing metaphorical terms. Second, however problematic Descartes’ 
                                            
35 It is rather clear that Descartes counts on the principle of parsimony, for different purposes, 
throughout his entire corpus. In the Treatise on Light, for example, he declares that ‘Nature always 
acts by the simplest and easiest means’ (AT XI 201/G 168). 
36 Descartes’ allusion to the functional argument for survival seems to support this conclusion. 




argument for the preservation of the human being might be on its own,37 it provides the 
tools, as we have seen, for understanding better what underpins ‘Descartes’ assumption’ in 
the analogy between types of signs.  
 
Finally, it will prove valuable to bear in mind that, amongst Descartes’ descriptions of the 
interaction between brain and mind in sensory perception, the appearance of natural signs is 
the only one, to my knowledge, that is equipped with a claim about ‘how strong’ is the 
connection between brain states and mental states. Dissimilarity (or the apparent lack of 
intelligibility) does not compromise these correlations. One could imagine the otherwise 
successful correlations established by means of conventional signs failing in some way (let us 
imagine a case involving illiteracy, or a case of miscommunication). But, if even with these 
shortcomings language functions remarkably well, that tells us something about how 
successful a system of natural signification must be. This textual fact, I believe, is one of the 
instances that unveils Descartes’ effort in exhausting naturalistic explanations in accounting 
for the interaction of the brain and the mind. I will assess the scope of Cartesian naturalistic 
explanations in §4 of this chapter. Before that, I finish §3 by offering additional textual 
support for a semantic model. 
 
 
3.2. NATURAL SIGNIFICATION IN DESCARTES’ TEXTS 
 
Certainly, a defence of a semantic model for sensory perception in Descartes requires 
more textual support. The question is now whether there is a way of consistently identifying 
the semantic scheme from the Treatise on Light, examined in the previous section, across 
                                            
37 Briefly, the argument for the preservation of the human being (the preservation of the union of 
mind and body), could be charged, for instance, with circularity. To the question of why certain 
correlations between physical and mental states are the case, Descartes responds with the claim that 
such correlations are the better suited for survival. But that in a way restates the question itself again 
—why are such correlations the better suited for survival? On another note, the argument can also be 
charged with appealing to a teleological explanation (certain correlations between physical and 
mental states are the case because of a natural goal of survival of the human being). On the face of it, 
this clashes with a notable aim of Descartes’ natural philosophy i.e. to eliminate teleology from 
explanation of natural processes. This is not, in any case, a fatal criticism. For a reconciling 
interpretation, see Simmons (2001).  




Descartes’ descriptions of sensory perception. By means of an analysis of the rest of relevant 
passages I single out a constant approach to sensory perception in which (a) there is a sign 
and a significatum, (b) those roles are always attributed to the same components of the 
process, and (c) there is no metaphorical talk involved. 
 
The second relevant passage to consider is found in Meditation Six, where Descartes 
outlines again the interaction of brain and mind using semantic terms. There, he writes that 
in sensory perception, ‘signals’ are ‘presented to the mind’ and, as a result, a sensation is 




Every time this part of the brain is in a given state, it presents the same signals to the 
mind, even though the other parts of the body may be in a different condition 
at the time (…) For example, when the nerves in the foot are set in motion in a 
violent and unusual manner, this motion, by way of the spinal cord, reaches the 
inner parts of the brain, and there gives the mind its signal for having a certain 
sensation, namely the sensation of a pain as occurring in the foot (AT VII 
86/CSM II 59-60, emphases added) 
 
Again, the picture of the process of sensory perception that Descartes presents in this passage 
is one in which brain states act as signs of certain physical interactions between objects and 
the perceiver’s body (the significatum). Brain states, consequently, are signs of something for 
the mind. As a result, the mind produces the outcome of the semantic relation, that is, it 
produces a sensory idea. Note that, even if very concisely, Descartes leaves room in this 
extract for the mind’s own causal efficacy —the brain state, he writes, ‘gives the mind its 
signal for having a certain sensation’.  
 
Passage (B) and its context express with particular clarity that the role of the (natural) sign is 
to be attributed to brain states, and not to any other component of the process. We read 
that it is only the brain —and specifically its inner parts— where signals are presented to the 
mind. Just a few lines before, Descartes had also written that ‘the mind is not affected by all 
parts of the body, but only by the brain, or perhaps just by one small part of the brain, 
namely the part which is said to contain the “common sense”’ (ibid. 86/59). Now, 




according to Descartes’ earlier physiological studies, we also know that what is located in the 
interior cavities of the brain is the pineal gland38 and that the isomorph of the external 
object is formed there (as a result of the process set off by external objects and carried out by 
the action of the nerves and the precursory electrical impulses that are the animal spirits). 
The equivalence of these descriptions provides a good case for considering, beyond doubt, 
that the role of the sign in this semantic scheme belongs to the isomorph (which is, at any 
rate, a certain brain state).  
 
Finally, the last passage to inspect is found in the Fourth Discourse of the Optics, where 
Descartes mentions signs in the context of rejecting a standard Aristotelian-Scholastic 
doctrine that casts sensory perception in terms of a necessary, given similarity between 
external objects and ideas. After criticising the explanatory impotency of such theory,39 he 
introduces an alternative conception of the transmission of information: first from the 
objects to the brain, and then from the brain to the mind. He follows a similar strategy as in 
the Treatise on Light by extrapolating the operation of conventional signs to the function of 
the isomorph formed in the brain. Once more, the function that they have in common is 




We should, however, recall that our mind can be stimulated by many things 
other than images - by signs and words, for example, which in no way resemble 
the things they signify […] Now we must think of the images40 formed in our 
                                            
38  Descartes inherited the Aristotelian notion of ‘common sense’ (sensus communis) from the 
Scholastics, and he defined it as an actual place in the brain which receives the different information 
from the five external senses and unifies it in a single structural representation of an object. 
39 ‘For since their conception of the images is confined to the requirement that they should resemble 
the objects they represent, the philosophers cannot possibly show us how the images can be formed 
by the objects, or how they can be received by the external sense organs and transmitted by the 
nerves to the brain’ (Op AT VI 112/CSM I 156) 
40 By ‘images’, Descartes refers here to what I have been referring more technically as ‘isomorph’ and, 
more generally, as ‘brain state’. There is, in Discourse Four of the Optics, an important transition to 
an alternative way of conceiving of the state of the brain in sensory perception. It is understandable, 
in this context, that Descartes’ terminology still has an Aristotelian-Scholastic tone. As I see it, he is 
especially cautious in this transition in order to convince a sceptical reader. He maintains the term 
 




brain in just the same way, and note that the problem is to know simply how 
they can enable the soul to have sensory perceptions of all the various qualities 
of the objects to which they correspond - not to know how they can resemble 
these objects (Op AT VI 112-113/CSM I 165-166 emphasis added) 
 
Interestingly, Descartes’ choice of words in this passage includes ‘stimulation’ (or the similar 
‘excitation’, since the original French text reads ‘exciter’) for capturing the action by means 
of which semantic relations work. We are also asked to think of sensory perception ‘in just 
the same way’ (‘en même façon’). Presumably, then, we can reconstruct a picture of the 
theory of sensory perception in which the isomorph formed in the brain is dissimilar in a 
non-problematic way from the external object that primarily caused it, but dissimilar 
nonetheless.41 This isomorph excites, or stimulates, the mind to form a sensory idea. 
Consequently, the scheme that passage (C) displays is equivalent to that of passages (A) and 
(B). A brief argument can be reconstructed for showing, in particular, the resemblance of 
(C) with the argument of the Treatise on Light, given that they both have their starting point 
in an analogy with conventional signs: 
 
(P1) Conventional signs do not resemble the things that they signify, and 
they are able to excite the mind. 
 
(P2) We must think of the isomorph formed in the brain during sensory 
perception ‘in the same way’. 
 
 
(C) Therefore, the isomorph does not resemble the thing that it signifies, 
and it is able to stimulate the mind. 
                                                                                                                            
‘images’ while asking, at the same time, that one should think of their nature ‘in an entirely different 
manner’ (ibid. 112/165).   
41 Recall, as exposed in Chapter One, that there are two instances of dissimilarity in the process of 
sensory perception. The first one occurs between the external object and the isomorph ultimately 
formed in the brain as a result. The second one is what I have been referring to as the Problem of 
Dissimilarity (PD). I have labelled the former as ‘non-problematic’ because it is explained in a 
naturalistic way by Descartes’ mechanistic physiology in terms of motion correspondences that 
mirror the geometrically derived properties of objects and that are transmitted through the nerves 
and to the brain by the action of the animal spirits. It is, therefore, an instance of dissimilarity (two-
dimensional brain states do not resemble the physical objects that we experience), but it is traceable 
as a naturalistic explanation. An approach to this notion of dissimilarity is developed in Chapter 
Four, where the focus is an assessment of primary and secondary qualities.  





In summary, these two additional passages restate a scheme in which the roles of the sign, 
the significatum, and the interpreter of their correlation are attributed to the same 
components of the process. Now, even though a textual analysis can assist in the task of 
presenting a semantic model as a plausible interpretation, the fact that Descartes writes 
about natural signs and signification with a genuine metaphysical purpose might still appear 
odd from the point of view of the philosophical context of the seventeenth century. I finish 
§3 with a brief look at the historical precedent of Descartes’ semantic model. 
 
 
3.2.1. Brief overview of precedents 
 
Indeed, Descartes’ reference to natural signs has been characterised in the literature as 
a ‘startling’ addition (Slezak 2000:543), as presenting a scheme that is the reverse of what 
one might expect from Descartes’ system of philosophy (Yolton 1984:23), and as not having 
a clear place in the early modern philosophical context (Yolton 1996). In a slightly more 
positive tone, it has also been looked on as an ‘intriguing but implausible’ model (Simmons 
2003:561). While a causal-semantic model for sensory perception is not (at least explicitly) 
an overwhelmingly preferred model throughout the early modern period, to consider it as 
anomalous and as unnecessarily bizarre is also a mistake. As a matter of fact, a study of the 
nature and type of signs (i.e. the discipline of semiotics) flourished during the Middle Ages, 
and it became a common topic in the disputationes of the late Scholastics.42 Specifically, the 
Conimbricenses produced an in-depth treatment of signs that Descartes most likely read 
during his studies at La Flèche. The Conimbricenses (in English, the ‘Coimbra 
Commentators’, or ‘Coimbrans’) were a group of Jesuits at the University of Coimbra 
(between 1592-1606) that produced a set of commentaries on Aristotle’s works that were to 
                                            
42  Also referred as ‘Second Scholasticism’, Late Scholasticism corresponds to the period of 
revitalisation of scholastic thought in the sixteenth century and the first decades of the seventeenth 
century. Amongst other scholastic schools of thought at the time, the Society of Jesus (founded in 
Spain in 1540 by St. Ignatius of Loyola) became an important intellectual force. The list of notable 
Jesuit thinkers includes Francisco Suárez, Pedro da Fonseca (who received the epithet of the 
‘Portuguese Aristotle’), and the influential group at the University of Coimbra (Portugal) that 
received the name of Conimbricenses. I focus on them in the upcoming paragraphs.  




be used as normative philosophy textbooks. Their commentaries became remarkably 
popular —they were reprinted several times during the seventeenth century and they were 
distributed even in Protestant countries (Solère 2015:150). These commentaries were part 
of the curriculum at La Flèche at the time of Descartes (who studied there from 1606 to 
1615). He reminisces about that twice in his correspondence with Mersenne.43 Descartes 
does not acknowledge a concrete influence of the Conimbricenses on his thought (yet that 
was not his habit regarding any intellectual debts, Scholastic or otherwise),44 but it is 
nevertheless worth noting that they examined the nature and types of signs in their extensive 
commentary of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione (the second part of Aristotle’s Logic —or 
Organon). Most importantly, they drew at least two distinctions between types of signs that 
are reflected in Descartes’ own treatment —be that deliberate or coincidental. The first one 
(1) is a distinction between ‘natural signs’ and ‘signs by institution’ that is similar to the one 
that Descartes establishes between natural and conventional signs. They state, first of all, 
that ‘a sign is anything which represents something other than itself to a knowing power’ 
(Q.2, Art.1/Doyle 2011:57). That being said, natural signs are those that have the capability 
to represent things by its own nature, whereas signs by institution need someone to impose 
that capability on them. While the former ‘signify the same thing for all’, the latter are in 
                                            
43 ‘I am due to receive the objections of the Jesuits, and I think I should hold myself in readiness for 
them. Meanwhile I should like to reread some of their philosophy, which I have not looked at for 
twenty years. I want to see if I like it better now than I did before. For this purpose, I beg you to 
send me the names of the authors who have written textbooks of philosophy, and to tell me which 
are the most commonly used, and whether they have any new ones since twenty years ago. I 
remember only some of the Conimbricenses, Toletus and Rubius’ (To Mersenne, 30th September 
1640, AT III 185/CSMK III 154). See also To Mersenne, 3rd December 1640, AT III 251 (not 
included in the CSMK edition). In preparing the rejoinder to the philosophy of the ‘School’ that 
eventually became his Principles, Descartes tells Mersenne that he would like to write in response to 
the doctrine of the ‘Society’ (of Jesus) in general, rather than to criticise a specific author. For these 
purposes, so he writes, the commentaries of the Conimbricenses that he got to know at La Flèche are 
‘too long’ (‘Les Conimbres, ils sont trop longs; mais je souhaiterais bien de bon cœur, qu'ils eussent 
écrit aussi brièvement que l'autre, et j'aimerais bien mieux avoir affaire à la grande Société, qu’à un 
particulier’). 
44 For example, the distinction between formal and objective reality was present in the works of F. 
Suárez and P. Da Fonseca. Similarly, Descartes did not acknowledge the influence of Beeckman on 
his micro-corpuscular mechanism, and his mathematical natural philosophy in general (in fact, the 
relationship between the two was rather quarrelsome for years). Recently, Cristia Mercer (2016) has 
made a compelling case for the unrecognised debt of Descartes to Teresa of Ávila. She elaborates on a 
comparison between the structure of St. Teresa’s Interior Castle and Descartes’ Meditations.  




that respect less reliable because they are subjected to human will.45 This idea is reflected in 
Descartes’ account of natural and conventional signs, especially in his account of what 
makes natural signification a reliable and robust correlation and, thus, a good contender for 
explaining sensory perception.  
 
In fact, the use of signs in the context of cognition had been explored before Descartes,46 
and this is apparent from the Conimbricenses’ distinction between ‘instrumental’ and 
‘formal’ signs. The precedent in the classification of signs between formal and instrumental 
has also been noticed by Behan (2000). This is the second distinction to consider. (2) 
Bearing in mind the general definition of sign mentioned above, an instrumental sign is a 
sign which we are aware of as an external object. One gets acquainted with that sign as such 
and, by mediation of it, also gets to know its significatum. Words are signs of this type. In 
contrast, formal signs are themselves not known as objects of experience, but they produce 
knowledge by ‘in-forming’ a cognitive power.47 They are, in sum, mediators in acts of 
cognition. It is possible to see in this distinction a precedent of Descartes’ formulation of 
brain states as natural signs. We have seen, throughout this section, that a key difference 
between natural and other type of signs consists in the robustness of connection that unites 
correlations between sign and significatum. At the same time, it is also possible to identify 
another important contrast whereby conventional signs are known themselves as objects in 
order to trigger the formation of an idea, while natural signs enable the formation of sensory 
                                            
45 The Conimbricenses put it as follows: ‘Certain signs are natural, others are by institution (…) 
whatever represents something besides itself has the power to make that representation either from its 
own nature or by benefit of something else (…). If it has the power from its nature, it is a natural 
sign; if it has the power by benefit of someone imposing it, then it is by institution (…) Moreover, 
natural signs are those which signify the same thing for all (…) But signs by institution are those 
which signify by human will’ (Q.2, Art.1/Doyle 2011:57). 
46 Behan (2000) traces back this idea to Augustine of Hippo, and he quotes a passage of De Doctrina 
Cristiana: ‘a sign is a thing which, in addition to the species that it impresses on the senses, makes 
something other than itself come into the mind’ (II.1/cited in Behan 2000:528). Closer to Descartes, 
Eustache of St. Paul had also worked on the topic of signs in his Summa Philosophiae 
Quadripartita (1609).  
47 ‘Everything by whose mediation we know something else must be itself first either known or not 
known to us. If it must be known, it is an instrumental sign; if not then it is formal. It is called 
formal because it causes knowledge by informing it’ (Q.2, Art. 1/Doyle 2011:59).  




ideas without being themselves objects of our awareness. Just like the formal signs of the late 
Scholastics, they seem to have the function of making cognition itself possible.48  
 
The attribution to Descartes of a Scholastic notion (even if partial, or just in some respects) 
is certainly debatable, mainly because we know of his overall intellectual aim of replacing the 
philosophy of the School. If anything, it seems that he should be read as drifting away from 
those notions. At the same time, it is not controversial to say, within the Cartesian 
scholarship, that this should not be taken at face value. Despite his undeniable new 
contributions, Descartes also maintained Scholastic metaphysical terminology (notably, 
from Suárez and da Fonseca), as well as actual bits of philosophy (for instance, the 
distinction between formal and objective reality, or his version of the ontological proof of 
the existence of God). To this conclusion, it is also worth noting that an account of 
semiotics including a distinction between natural and conventional signs lived on after 






                                            
48 Because of the interesting implications of the relation between formal and natural signs, I will look 
at it in finer detail in the last section (§4), where I consider the issue of the interpretative activity of 
the mind.  
49 Commonly referred to as ‘Port-Royal Logic’, this is Antoine Arnauld’s and Pierre Nicole’s Logic or 
the Art of Thinking (1662). This textbook on logic (which also included topics on metaphysics, 
epistemology, grammar, and philosophy of language) became the most influential of its kind from 
Aristotle until the end of the nineteenth century (Buroker 2006:xxiii). Arnauld and Nicole were 
associated with the Port-Royal Abbey, which had become the base of the Jansenist movement. In 
short, Jansenism was a French Catholic movement stemming from Augustine’s doctrine of the 
relation of free will to the need of divine grace. Jansenism centred around a low conception of the 
nature of the human being (who cannot act morally out of their own free will) which also included 
scepticism regarding the use of reason. While defending Jansenism against charges of heresy, Arnauld 
and Nicole, however, distanced themselves from such pessimistic conception and embraced 
emphatically Cartesian rationalism. The Port-Royal Logic is, in fact, a treatise on Cartesian 
philosophy. Descartes’ theory of ideas, his dualism, and even his position on language are present in 
it.  
50 ‘The third classification of signs is between natural signs, which do not depend on human fancy 
(…) and others that are only instituted or conventional’ (I.4/Buroker 1996:36-37). 





3.3. NATURAL SIGNS: COROLLARY  
 
In light of the textual analysis of this section, I extract the following implications for 
the status of natural signs in Descartes and, consequently, for the viability of a causal-
semantic model for sensory perception. 
  
First, the main objective of this textual analysis has been to challenge a widespread 
interpretation according to which natural signs are simply a figure of speech in the Cartesian 
texts and, consequently, should not be seen as indicative of any specific causal model for 
sensory perception. I have argued for the claim that, even when an initial analogy is made 
between conventional and natural signs (namely, in the Treatise on Light), Descartes can be 
read as primarily putting forward an argument to the effect that it is language that mirrors 
the superior workings of nature, and not vice-versa. By means of what I have called 
‘Descartes’ assumption’ (i.e. anything that human beings can do, natural institution can do 
more perfectly), he starts presenting a model for sensory perception in which correlations 
between physical and mental states exhibit a necessity that no other type of sign 
incorporates. The genuine (non-metaphorical) character of natural signs as a notion of 
metaphysical weight is also supported by other textual occurrences. Passage (B), which is 
found in Meditation Six, displays a particularly authoritative tone: it does not include any 
analogy nor metaphor, and it mirrors accurately Descartes’ physiology.   
 
Second, the characteristics of natural signs that have been singled out throughout the 
analysis square well with Descartes’ taxonomy of signs as presented in §2 above. There, I 
showed that Descartes’ introduction of a general notion of sign in explanation can hardly be 
considered as an anomaly. As a matter of fact, he held a remarkably stable position 
concerning semantic relations for the case of conventional and external signs. Given this, 
any charitable approach, as I see it, should consider the possibility that the third type of sign 
that enters the picture (i.e. natural signs) is also part of Descartes’ considered doctrine. In 
other words, as I have mentioned before, a semantic narrative is not foreign to Descartes’ 
thought.  





This claim receives additional support from the fact that the three characteristics that I 
singled out at the end of §2 above as the shared features of conventional and external signs 
also appear in the case of natural signs as well. They are the following: (i) they constitute a 
picture of semantic relations with the same components: a sign, a significatum, an 
interpreter of the relation between the two, and an outcome in the form of an idea of the 
significatum. (ii) The semantic relation between sign and significatum can be realised, at 
least in principle, without any conscious activity. (iii) The semantic relation appears in 
Descartes’ explanations when the phenomenon of dissimilarity between physical and mental 
states is at stake. On the basis of these common characteristics, I suggest that there is a 
consistent taxonomy of signs in Descartes. To put it simply, it makes sense to talk about 
Descartes’ considered view on signs. For further support, I have provided a brief overview of 
a philosophical precedent of a theory of natural signs (chiefly, the Conimbricenses), that 




 SECTION 4. TOWARDS A CAUSAL-SEMANTIC MODEL 
 
After having examined the textual support for a causal-semantic model (that is, the 
import of Descartes’ allusions to natural signs), I will now delve into two further features of 
my view. First (§4.1) I explore in finer detail whether it is plausible that Descartes held a 
triadic relation between a sign, a significatum, and their relation to a ‘cognitive power’ 
whose task is to interpret. Second (§4.2), I suggest that a causal-semantic model is 
particularly favourable to Descartes’ naturalism about the mental. The argument for this 
claim relies on a methodological policy called ‘Qualified Explanatory Naturalism’ (Chignell 
2009).   
 
 






4.1. SIGNS FOR A COGNITIVE POWER 
  
At the beginning of this chapter, I mentioned that a causal-semantic model reveals an 
important feature of the way in which Descartes understood the workings of sensory 
perception. This feature, as stated before, is the activity of the mind. A non-trivial sense in 
which the mind is active in sensory perception has entered the picture of the semantic model 
in the form of an interpreter, or decoder of signs. On one hand, we have looked at passages 
that suggest that the mind does something as a result of the triggering action of brain states. 
The incorporation of causal efficacy of the mind in sensory perception into a semantic 
model is seen, for example, in the Treatise on Light: ‘it is our mind that represents to us the 
idea of light each time the action that signifies it touches our eye’ (AT XI 4-5/G 4). On the 
other hand, Descartes’ taxonomy of signs offered a stable characterisation of semantic 
relations across the board that includes a sign, a significatum, an interpreter, and an 
outcome in the form of an idea of the significatum.51 Recall that this scheme is also 
contained within a standard definition of sign at the time. An archetypal version of it is the 
one by the Conimbricenses: ‘a sign is anything which represents something other than itself 
to a knowing power’ (Q.2, Art.1/Doyle 2011:57).  
 
However, an interpreter of natural signs is different from an interpreter of conventional or 
external signs in a notable way. While as perceivers we get acquainted with words and facial 
expressions as objects, we do not experience natural signs as such. Rather, it seems that 
natural signs have the prior, more fundamental role of making cognition itself possible. 
Another way of expressing this difference is by noticing that natural signs do not play a role 
in the phenomenology of the experience, but rather enable it. They appear in explanation in 
order to account for sensory experience itself. Given this difference between natural and the 
rest of signs, the question is whether there is a Cartesian way of accounting for this 
peculiarity. I examine this question in the upcoming paragraphs.  
 
                                            
51 In this sense semantic relations are called ‘triadic’.   




As I see it, a promising way to spell out the function of natural signs and their peculiar 
interpretation within Descartes’ thought is to explore a bit more the parallel between the late 
Scholastic notion of formal signs with natural signs that I introduced above (§2.3.1). In 
contrast to instrumental signs (such as words or facial expressions), formal signs are not 
themselves known as objects of experience. Their function is to inform a cognitive power in 
order for it to bring about knowledge of the significatum (Q.2, Art. 1/Doyle 2011:59). This 
is precisely the task of natural signs in Descartes’ semantic model of sensory perception. By 
means of identifying them with brain states, natural signs enable the formation of sensory 
ideas without being themselves objects of our awareness. So far, this analysis of a common 
conception at the time seems to square well with Descartes’ theory, and specifically with the 
claim that brain states trigger the mind’s own causal efficacy (meaning, consequently, that 
the mind is not passive in sensory perception). Here I anticipate a figure of the whole 
process: 
 
Figure 2. The causal-semantic model 
 
It is true that, even if it is only due to his own insistence, one should be wary of attributing 
to Descartes a doctrine of sensory perception that is in some sense Scholastic. To this effect, 
it is important to remark that Descartes’ main charge against a standard Aristotelian-
Scholastic account of sensory perception is its similarity thesis accompanied by the doctrine 
of transmission of a ‘sensible species’ from the object to the perceiver’s mind. I suggest, in 
this respect, that Descartes departs clearly from a purely Scholastic usage of semantic terms. 
For him, a semantic model is subordinated primarily to the conclusions of his natural 
philosophy. Descartes’ stance against the Scholastic theory of perception is not 
compromised by the introduction of a semantic model that employs some late Scholastic 
Significatum Natural Sign Interpreter










common terms for at least two reasons. First, we have seen that, noticeably, Descartes 
appeals to natural signs to deal with the dissimilarity between physical and mental states. 
This feature arising from his mechanism (the PD) is what shapes the theory to begin with. 
Second (2), a purely Scholastic account (such as the one from the Conimbricenses) 
identified formal signs with the ‘sensible species’ transmitted from the object as a form 
without matter.52 Descartes, however, was careful enough to assign the role of natural sign to 
brain states, accounted for mechanistically, and was emphatic beyond doubt about 
eliminating the obscure species ‘flitting through the air’ of previous doctrines (Op, AT VI 
85/CSM I 154). In this sense, it can be argued that he made the necessary changes for the 
theory not to be Aristotelian-Scholastic in its most substantial aspect. At this point, it is 
helpful to recall the passage of the Optics that we have looked at before, where Descartes 
retains the (traditional) word ‘images’ for referring to brain states but urges the reader to 
think of them ‘in an entirely different manner from that of the philosophers’ (AT VI 
112/CSM I 165). 
 
There is a further aspect of formal signs that will assist in making sense of Descartes’ view. 
Behan (2000:530-1) has noted that in the assessments made by the Conimbricenses and by 
others at the time,53 it was common to emphasise the two-fold character of signs. In 
particular, the Conimbricenses phrased this idea as the sign having two ‘dispositions’ —one 
to the object that it signifies, and the other to the cognitive power to which it represents 
something. 54  More technically, one disposition is ‘significative’ and the other is 
                                            
52 Q.2, Art.1/Doyle 2001:55,57, and particularly Q.2, Art.3/ibid. 69 
53 He refers to John of St. Thomas (also known as John Poinsot). Later on, Eustache of St. Paul (also 
known as Eustache Asseline) included a treatment of the topic in his Summa Philosophiae 
Quadripartita (1609). Incidentally, Descartes writes to Mersenne that he had bought a copy of the 
Summa to get reacquainted with the philosophy of the School for the writing of the Principles: ‘I do 
not think that the diversity of the opinions of the scholastics makes their philosophy difficult to 
refute. It is easy to overturn the foundations on which they all agree, and once that has been done, all 
their disagreements over detail will seem foolish. I have bought the Philosophy of Father Eustache of 
St Paul, which seems to me the best book of its kind ever made’ (To Mersenne, 11th November 
1640, AT III 232/CSMK III 156).  
54 ‘The True Opinion Affirming that a Sign Formally Includes Dispositions both to a Thing and to a 
Potency (…) it seems more probable that a sign formally includes both dispositions. This is first 
inferred from the definition in which both are equally expressed. And this is most right; for if we 
 




‘representative’.55 That a formal sign has a significative disposition means that, by its very 
nature, it signifies something other than itself. The representative disposition refers to its 
relation to a cognitive power by means of representing something for it. The meaning of this 
instance of representation throughout the commentary of the Conimbricenses seems to be 
equivalent to ‘presenting’ or to ‘making something present’ to the mind.56 It is interesting to 
observe that the double aspect of formal signs is able to accommodate rather well the way in 
which Descartes writes about natural signs. The two dispositions appear in the 
aforementioned passages of the Treatise on Light and Meditation Six:  
 
It is our mind that represents to us the idea of light each time the action that 
signifies it touches our eye (TL, AT XI 4-5/G 4, emphases added) 
 
Every time this part of the brain is in a given state, it presents the same signals to 
the mind (M, AT VII 86/CSM II 59, emphasis added) 
 
A description of interaction between brain and mind in terms of the ‘presentation’ of brain 
states to the mind also appears in the Passions (PS I 32), and it is also how Descartes 
accounts for imagination in the Meditations (AT VII 75/CSM II 52). This textual fact has 
led some commentators —notably Wilson (1999)— to declare that Descartes’ favoured a 
‘presentation model’ for sensory perception, within which the allusion to natural signs (and 
to signification in general) is regarded as an analogy with the sole objective of making a 
point about dissimilarity between sensory ideas and their physical causes (1999:43). I 
believe, on the contrary, that the semantic model is the one that encompasses within its 
workings the presentation activity, rather than vice-versa. It is certainly clear from the texts 
that Descartes holds that the brain ‘presents’ information to the mind. But he also makes 
                                                                                                                            
reflect, the whole nature of a sign cannot be grasped unless we conceive its power to make something 
an object for some potency’ (Q.1, Art.1/Doyle 2001:41). 
55 Note that this distinction between signification and representation is different from the one that 
Yolton (1984, 2000) elaborates on. He claims that the difference stands on the fact that signification 
is a non-causal link that connects dissimilar items (such as physical and mental states). 
Representation, he suggests, is a causal link that operates by means of resemblance (such as the 
connection between external objects and brain states). As I have stated above (§1), I do not find in 
the Cartesian texts any support for this division.  
56 ‘The meaning of the word ‘represent’ indicates that; for to represent is to make something present’ 
(Q.1, Art.2/Doyle 2001:47, see also Q.1, Art.1/ibid. 41). 




reference to the brain ‘giving signals’, ‘giving occasion’, ‘giving means’, ‘affecting’, 
‘stimulating’, ‘exciting’, and ‘making the soul sense’, and it is not obvious how these 
occurrences are incorporated into a presentation model.  
 
In this regard, an interpretation of Descartes’ doctrine in terms of a semantic model has an 
advantage that I mentioned in passing at the beginning of the chapter. Namely, it does a 
good job of integrating disperse terminology. In a model in which brain states function as 
natural signs (meaning that natural signs signify external objects and present information to 
a cognitive power that functions as an interpreter of semantic relations), it is possible to 
retain ‘presentation’ terminology while at the same time incorporating the rest of 
expressions. On one hand, within the Cartesian model, it is not odd to affirm that insofar as 
natural signs signify an external object to the mind, they ‘present’ it, and thus they elicit the 
activity of the mind by means of ‘stimulation’, ‘excitation’, or by ‘giving means’. These 
expressions admit of a rather natural reading as encouraging the mind’s own activity. 
Interestingly, this peculiar kind of causal activity57 also mirrors the way in which the 
Conimbricenses formulated the function of signs in respect to a cognitive power as one of 
‘influencing’ and ‘arousing awareness’.58 On the other hand, associationism (AT IV 604), 
occasionalist expressions, and mentions of ‘natural institution’ find a place in a semantic 
model because they can be seen as contained within the notion of a code. The naturally 
(and, in Descartes, divinely) instituted correlations between objects, brain states, and sensory 




                                            
57 Recall that this echoes the conclusion that I presented in Chapter One, according to which 
Descartes envisages the operation of a cause of a peculiar sort for the interaction of the brain and the 
mind in sensory perception. 
58 ‘That is, a sign is said to be that which, perceived by some sense, is the cause of a knower’s being 
carried by its influence to the knowledge of something else’ (Q.1, Art1/Doyle 2011:39). ‘A sign is 
what is put in the place of a thing and arouses awareness (‘notitiam affert’) of that thing’ (ibid.).  





4.2. DESCARTES’ QUALIFIED EXPLANATORY NATURALISM 
  
In the final section of the chapter, I complete the characterisation of a causal-semantic 
model by assessing one main explanatory advantage that is has over rival models. Even 
though there is, in Descartes’ theory, an ultimate appeal to divine will, a causal-semantic 
model attempts to exhaust the naturalistic explanations available for the interaction between 
the brain and the mind in sensory perception. Chignell (2009)59 has formulated this 
through a methodological approach that he calls ‘Qualified Explanatory Naturalism’. This 
approach is congenial to Descartes’ goals as a natural philosopher and, in particular, as a 
rationalist. He defines sharply in the following way (2009:16): 
 
(QEN) The policy of not resorting to supernaturalistic appeals until naturalistic 
explanations have been exhausted. 
 
To express it in finer detail, (QEN) counts, in the context of a theory of sensory perception, 
as a methodological strategy that aims at securing a model that is as grounded as possible in 
the powers and dispositions of the human brain and the human mind. Following (QEN), 
God’s action (although it will certainly appear at some point) is adjourned as much as 
possible.  It is worth stating once again, as I contended in Chapter One, that a denial of 
genuine causal powers is not a plausible reading of Descartes’ picture of sensory perception. 
This is not a guarantee of an immediately obvious improvement in the intelligibility of the 
theory, and it is certainly not a view without complications. But in any case, it is a textual 
fact that one should give full credit to Descartes’ remark to Elizabeth that ‘we have 
heretofore confused the notion of power with which the soul acts on the body with the 
power one body has to act on another’ (AT III 667/S 66). The way to spell out this basic 
affirmation about the presence of genuine causes that are not efficient (i.e. transeunt) varies 
in the literature (as it varied at the time of Descartes). For example, associationism, 
occasionalism, and a reading in terms of natural institution are models of causation that 
                                            
59 In this section I follow closely the some of the insights by Chignell (2009) that I will highlight 
accordingly. 




attempt to explain body-mind interaction while taking seriously Descartes’ talk of brain 
states as ‘occasions’ for the mind. The appearance of natural signs in the texts has sometimes 
been read as a partial (and often non-literal) feature subordinated to these other models (see, 
for instance Rozemond 1999, Wilson 1991). Before delving into the explanatory advantage 
of the causal-semantic model, I characterise briefly the three other contenders.  
 
• Associationism is the view that all that there is to say about the causation at stake 
between physical and mental states is that they exhibit constant conjunction. A 
brain state B is consistently followed by a mental state M.60 
 
• Occasionalism states that what bridges physical states with mental states is the 
ongoing causal activity of God. Every time that a brain is in state B, God intervenes 
as a causal agent in bringing about mental state M. This general formulation refers 
strictly to what has been named ‘strong’ or Malebranchian occasionalism, in which a 
certain physical state is an ‘occasional cause’ for the genuine causal efficacy of God.61 
 
• Natural institutionalism includes finite, genuine, causal connections between 
physical and mental states and ultimately invokes prescribed psycho-physical laws 
stemming from an initial, single divine act of ordination. Hence causation between 
brain and mind, unlike in the occasionalist model, is self-sufficient to a greater 
extent. And unlike the case of associationism, a reading along the lines of natural 
                                            
60 This is, in order words, Humean associationism. The reading of Descartes as an associationist has 
been supported by Richardson (1982) and Loeb (1982). Chignell attributes it also to Wilson (1991), 
but I don’t think this is correct. As I read her proposal, Wilson’s ‘presentation model’ aims at 
providing at least a partial story about the doings of the brain and the mind in sensory perception.  
61 It is noteworthy that for Malebranche and other Cartesians at the time (such as Géraud de 
Cordemoy and Claude Clerselier), the motivation for endorsing occasionalism is the doctrine that 
finite causes cannot be proper causes precisely because of their finitude (Garber 1993:24-5). This 
nuance sheds light on an understanding of occasionalism as different than an ad hoc solution to the 
mind-body problem. Garber (1993) has endorsed an occasionalist reading of Descartes on causation 
(including, interestingly, body-to-body causation). Nadler (1994) has differentiated ‘strong 
occasionalism’ from ‘occasional causation’, while attributing to Descartes only the latter. In 
occasional causation, the brain and the mind, and not God at that stage, are genuine causal powers. 
He puts it in this manner: ‘a relationship of occasional causation exists when one thing or state of 
affairs brings about an effect by inducing (but not through efficient causation) another thing to 
exercise its own causal power’ (Nadler 1994:39).  




institution adds a further level of naturalistic explanation by saying a bit more about 
why certain physical states are correlated to certain mental states. It provides, in 
other words, more than a sequential concurrence of physical and mental states. This 
type of model also has the merit of being able to incorporate the causal activity of 
the mind that is strongly suggested by Descartes’ terminology: according to a 
psycho-physical law L that stems from God’s ordination of nature, a brain state B is 
an occasion for prompting the causal efficacy of the mind, which causes a mental 
state M.62 
 
Now, a causal-semantic model also reaches ‘explanatory bedrock’ (Chignell 2009:5) by 
invoking God’s ordination in the end. As a matter of fact, that God appears at some stage to 
explain the order of nature is a straightforward feature of Descartes’ model. The point, 
however, is to determine when God appears, and to what extent ‘He’ is implicated in the 
causal processes of the world. In a causal-semantic model, the specific correlations between 
sign, significatum, and outcome of the process (a specific sensory idea) are instituted by God 
in an initial, single, act of creation (accompanied in Descartes, as we have seen, by the 
operation of a principle of parsimony). In this regard, natural institution and the causal-
semantic model are on a par. Furthermore, both models identify, in some degree, (QEN) as 
the methodological approach that Descartes adopts tacitly throughout his system of 
philosophy. On the contrary, associationism, for example, might be able to accommodate 
some textual occurrences in which Descartes is remarkably brief in his depictions of the 
theory of sensory perception, but it falls short, I believe, when it comes to explaining why he 
devoted so many pages and intricate terminology (‘excite’, ‘stimulate’, ‘represent’, ‘give 
means’) to explain the occurrence and the qualitative nature of sensory ideas. Crucially, 
however, in line with the aims of a rationalist natural philosopher like Descartes, a causal-
semantic model does not only reveal an effort to account for the process of sensory 
perception in finite, genuine causal powers, but it is the model that does so to a larger 
extent. This interpretation runs as follows.  
 
                                            
62 This reading is favoured by Shapiro (2003), Simmons (1999), Nadler (1994), and Schmaltz 
(1992).  




The gist of this view is that a causal-semantic model postpones the appeal to God’s 
ordination to the next level of explanation by telling us a bit more about the kind of activity 
that the mind performs as an interpreter of correlations between a sign and its significatum. 
This can be seen clearly in the comparison between the steps of explanation for a causal-
semantic model and that of a natural institution theory (Fig.3 below). As a series of 
naturalistic causal steps that lead to sensory perception, a natural institution theory offers 
the following: a correlation between brain state B and mental state M is explained by an 
appeal to psycho-physical law L, which is then explained by resorting to God’s will 
(Chignell 2009:15). As I mentioned above, the appeal to psycho-physical laws might 
integrate the activity of the mind, but it does not say much about why or how the mind acts 
on the brain, or acts within itself. Where the natural ordination view stops providing 
naturalistic explanations, the causal-semantic model adds a further level of explanation: the 
mind reads correlations between a sign and its significatum due to its interpretative ability. 
That is to say, the correlations mean something to the mind, they don’t just trigger the 
production of concurrent content in it. Another way of putting this is by introducing the 
notion that the mind acts on the basis of the natural possession of a code. Thus, the scheme 
can be reconstructed in this manner: a correlation between brain state B and mental state M 
is explained by psycho-physical law L, in the form of a semantic relation between a sign, a 
significatum, and an outcome, this is then explained by the interpretative ability of the mind 
(the correlation means something for the mind), and only after this step is the appeal to 
God’s will required.  
 
Consequently, (QEN) is further preserved in this model by means of an additional level in 
which the mind identifies meaning in correlations. After that, divine ordination is 
summoned for explaining the seemingly arbitrary specific connections between certain 
arrangements and motions of particles on one hand, and the qualitative nature of sensory 
experience on the other. This is, as in the case of natural ordination theories, the deepest 
layer beyond which there is, so to speak, ‘no asking why’.63  
                                            
63 Recall the passage of Meditation Six that has been cited in §3.1.1: ‘why should that curious 
sensation of pain give rise to a particular distress in the mind; or why should a certain kind of delight 
follow on a tickling sensation?’ (AT VII 76/CSM II 52-53). He adds a few lines ahead: ‘God could 
have made the nature of man such that this particular motion in the brain indicated something else 
 





Figure 3. Levels of Explanation 64 
 
It is worth clarifying a further aspect of (QEN). I mentioned at the start of this section, that, 
in the context of a theory of sensory perception, the objective of this methodological policy 
is to ground the process in the powers and dispositions of the human brain and also of the 
human mind. This is meant to capture the sense in which Descartes’ naturalism is also a 
naturalism about the mental. That is to say, the products of finite minds are, for Descartes, 
rightful components of the causal processes and thus of the ontological map of the world.65 
Before going any further, this means that the ‘naturalism’ in ‘Qualified Explanatory 
Naturalism’ is not equivalent to ‘mechanistic explanation’. While the counterpart of 
‘mechanistic’ is ‘non-mechanistic’ (i.e. ‘non-extended’, or ‘immaterial’) the counterpart of 
‘naturalistic’ is ‘supernaturalistic’ (Chignell 2009:16).66 In a nutshell, the explanations that 
(QEN) aims at exhausting are finite ones (whether material or immaterial), while 
postponing the (inescapable) appeal to the infinite (divine) ones. This is not to deny that, in 
Descartes, there is also a policy in play for adjourning non-mechanistic explanations. 
Charitably, an akin ‘Qualified Explanatory Mechanism’ could also be rightly identified in 
                                                                                                                            
to the mind; it might, for example have made the mind aware of the actual motion occurring in the 
brain, or in the foot (…) or it might have indicated something else entirely’ (AT VII 88/CSM II 60-
1). 
64 This table has been inspired by Chignell (2009). 
65 The fact that ideas of sensation are rightful components of the causal processes and of the true 
ontology of the world is developed in Chapter Four. 
66 Chignell makes the distinction between ‘naturalistic’ and ‘mechanistic’, but he does not expand on 
the implications for the place of sensation in Descartes’ ontological map. 
Natural institution theory Causal-semantic model
Correlation between brain
state and mental state
Correlation between brain
state and mental state
Appeal to psycho-physical laws Appeal to psycho-physical laws
(as semantic relations)
God’s will
God’s will The interpretive ability of
the mind




his natural philosophy, even if it is as a result of the goals and tools of the New Science 





 In this chapter I have presented a causal-semantic model for sensory perception as a 
theory that Descartes could have plausibly held. I have reconstructed Descartes’ taxonomy 
of semantic relations, and I have contended that natural signs are not a figure of speech in 
the Cartesian narrative. Rather, they count as proper members of a taxonomy of semantic 
relations that also includes conventional and external signs. Aside from ample textual 
support, I have also provided an overview of philosophical precedents that can assist in 
understanding the place of a semantic model at the time of Descartes. The causal-semantic 
model, I believe, has proven to be a particularly successful theory for capturing a crucial 
contribution of Descartes to the workings of sensory perception. This contribution the 
activity of the mind. Overall, this examination of the causal-semantic model has 
demonstrated a few important explanatory advantages that were anticipated at the beginning 
of the Chapter. First, this model is directly supported by a number of texts and consistent 
with the majority of texts. Second, it is particularly integrative of disperse terminology. 
Third, it incorporates a notion (natural signs) that was not unusual at the time. Finally, it 
proves to be in line with the explanatory goals of a natural philosopher like Descartes. In 
this regard, it is as much of a naturalistic explanation of sensory perception as it can be.  
                                            
67 Gaukroger’s view (2001) is a result, I believe, of the priority of ‘Qualified Explanatory Mechanism’ 
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 0. INTRODUCTION 
  
In the first and second chapters, I reconstructed a causal story for Descartes’ theory of 
sensory perception. In Chapter One, I started with a characterisation of the theoretical 
framework of the theory. On the basis of Descartes’ mindful terminological balance, I 
suggested that a theory of sensory perception should contain genuine causal powers that are 
not of the efficient-transeunt type. In Chapter Two, I supplied the materials for this scheme 
in the form of a causal-semantic model. Even though Descartes did not afford a 
comprehensive, unambiguous doctrine of sensory perception, I sustained that his 
identification of natural signs with brain states marked his most refined attempt at a causal 
model for the process. Against readings that deem the introduction of natural signs a figure 
of speech with no metaphysical import, I showed that it is plausible to regard natural signs as 
proper members of Descartes’ taxonomy of semantic relations. Furthermore, a causal-
semantic model incorporated the activity of the mind, in accordance with Descartes’ varying 
suggestions throughout his works. In short, in a causal-semantic model, the mind exerts its 
own causal efficacy as an interpreter of signs. The result of this activity of the mind is the 
production of a sensory idea, which can be understood as a semantic response that, upon 
decoding a correlation between the brain state (sign) and the external object (significatum), 
means something for the mind.    





Certainly, a reconstruction of a plausible and textually supported causal model is necessary for 
any interpretative proposal of Descartes’ thought that engages with the hypothesis that the 
mind has a substantial role in the way in which we perceive the world. At the same time, 
however, this is not the only issue that requires disentangling. Descartes also equipped his 
views on the activity of the mind with claims about innateness. Notably in the Comments on 
a Certain Broadsheet (1648), he declared somehow surprisingly that ‘in no case are the ideas 
of things presented to us by the senses as we form them in our thinking. So much that there 
is nothing in our ideas which is not innate to the mind or the faculty of thinking’ (AT VIIIB 
359/CSM I 304, emphasis added). In the literature, the view that, for Descartes, all ideas 
(even sensory ideas) are innate receives the name of ‘universal innateness’ or ‘hyper-nativism’ 
(Gorham 2002). I shall refer to it as ‘hyper-nativism’ for a clearer opposition with its 
counterpart in the Cartesian works: ‘moderate nativism’. The appearance of the notion of 
innateness is important for the hypothesis that the mind is active in sensory perception 
because Descartes invokes hyper-nativism as a consequence of the Problem of Dissimilarity 
(PD).1 Roughly, the reasoning appears to be that, since the representational content of sensory 
ideas cannot be identified with its physical causes, it cannot be brought about by them 
(Schmaltz 1997:34). Consequently, so the story goes, the representational content of sensory 
ideas must be produced innately by the mind. Once more, the causal efficacy of the mind 
appears in the picture of sensory perception —this time under the category of innateness.  
 
In this chapter I will contend that hyper-nativism is Descartes’ strategy for accounting for a 
type of mental content that is needed for the production of sensory ideas. While being the 
result of the mind’s own efficacy as well, this type of content is different from that of his 
paradigmatic innate ideas (the ideas of God and mathematical notions, for example). Now, it 
is worth observing that the introduction of innateness as a consequence of the (PD) does not 
amount to a separate causal model for sensory perception that would compromise the 
plausibility of the causal-semantic model. As I see it, hyper-nativism is not intended as a causal 
model, but as a description of the type of mental content involved in the process within the 
                                            
1 As stated in Chapter One, the (PD) refers to the lack of similarity between the qualitative character 
of sensory experiences and the quantitative nature of the physical causes of these experiences. 




theory of ideas that Descartes had established on independent grounds. To put it concisely, 
the workings of sensory perception involve the activity of the mind, which acts as an 
interpreter that contributes to the representational content of ideas. This means that there is 
a mental occurrence involved that needs to be categorised, just as others (such as judgments, 
volitions, etc.) were also given a place within Descartes’ taxonomy of the mental. For 
Descartes, the category of the innate becomes the natural place for a mental occurrence that 
is the product of the mind’s activity. This is why —as a continuation from the picture 
established by the causal-semantic model— this chapter receives the name of the ‘innateness 
strategy’. 
 
Nonetheless, an innateness strategy is not free of textual tensions. Most evidently, it clashes 
with the three-fold classification that Descartes presents in the Meditations between 
adventitious,2 factitious, and innate ideas (AT VII 37-8/CSM II 26). This taxonomy is only 
moderately nativist, meaning that only some ideas are innate. The group of innate ideas 
includes our ideas of God, of eternal truths, and of fundamental logical axioms. Beyond this 
textual tension between hyper-nativism and moderate nativism, however, a more considerable 
problem arises for the Cartesian system. Hyper-nativism appears to conflict with Descartes’ 
claim that adventitious ideas come somewhat passively from external objects. In the 
progression of the method of doubt in the Meditations, this remark prompts the argument for 
the existence of body via the axiomatic claim of the all-powerful, benevolent nature of God. 
In a nutshell, hyper-nativism compromises the three-fold taxonomy and its strategic role in 
the Meditations and, most importantly, it compromises the causal efficacy of the external 
world. In this chapter, I pursue an reconciling interpretation of Descartes’ differing views on 
ideas. Specifically, I argue that it is possible for him to hold a version of hyper-nativism while 
preserving the causal efficacy of bodies in the production of adventitious ideas. By arguing for 
this claim, I side with a group of diverse reconciling responses provided, amongst others, by 
Jolley (1990), Schmaltz (1997), Rozemond (1999), Nelson (2008), and Boyle (2009).  
                                            
2 The term ‘adventitious idea’ appears in Descartes’ theory of ideas as equivalent to what he calls 
‘sensory ideas’ in any other contexts throughout his works. Presumably, the adjective ‘adventitious’ 
provides a terminological nuance in the context of Meditation Three, where the meditator wonders 
about where her diverse ideas might come from. Since at that point of the journey of the Meditations 
the existence of a sensory faculty is still uncertain, Descartes simply hypothesises that some ideas might 
come from outside (‘advenire’). Accordingly, he labels them as ‘adventitious’. 





I structure my argumentation in three stages. In §1, I present the standard taxonomy that 
appears in the Meditations, and I explain the tension that stands between this and Descartes’ 
hyper-nativist claims. I also reconstruct the argument for hyper-nativism that Descartes 
mounts in the Comments and I identify its implicit position in previous works. In §2, I provide 
a reading of Descartes’ theory of ideas that renders the two opposed taxonomies compatible. 
Broadly, I point out that each taxonomy seeks the answer of a different causal question about 
ideas. As a result, two different (yet compatible) definitions of innateness arise. Finally, in §3, 
I sketch the implications of these definitions for Descartes’ theory of sensory perception. I 




 SECTION 1. MODERATE NATIVISM VERSUS HYPER-NATIVISM 
 
In this section I introduce the three-fold classification of ideas that Descartes introduces in 
the Meditations and I pinpoint the tension with the hyper-nativist taxonomy that emerges 
explicitly from the Comments.  
 
It is commonly agreed that a main feature of Descartes’ rationalism is the revival of a type of 
moderate nativism. In its simplest form, this is the doctrine that some of our ideas are innate, 
and so they are obtainable by the sole resources of the mind. These are (at least) our ideas of 
God, of eternal truths, and ‘simple natures’ (i.e. fundamental logical axioms).3 This view arises 
with special force from the Meditations. In Meditation Three, Descartes puts forward a rather 
forthright classification of ideas: ideas are either adventitious, factitious (invented by us), or 
innate (AT VII 37-8/CSM II 26). At first glance, and bearing in mind the taxonomy of ideas 
presented sharply in the Meditations and elsewhere, it seems that Descartes introduced innate 
ideas to explain a priori knowledge (Jolley 1990:32). For example, he also writes to Mersenne 
                                            
3 The term ‘common notion’ (‘notio communis’) was, at the time of Descartes, the way to reference 
Euclid’s axioms. Nonetheless, Descartes uses it as a synonym of logical axioms in general and even as 
referring to eternal truths (Cottingham 1993:37). 




that some ideas ‘are adventitious, (…) others are constructed or made up (…), and others are 
innate, such as the idea of God, mind, body, triangle, and in general all those which represent 
true, immutable and eternal essences’ (16th June 1641, AT III 383/CSMK 183).  
 
This is, however, just one part of the story. Most contemporary commentators have suggested 
(correctly, I believe) that innate ideas constitute an integral part of Descartes’ anti-scholastic 
theory of sensory perception, with wide disagreement in elucidating which role do innate ideas 
have, how far did Descartes go in developing the view, and whether it is compatible with the 
rest of his system.4 Again, I will argue that Descartes built innate ideas into his theory of 
sensory perception, and this means that he resorted to the notion of innateness in order to 
flesh out the type of mental content that occurs within a process determined by fundamental 
dissimilarity between sensory ideas and its physical causes. To this end I examine in the 
upcoming paragraphs the contrast between Descartes’ taxonomies of ideas.  
 
 
1.1. THE TENSION WITH THE STANDARD TAXONOMY 
 
 Readers of Descartes are familiar with the taxonomy of ideas that figures in 
Meditation Three, according to which ideas are either innate, adventitious, or factitious. I 




Among my ideas, some appear to be innate, some to be adventitious, and other 
to have been invented by me. My understanding of what a thing is, what truth 
is, and what thought is, seems to derive simply from my own nature. But my 
hearing a noise, as I do now, or seeing the sun, or feeling the fire, comes from 
things located which are located outside me, or so I have hitherto judged. Lastly, 
sirens, hippogriffs, and the like are my own invention (AT VII 37-8/CSM II 26 
emphasis added) 
                                            
4 Claims to this effect include, amongst others, the (very diverse) ones by Williams (1978), Jolley 
(1990), Wilson (1991), Cottingham (1993), Nolan (1997), Schmaltz (1997), Nelson (1998), 
Simmons (2003), Boyle (2009), Chignell (2009), and De Rosa (2010). 





We can see in the passage that innate ideas are described, in opposition to adventitious and 
factitious ideas, as derived from the meditator’s ‘own nature’, presumably in the sense that an 
innate idea is a product of the sole activity of the mind. However, the truth is that Descartes 
seldom defines concisely the notion of innate idea beyond this. In other passages, he appears 
to emphasise a sense in which innateness is merely a faculty or disposition to think of a 
particular idea. For example, he writes in his replies to Hobbes and elsewhere that ‘when we 
say that an idea is innate in us (…) we simply mean that we have within ourselves the faculty 
of summoning up the idea’ (Third Set of Replies, AT VII 189/CSM II 132). On the face of 
it, this suggests a minimal conception of innateness that is at odds with the standard 
taxonomy. Also, at times, lists of concrete innate ideas substitute actual definitions, and it 
seems to be the task of the reader to identify their unifying feature.5 The items in such 
enumerations are diverse, and sometimes they vary from text to text. In the Rules, he speaks 
of ‘simple natures’ that are known by the ‘innate light’ of the intellect, without the 
contribution of sensory perception. Examples of those simple natures are ‘what knowledge, 
or doubt, or ignorance is’ (AT X 419/CSM I 44). In Meditation Three he lists ‘my 
understanding of what a thing is, what truth is and what thought is’ (AT VII 38/CSM II 26). 
A few passages ahead, in examining the origin of the idea of God, he concludes that ‘it is 
innate in me, just as the idea of myself is innate in me’ (AT VII 51/CSM II 35). In the above 
letter to Mersenne from 1641 (the year of publication of the Meditations), he includes ‘God, 
mind, body, triangle, and in general all those which represent true, immutable and eternal 
essences’ (AT III 383/CSMK III 183). Finally, in the Comments, he challenges Regius’6 denial 
of innate ideas with the example of a fundamental logical axiom (‘things which are equal to a 
third thing are equal to each other’) while affirming that innate ideas are those that come 
‘solely from the power of my thinking’ (AT VIIIB 358-9/CSM I 303-4). For the purpose of 
the chapter, it is sufficient to note that what these passages emphasise about innate ideas is 
that they are an exclusive result of the mind’s efficacy. In this regard, they can be read in 
agreement with the standard taxonomy in the sense that the mind is fully responsible for their 
                                            
5 For a comprehensive treatment of the designations of innateness, see Boyle (2009).  
6  This is Descartes’ disciple Henri le Roy (Henricus Regius, 1598-1679). Descartes wrote the 
Comments in response to an (initially) anonymous pamphlet of his. I expand on this issue in §2. 




production. 7  This conclusion is in line with a straightforward reading of the standard 
taxonomy according to which its rationale is to establish a causal origin of ideas —where 
causal origin is equivalent to the source of representational content of each group.  
 
Nevertheless, Descartes provides, in a few occasions, what seems to be a wider definition of 
innateness that includes sensory ideas. The moderate nativism of the Meditations is allegedly 
substituted by a hyper-nativist taxonomy that is reduced to just one category: all ideas, so we 
are told, are innate. One can find this perplexing addition most famously in the Comments. 
These are three relevant excerpts in favour of hyper-nativism: 
 
If we bear well in mind the scope of our senses and what it is exactly that reaches 
our faculty of thinking by way of them, we must admit that in no case are the 
ideas presented to us by the senses just as we form them in our thinking. So much 
that there is nothing in our ideas which is not innate to the mind or the faculty 
of thinking (AT VIIIB 358/CSM I 304) 
 
Nothing reaches our mind from external objects through the sense organs except 
certain corporeal motions (…) but neither the motions themselves nor the figures 
arising from them are conceived by us exactly as they occur in the sense organs 
(…) Hence it follows that the very ideas of the motions themselves and of the 
figures are innate to us (ibid. 359/304) 
 
The ideas of pain, colours, sounds and the like must be all the more innate if, on 
the occasion of certain corporeal motions, our mind is to be capable of 
representing them to itself, for there is no similarity between these ideas and the 
corporeal motions (ibid. 359/304) 
 
Note, for the moment, that the three passages convey the same reasoning: given that there is 
a fundamental dissimilarity between sensory ideas and their physical causes, sensory ideas must 
be an innate product of the mind. It could be objected at this point that a one-off allusion to 
hyper-nativism cannot possibly count against a previous theory of ideas that, significantly, is 
deeply rooted and certainly required in Descartes’ spiritual quest in the Meditations. 
                                            
7 Here I leave aside the discussion concerning whether innate ideas are dispositions to have certain 
ideas that are otherwise triggered or fully-fledged mental contents.  




Nevertheless, the view is not incidental. First, it had already been stated, although with less 
detail, in a 1641 letter to Mersenne: ‘all those (ideas) which involve no affirmation or negation 
are innate in us; for the sense-organs do not bring us anything which is like the idea which 
arises in us on the occasion of their stimulus, and so this idea must have been in us before’ 
(AT III 383/CSMK III 183). Second, it is noteworthy that, in the very context of the 
introduction of explicit hyper-nativism in the Comments, Descartes refers the reader back to 
his work in the Optics (‘…as I have explained at length in the Optics’, AT VIIIB 359/CSM I 
304). The recommendation is so casual that it makes the reader wonder whether hyper-
nativism had already been established before, yet in a subtler manner. Together with the 
introduction of the (PD), the mention of his previously established natural philosophy can be 
taken as a first indication that Descartes is dealing here with a familiar topic. As we saw in 
Chapter One, the terminology chosen in the Optics for describing sensory perception evoked 
a type of cause that was different from the efficient-transeunt one operating amongst bodies 
within Descartes’ mechanism. This was motivated by the (PD) and it suggested that the mind 
had a substantial role in sensory perception. The treatment of this issue in the Optics is similar 
to that of The World (particularly the Treatise on Man), but of course Descartes cannot refer 
back to it because it remained unpublished until after his death. 
 
To recapitulate Descartes’ two positions, he endorses moderate nativism in the Meditations, 
while in the Comments the three categories of the standard taxonomy are reduced to one. 
Given that the standard taxonomy has become a point of reference for understanding what 
makes ideas innate, adventitious, or factitious, hyper-nativism introduces tensions in 
Descartes’ thought. It is immediately problematic for at least two reasons: one is purely 
textual, and the other concerns the philosophical consistency of the Cartesian system.  
 
(1) First, on the face of it, hyper-nativism is at odds with the sharp and seemingly authoritative 
standard taxonomy. Moderate nativism and hyper-nativism seem to mutually exclude each 
other, that is, either some ideas are innate, or all ideas are innate. It is of course possible that 
in between the Meditations (1641) and the Comments (1648) Descartes changed his mind 
about the notion of innateness. But we are not given any reasons for this change. If anything, 
the rest of the content of the Comments provides evidence for thinking that Descartes’s views 
are the same. At best, it seems, we are left with a glaring textual contradiction.  





(2) Second, and most importantly, the opposition between moderate and hyper-nativism 
creates a rather formidable tension for the Cartesian system. Recall that the classification of 
ideas amongst adventitious, factitious, and innate serves a central function in the process of 
advancing towards new truths by means of Descartes’ method of doubt. After having reached 
the knowledge that she is a ‘thinking thing’ (i.e. the discovery of the indubitable truth of the 
cogito towards the end of Meditation Two) the next step that the meditator needs to take is 
to analyse the sorts of ideas that can be found in the mind. Consequently, Descartes starts 
Meditation Three by outlining this strategy: 
 
I will attempt to achieve little by little, a more intimate knowledge of myself. I 
am a thing that thinks: that is, a thing that doubts, affirms, denies, understands 
a few things, is ignorant of many things (…) Now I will cast around more 
carefully to see whether they might be other things within me which I have not 
yet noticed (…) First, however, considerations of order appear to dictate that I 
now classify my thoughts into definite kinds (AT VII 35-7/CSM II 24-5)  
 
This passage constitutes the preamble to the standard taxonomy, which is hypothetical in 
Meditation Three (since the meditator has not yet attained knowledge of the existence of the 
external world), and it is made genuine in Meditation Six (when the existence of the external 
world has been proven). What it is most important is that, within the method of doubt, the 
step of analysing the types of ideas ‘within me’ is not only the preliminary step for a 
hypothetical standard taxonomy, but it is also the catalyst for the cosmological argument for 
the existence of God and, in turn, for the argument for the existence of the external world. 
Regarding the latter, the main point of contention is that Descartes’ hyper-nativism seems 
incompatible with his point in Meditations Three and Six about sensory ideas being received 
somewhat passively from external objects —which is what appears to be the rationale behind 
the category of the adventitious as opposed to the factitious and the innate. This compromises 
the subsequent proof of the existence of bodies, which relies upon realising a strong tendency 
to believe that sensory ideas come from external objects together with the axiomatic point 
about God’s all-powerful, benevolent nature.  
 
This amounts to the claim that, if sensory ideas are not caused by external objects (that is, if 
instead of being adventitious, they are, in fact, innate), God’s perfection is compromised. 




Descartes was categorical about the matter, most notably in his proof of the external world in 
Meditation Six: ‘I do not see how God could be understood to be anything but a deceiver if 
the ideas (of external objects) were transmitted from a source other than corporeal things. It 
follows that corporeal things exist’ (AT VII 80/CSM II 55, clarification added). 
Consequently, the possibility that the standard taxonomy might not apply anymore in light 
of the hyper-nativist statements not only poses an incidental textual problem, but is also 
generates a major tension within the Cartesian system. If Descartes is genuinely collapsing 
adventitious ideas into the innate, and thus they are only adventitious in appearance, the 
external world is either made redundant or illusory. In both cases, the role of God is threatened 
by a hyper-nativist position: God is either seen as the creator of an ontologically 
overcomplicated world or as a deceiver that is no different from an evil demon. This would 
mean that, if the standard taxonomy is substituted by a hyper-nativist one, one should also be 
prepared for the collapse of deeply entrenched principles of Descartes’ thought. Needless to 
say, this is an extremely undesirable outcome. Within the literature, Nelson (2008), for 
example, has expressed concisely the general tension between hyper-nativism and moderate 
nativism in this way:  
 
This (the tension) has led commentators to object that Descartes is attempting 
to mobilize innate ideas for at least two disjoint tasks. One is providing thinkers 
with cognitive contact with fundamental metaphysical truths. The other is 
underwriting the revolutionary, mechanical theory of sensory perception. The 
alleged muddle, then, consists in lumping the distinctly perceivable innate ideas 
(and their special epistemological role) together with the sensory ideas (and their 
special explanatory role in the theory of sensory perception (…) This is one of 
the grounds for the general allegation that Descartes’ doctrine of innate ideas 
ends up muddled because he tried to accomplish too many inherently diverse 
things with it (Nelson 2008:322-3, clarification added) 
 
This conclusion, however, might be premature. In the following sections I cast new light on 
Descartes’ descriptions of moderate and hyper-nativism, and I pursue a reconciling 
interpretation. This is not to say that Descartes offers a perfectly unified, tension-free theory 
of ideas, but rather that, although he could have sometimes expressed matters more sharply, 
his use of hyper-nativism is in consonance with the main Cartesian theses and, significantly, 
it reveals his attempt to account for the contribution of the mind in sensory perception. For 
a reconciling reading, it is possible that Descartes held a version of hyper-nativism without 




discarding a non-trivial sense in which external objects cause adventitious ideas. In doing this, 
I join a group of interpretations in the literature that present ways to make the two taxonomies 
compatible to some extent, while preserving the causal role of the external world (Jolley 1990, 
Schmaltz 1997, Rozemond 1999, Nelson 2008, Boyle 2009). I will rely on some on their 
insights that will be pointed out accordingly. At the same time, I take a slightly different route 
in my reasoning. I start with a reconstruction of Descartes’ argument for hyper-nativism in 
the following section. This textual analysis will serve as a platform for the upcoming 
reconciling interpretation.  
 
 
1.2 THE ARGUMENT FOR HYPER-NATIVISM IN THE TEXTS 
 
 We have seen that Descartes offered a particularly clear instance of the thesis that all 
ideas are innate in the Comments, a short work published in early 1648, two years before his 
death in the court of Queen Cristina of Sweden. The Comments are his response to a 
pamphlet containing twenty-one articles published in 1647 anonymously by a former disciple 
of his, Henri le Roy (Henricus Regius), Professor of Medicine at Utrecht. The pamphlet was 
entitled ‘An account of the human mind, or rational soul, which explains what it is and what 
it can be’,8 and Descartes described it as being ‘issued in the form of a broadsheet which can 
be fixed to church doors’ and as expressing ‘opinions which I judge to be positively harmful 
or mistaken’ (AT VIIIB 342/CSM I 294). After reading primarily the Discourse, the Optics 
and a copy of the unpublished manuscript of The World, Regius considered himself a 
proponent of Cartesian natural philosophy. Nevertheless, his writings would make clear to 
Descartes that there were important areas of disagreement (or, at least, of misunderstanding) 
between them. For instance, in 1641, Descartes had to urge Regius to change some of the 
theses he was presenting in Utrecht under the umbrella of Cartesian philosophy in order to 
                                            
8 The original title reads: ‘Brevis explicatio mentis humanae, sive animae rationalis: ubi explicatur, quid 
sit & quid esse possit’. 




avoid the accusations of heresy that he had been careful to stay away from in the past.9 A 
deferential master-disciple exchange continued for a few years until Regius published his 
Foundations of Physics (1646) against Descartes’ advice.10 In the preface to the French edition 
of the Principles of Philosophy (1647), Descartes accused Regius of having plagiarised his 
natural philosophy and of having distorted his metaphysics, ‘on which the whole of physics 
must be based’ (AT IXB 20/CSM I 189)11. It was in response to those accusations that Regius 
published his pamphlet, thus prompting Descartes’ point-by-point response in the Comments.  
 
The exchange contains abundant points of disagreement. For the purposes of this project, I 
will focus exclusively on the dispute relating to the origin of the representational content of 
ideas, which is what induces Descartes’ hyper-nativist claims. This debate stems mainly from 
an argument that Regius presented in articles 12 and 13 of his pamphlet. In them, he claimed 
that all that we come to know has its origin in experience and that, therefore, the mind simply 
does not need innate ideas. In the light of this empiricist stance, innate ideas are simply 
redundant. Regius’ articles are the following:  
 
(12) The mind has no need of ideas, or notions, or axioms which are innate: its 
faculty of thinking is all it needs for performing its own acts (AT VIIIB 345/CSM 
I 295) 
 
                                            
9 For instance, Descartes wrote to him in May 1641: ‘In the first place, a Roman Catholic is not allowed 
to say that the soul in man is threefold; and I am afraid that people will impute to me the views 
expressed in your thesis. So I would prefer you to avoid this way of talking’ (AT III 369/CSMK 181). 
10 This is another excerpt of their correspondence, from July 1645. Descartes writes: ‘I was completely 
astounded and saddened, both because you seem to believe such things and because you cannot refrain 
from writing and teaching them even though they expose you to danger and censure without bringing 
you any praise (…) I find it necessary to declare once and for all that I differ from you on metaphysical 
questions as much as I possibly could, and I shall even put this declaration into print if your book 
should see the light of day. I am indeed grateful that you have shown it to me before publishing it; but 
I am not grateful that you have been teaching its contents privately, without my knowledge’ (AT IV 
248-50/CSMK 254-55). 
11 ‘Last year he (Regius) published a book entitled The Foundations of Physics in which, as far as physics 
and medicine are concerned, it appears that everything he wrote was taken from my writings - both 
from those I have published and also from a still imperfect work on the nature of animals which fell 
into his hands. But because he copied down the material inaccurately and changed the order and denied 
certain truths of metaphysics on which the whole of physics must be based, I am obliged to disavow 
his work entirely. And I must also beg my readers never to attribute to me any opinion they do not 
find explicitly stated in my writings’ (AT IXB 20/CSM I 189, clarification added). 




(13) Thus all common notions which are engraved in the mind have their origin 
in observation of things or in verbal instruction. (ibid.) 
 
In direct response to these articles (recall that Descartes elaborates on a point-by-point 
response to Regius’ pamphlet), he brings forward hyper-nativist claims. In their abbreviated 
versions, they contain an argument to the effect that ‘there is nothing in our ideas which is 
not innate to the mind or the faculty of thinking’, and that ‘the very ideas of the motions 
themselves and of the figures are innate to us’ (referring to the motion patterns transmitted 
through the nerves that form a figure —an isomorph— in the internal cavities of the brain). 
Again, given the moderate nativism presented in the Meditations, this passage contains an 
unexpected claim. Descartes seems to be endorsing a hyper-nativist position in response to 
Regius’ empiricism. At this point, it is worth clarifying that, for Descartes, as well as for 
Regius, the senses provide crucial information. For instance, we have seen that the existence 
of the physical world is paramount to the itinerary of the Meditations. However, contrary to 
Regius, Descartes’ way of emphasising the causal efficacy of the external world in the 
Comments is by reminding the reader of the fundamental dissimilarity between what 
constitutes the external object that we perceive, and the idea that it is formed in the mind as 
a result. This is no other than the familiar (PD), restated in the Comments in a way that 
mirrors, indeed, the treatment of dissimilarity in the Treatise on Light and in the Optics: ‘in 
no case are the ideas of things presented to us by the senses just as we form them in our 
thinking’ (AT VIIIB 358/CSM I 304).  
 
This time, however, Descartes draws from the (PD) what appears to be a more radical 
conclusion than the implications that he had (at least explicitly) contemplated in the past 
(particularly in the Treatise on Light and the Optics, following the textual analysis of Chapter 
One). His conclusion here is that precisely due to the (PD), adventitious ideas are to be 
considered innate. This is rather peculiar for at least two reasons. On one hand, by the time 
of the Comments, Descartes had already introduced the (PD) in many occasions, but this 
seemingly important consequence of it (hyper-nativism) had not appeared with it in the past 
(with the exception of the aforementioned letter to Mersenne from 1641). On the other hand, 
the hyper-nativist response is unusually strong given that Descartes was already familiar with 
versions of the empiricist position endorsed by Regius. It had been raised to him as an 
objection to the moderate nativism of the Meditations by Hobbes and Gassendi in the Third 




and Fifth Sets of Replies respectively. Gorham (2002) has also pointed this out regarding the 
rejoinder in the Comments: ‘it would have been sufficient simply to enlist familiar arguments 
leading to a modest brand of innatism about the idea of God and certain notions, as he had 
done in his responses to Hobbes and Gassendi’ (2002:357).   
 
For example, he responds to Hobbes’ rejection of innate ideas by pointing out the difference 
between imagination and intellect. He tells Hobbes that God is certainly ‘inconceivable’ in 
the sense that a human concept will never adequately represent ‘him’, but that the idea of God 
is nevertheless innate as a product of the intellect. He also reminds him that the term ‘idea’ 
does not only refer to imagistic ideas (‘images of material things that are depicted in the 
corporeal imagination’), but to anything that is perceived by the mind (Third Set of Replies, 
AT VII 188-89/CSM II 132). Also, Gassendi held a similar empiricism about the origin of 
all ideas that can also be identified in Regius’ twelfth and thirteenth articles. For he objects to 
Descartes: ‘as for the forms which you say are innate, there do not seem to be any: whatever 
ideas are said to belong to this category also appear to have an external origin’ (Fifth Set of 
Replies, ibid. 280/195). Descartes’s response contains an argument for the innateness of 
geometrical figures: ‘when in our childhood we first happened to see a triangular figure drawn 
on a paper, it cannot have been this figure that showed us how we should conceive of the true 
triangle of the geometers’ (ibid. 382/262). To Gassendi’s charge that the idea of God is formed 
by amplifying properties that we acquire by the senses, he replies again with a distinction 
between the products of ‘imagination’ and those of ‘understanding’ (here standing for 
‘intellect’ (ibid. 364-6/251-2). In both sets of Replies, Descartes’ claims are led by the notion 
of innateness that appears in the standard taxonomy. The examples that he employs (God and 
geometrical notions) are archetypical of a moderate nativist account.   
 
In the Comments, Descartes constructs an argument in favour of innateness that is significantly 
different. His response stems from what he takes to be the ‘extraordinary conclusion’ 
contained in article thirteen of Regius’ pamphlet, that is, that if all common notions that exist 
in the mind are given by the senses, this would be the same as to say that the mind cannot do 




anything on its own.12 Descartes’ response is constructed through an appeal to the (PD) that 
is supposed to show that, given that what the external objects provide is only motion patterns, 
the mind, in fact, has quite a lot of work to do by itself. The opening statement for his 
reasoning emphasises precisely this fact. To Regius’ claim that ‘the power of thinking could 
not achieve anything on its own’, he responds with a clear ‘on the contrary’. This is the passage 
that has been already cited in §1 above, now in better context: 
 
This (that the power of thinking cannot achieve anything on its own) is so far 
from being true that, on the contrary, if we bear in mind the scope of our senses 
and what it is exactly that reaches our faculty of thinking by way of them, we 
must admit that in no case are the ideas of things presented to us by the senses 
just as we form them in our thinking. So much that there is nothing in our ideas 
which is not innate to the mind or the faculty of thinking (AT VIIIB 358/CSM 
I 304, clarification and emphasis added) 
 
It is important to note that here Descartes identifies hyper-nativism, as a consequence of the 
(PD), as a reply to Regius’ claim about the ‘power of thinking not being able to do anything 
on its own’. The ‘contrary’ of an inefficacious mind, in this passage, seems to be a mind that 
is capable of bridging the qualitative gap captured by the (PD). The argument can be 
reconstructed as follows: 
 
(P1) In sensory perception, nothing reaches the mind except for an 
isomorphic representation of the geometrically reduced properties of 
objects that is formed in the brain. 
 
(P2) Ideas of external objects have a qualitative character that cannot be 
identified with the quantifiable nature of their physical causes (the 
isomorphic representation in the brain as well as what constitutes the 
external object itself). 
 
 
                                            
12 Descartes interprets Regius as thus: ‘In article thirteen he draws an extraordinary conclusion from 
the preceding article. Because the mind has no need of innate ideas, its power of thinking being 
sufficient, he says, 'all common notions which are engraved in the mind have their origin in observation 
of things or in verbal instruction'- as if the power of thinking could achieve nothing on its own, could 
never perceive or think anything except what it receives through observation of things or through 
verbal instruction, i.e. from the senses’ (AT VIIIB 358/CSM I 304). 




(C) Therefore, qualities exhibited by ideas are supplied by the mind i.e. they 
belong to the category of mental content that we call ‘innate’. 
 
This argument is restated three times in the Comments (one for every time that Descartes 
mentions hyper-nativism). Significantly, it is also the same argument that Descartes sketched 
in the letter to Mersenne: ‘the sense-organs do not bring us anything which is like the idea 
which arises in us on the occasion of their stimulus, and so this idea must have been in us 
before’ (AT III 418/CSMK 187). Now, on the basis of the analysis of this chapter, we can at 
least make sense of one aspect of Descartes hyper-nativism. Specifically, that it appears as the 
necessary outcome of the (PD) between mechanistic explanations and mental representations 
and, in that, it fills the same space that in previous occurrences of the (PD) was occupied by 
suggestions of mental activity. Due to this equivalence, I take the following claim to be a 
plausible hypothesis at this point: namely, that Descartes used a widened category of 
innateness as a late strategy (post-Meditations, to be precise) for accounting for a type of 
mental content that appeared in his naturalistic account of sensory perception.  
 
In Chapter Two I argued that Descartes held a causal-semantic model of sensory perception 
in which the activity of the mind is that of a decoder of natural semantic correlations. All the 
details of the model do not need to enter here, but recall that the mind exercises its own causal 
efficacy by interpreting meaningful correlations between a natural sign and a significatum. 
This means, in other words, that the mind brings about a type of content through its own 
causal efficacy. Importantly, the sorts of contents that are characterised by being produced by 
the mind are, across Descartes’ thought, precisely the ones that receive the designation 
‘innate’. Descartes made a patent effort in mapping a taxonomy of the mind, but it is also 
true, at the same time, that the type of mental content that appears in his doctrine of sensory 
perception is the most elusive and complex (as we saw in Chapter Two). Certainly, the label 
of ‘innateness’ is perhaps confusing, and Descartes could have elaborated on the glaring 
tension that it might generate when it is applied to ideas of sense. This does not amount, 
however, to a pessimist conclusion regarding Descartes’ theory (or theories) of ideas. In what 
follows I assist Descartes in the reconstruction of what I take to be his reconciling position 
between hyper-nativism and moderate nativism. I do this, in the next section, by recasting the 
rationale behind the two classifications of ideas that Descartes puts forward.  
 






 SECTION 2. RECONCILING TAXONOMIES OF IDEAS 
 
So far, I have presented the argument Descartes offers in favour of hyper-nativism, both 
in the Comments and in the 1641 letter to Mersenne. I have argued that the (PD) is at the 
core of Descartes’ response and that this shows that his appeal to innateness is a strategy for 
accounting for the type of mental content that figures in his theory of sensory perception. 
Now, for this interpretation to stand on solid grounds, one needs to address the major tensions 
specified above. That is, if hyper-nativist statements are to be taken as genuine, what happens 
with the foundational standard taxonomy? And, in turn, what does one make of the role of 
the external world in this philosophical scenario? In this section I analyse the rationale of 
Descartes’ differing taxonomies of ideas with the purpose of showing that they are compatible. 
To this end, I start with a short preliminary concerning two interpretative requirements.  
 
 
2.1. PRELIMINARY: INTERPRETATIVE REQUIREMENTS 
 
A tempting solution for reconciling the hyper-nativism with the standard taxonomy 
would be to downgrade hyper-nativism to a simple claim about the fact that, within Descartes’ 
ontology, all ideas are modes of mind as opposed to modes of extension. Then, when 
Descartes says that ‘there is nothing in our ideas which is not innate to the mind’ (AT VIIIB 
358/CSM I 304), he must only mean that adventitious ideas, much like any other type of 
idea, belong to the thinking substance, rather than to the extended substance. This possible 
way out of the tension between taxonomies takes in a distinction that appears in the Preface 
to the Meditations between ideas taken ‘materially’ and ideas taken ‘objectively’ (AT VII 
8/CSM II 7). From the perspective of their material reality, all ideas (regardless of what they 
are ideas of) are mental acts. Following the terms of Cartesian ontology, they are modes of 
thought, which in turn is the attribute of the finite substance of mind. However, something 
peculiar to ideas (as opposed to modes of extension) is that they can be about something. That 
is to say, they have representational content. Taken objectively, an idea is ‘the thing 




represented by that operation’ (ibid.). To read this distinction into Descartes’ hyper-nativism 
would provide a rather effortless solution.  
 
However, it would be as effortless as it is textually unjustified. In the Comments, Descartes is 
concerned with the content of ideas, not with their status as mental operations (Schmaltz 
1997:38). We have seen that hyper-nativism enters in the Comments as the direct consequence 
of the fundamental dissimilarity between mechanistic explanations and mental 
representations —that is, the (PD). The (PD), crucially, is a problem of representational 
content, and it is not concerned with ideas qua mental acts, but with the origin of the content 
of those mental acts that we call sensory ideas. In the Comments and in previous works, the 
(PD) is accompanied by a description of the process of sensory perception in which the mind 
can hardly be seen as a passive receiver of inputs from the body. Recall, most notably, that in 
the Optics he writes that the mind is ‘stimulated’ (‘excitée’), and that the isomorph formed in 
the brain ‘gives means to the mind’ (‘donner moyen’). In the Comments, the terminological 
balance (which I singled out in Chapter One) reappears: ‘on the occasion of certain corporeal 
motions, our mind is to be capable of representing them (sensory ideas) to itself’ (AT VIIIB 
359/CSM I 304). Therefore, I take the first interpretative requirement for a reconciliation of 
taxonomies to be the following: 
 
(A) An interpretation of Descartes’ hyper-nativism should preserve a meaningful 
sense in which adventitious ideas are innate, that is, a sense that is not equivalent 
to ideas taken materially.  
 
Now, given the importance of the (PD), one could be tempted to travel to the other end of 
the spectrum of interpretations and renounce to the standard taxonomy altogether, therefore 
making all ideas innate in a meaningful sense. But that would also be a mistake. As seen in 
section §1.1, the standard taxonomy is a decisive component within the method of doubt and 
the price for giving it up is simply too high. A charitable commentator, I believe, should try 
to retain a sense in which, in agreement with the Meditations, bodies are genuine causes of 
adventitious ideas. Furthermore, the Comments provide, as a matter of fact, textual support 
for maintaining the standard taxonomy. Interestingly, right before the hyper-nativist claims 
that I have sketched before, Descartes restates as valid the familiar taxonomy: 
 




I did, however, observe that there were certain thoughts within me which neither 
came to me from external objects nor were determined by my will, but which 
came solely from the power of thinking within me; so I applied the term ‘innate’ 
to the ideas or notions which are the forms of these thoughts in order to 
distinguish them from others, which I called ‘adventitious’ or ‘made up’ (AT 
VIIIB 358/CSM I 303)  
 
So there is strong textual motivation for maintaining the standard taxonomy even at the stage 
of the Comments. It is unlikely, I believe, that Descartes would ratify it and then abandon it 
immediately after in the same text. It is also important to note, as I have mentioned before, 
that his hyper-nativist statement in the letter to Mersenne happens in 1641, the year of the 
publication of the Meditations. For these textual reasons, I take the second interpretative 
requirement to be as follows: 
 
(B) An interpretation of Descartes’ hyper-nativism should keep, at the same time, 
the standard taxonomy, thereby preserving a genuine sense in which bodies are 
causes of adventitious ideas.  
 
Now that the interpretative requirements have been established, I offer in the next section 
what I take to be a more promising strategy for solving the textual and philosophical problems 
posed by hyper-nativism. I will assess the two taxonomies of ideas and identify a difference in 
their rationale. To be precise, I will contend that they are directed to two different causal 
questions about ideas.  
 
 
2.2. TWO CAUSAL QUESTIONS ABOUT IDEAS 
 
A common interpretation of the standard taxonomy of the Meditations states that the 
criterion for constructing the clear-cut distinction between adventitious, factitious, and innate 
ideas is the source that accounts fully for their production.13 This includes a claim about their 
causal origin, as well as a claim about the source of their representational content. Adventitious 
                                            
13 General treatments of Descartes’ theory of ideas include claims to this effect. See, for instance, 
Williams (1978), Hatfield (2003), and Smith (2013).  




are fully accounted for by the external world (‘things which are located outside me’) innate 
ideas by sole activity of the intellect (‘my own nature’), and factitious ideas by the faculty of 
the will (‘my own invention’). A reading of the rationale of the standard taxonomy as 
including a claim about the source of representational content of ideas is difficult (if not 
impossible) to couple with hyper-nativist statements that are also, as we have seen, about 
representational content. Either adventitious ideas get their representational content from the 
external world, and that is precisely what makes them adventitious, or they get their 
representational content from the mind and that is what merges them with the innate. Indeed, 
the standard taxonomy seems to be constructed in such a way that the three categories are not 
only ‘exhaustive but exclusive – that is to say, no idea could belong to more than one of them’ 
(Williams 1978:118). I intend to challenge this common reading of the taxonomy by showing 
that the rationale of the standard taxonomy is concerned with the production process of ideas 
rather than with the origin of their representational content. I flesh out this reasoning in the 
next paragraphs.  
 
As a starting point, I agree with Jolley’s useful analysis that Descartes’ theory of ideas, in its 
fundamental form, is an explanatory theory about classes of occurrent thoughts. In other 
words, in constructing each of the three categories (adventitious, factitious, and innate), he is 
giving a ‘possible answer to a causal question’ about ideas (1990:33)14. It is not only useful, 
but also textually accurate, to approach the standard taxonomy without an assumption about 
representational content, but rather from a more general standpoint about causality. In the 
text, Descartes does not explicitly address ‘content’ (and he does not mention ideas ‘taken 
objectively’). Rather, he frames the discussion with more general causal claims. We are told 
that ideas ‘come from’ (‘procedere’) and ‘derive’ from different sources, and that one of the 
tasks of the meditator will be to ‘perceive their true origin’ (something that is still not possible 
in Meditation Three, given that the existence of external world will be uncertain until 
Meditation Six). In order to reconcile taxonomies, the causal question implicit in the 
taxonomy of Meditation Three needs sharpening. To look for a causal source is not equivalent 
                                            
14 Jolley (1990) goes on to assert that Descartes conceived of innate ideas as having their causal source 
in a dispositional property of the mind. He does not assess, however, how focusing on the causal 
question instead of directly on representational content might affect the taxonomy, or how can one 
couple it with hyper-nativism.  




to looking for a source of representational content, and it is certainly not the same as to look 
for the only source of representational content. Descartes does not specify the precise causal 
question underpinning the taxonomy, and whereas formulating it in terms of representational 
content clashes with his parallel hyper-nativism, a different causal claim might preserve higher 
textual consistency.  
 
The causal claim at stake, I suggest, concerns the faculty that initiates the causal mechanism 
by which an idea is formed in the mind. This is what causal or ‘true’ origin means in the 
Meditations (AT VII 38/CSM II 26). That is to say, what determines the category to which 
ideas belong to (adventitious, factitious, or innate) is not their representational content, but 
the faculty in which we locate the causal origin of its production process. Following this 
reading, then, some ideas are adventitious because their production process is set off by an 
external object, some ideas are innate because their production process is set off by the sole 
activity of the mind, and some ideas are factitious because their production process is set off 
by the will. A similar story is told in the part of the Comments where Descartes restates the 
standard taxonomy. There, the emphasis is also on the distinction between the three faculties 
that set off the different production processes:  
 
There were certain thoughts within me which neither came to me from external 
objects nor were determined by my will, but which came solely from the power 
of thinking within me (AT VIIIB 358/CSM I 303 emphases added).  
 
Therefore, my point is that, on one hand, it is plausible that the criterion that constructs the 
taxonomy of Meditation Three is not a difference in representational content. Rather, it is 
concerned with the faculty that initiates a causal process that culminates with the formation 
of an idea in the mind. On the other hand, we have observed that Descartes’ focus on the 
(PD) justifies a reading of the hyper-nativist statements as being about representational 
content of ideas. In the Comments, then, the hyper-nativist taxonomy is shaped by a question 
about representational content, not about faculty origin. The two taxonomies of ideas that 
Descartes presents (the moderate nativist and the hyper-nativist) have different results, then, 
because they answer different causal questions. This means that Descartes cannot be charged 
with providing two mutually exclusive classifications of ideas. At this point, it is charitable to 
consider that Descartes did not attempt ‘to accomplish too many inherently diverse things’ 




with the category of innateness (Nelson 2008:323).15 Concisely, these are the two causal 
questions underlying the taxonomies: 
 
1. The first question is brought about by a general causal query that finds its place 
within the itinerary of the Meditations. The meditator notices that she is a 
‘thinking thing’ that has a variety of ideas, and that is what prompts an 
investigation concerning their origins that allows for the method of doubt to go 
forward. This general causal query will reach the conclusion that there are three 
different causal origins located in three different faculties that initiate causal 
processes: the world, the will, and the intellect. 
 
2. The second, hyper-nativist taxonomy is the answer to a different causal question 
motivated by one of Descartes’ main philosophical worries, that is, the (PD). As 
we have seen, the fact that adventitious ideas are dissimilar to their causes does not 
pose, for Descartes, a problem of interaction between finite substances qua 
substances, but an explanatory problem involving the specifics of the given fact of 
body-to-mind interaction. The causal question, in this case, concerns where ideas 
get their representational content from, given the phenomenon of dissimilarity.16 
This question will reach a different outcome: given the (PD), the source of 
representational content of all ideas is the mind.  
 
Then, this variation in the criterion for Descartes’ classifications of ideas produces the 
following compatible definitions of innateness. In the standard taxonomy, we encounter the 
first meaning: 
 
                                            
15 Here I refer to Nelson (2008) because of his particularly succinct exposition of the tensions that 
hyper-nativism introduces in the Cartesian system. This is a reference to a longer quotation in §1.1. 
Just to be clear, Nelson does think that it is possible to square both classifications of ideas. Ultimately, 
though, he endorses the view that, while there are only a few innate ideas (as specified in the 
Meditations, for example), these ideas inform, or make intelligible the specific adventitious ideas that 
we form. De Rosa (2010) also sympathises with this reading of innateness along the lines of 
intelligibility.  
16  I will explore in more depth the second rationale (source of representational content) in the 
following, final section.  




 (IN1) An idea is innate if the causal process that culminates in its 
 formation is set off by the pure intellect. 
 
In the Comments, we are presented with the second meaning: 
 
 (IN2) An idea is innate if the total or partial source of its representational 
 content is the mind. 
 
Before moving on to examine the implications of these two definitions for Descartes’ theory 
of sensory perception, I provide some additional textual grounds for the distinction between 
the two causal questions.  
 
To begin with, there is a notable motivation for reading the standard taxonomy as involving 
only a question about faculty origin. Crucially, if the meditator were to classify the types of 
ideas in terms of the source of their representational content, the outcome of such an exercise 
would not be the standard taxonomy as we know it. The reason lays in the category of 
factitious ideas. Factitious ideas are a result of our will and are put together by the imagination, 
but the origin of their representational content is the same as adventitious ideas. They work, 
one could say, with the same materials. In her monograph about Descartes on innate ideas, 
Boyle has most recently brought attention to this fact: ‘Descartes’ examples of his ideas of 
sirens and hippogriffs, suggest that factitious ideas are compositions of ideas that seem to come 
to him through the senses, and thus that factitious ideas are parasitic on adventitious ideas’ 
(2009:38).17 To consider that the standard taxonomy is about representational content merges 
adventitious and factitious ideas into the same category and, consequently, the taxonomy is 
dissolved. By making the taxonomy about the faculty that initiates a causal process (the details 
of which are not specified by the taxonomy), the three categories are preserved. While the 
causal mechanism that generates adventitious ideas is initiated by an external object, the causal 
mechanism that ends with factitious ideas is prompted by the will.  
 
                                            
17 Boyle (2009) does not elaborate, however, on a possible reinterpretation of the rationale behind the 
taxonomy.  




Finally, I make a couple of smaller textual points concerning the difference between the two 
causal questions. First (i), by taking a careful look at the texts, it is possible to notice the two 
causal questions as separate. Although Descartes did not offer a forthright distinction between 
them, one can detect how in the Meditations the validity of the standard taxonomy is not 
affected by the issue of dissimilarity between adventitious ideas and their causes, which is an 
issue that appears repeatedly. Immediately after the first appearance of the taxonomy in 
Meditation Three, Descartes goes on to examine why the reasons for the belief that 
adventitious ideas reveal the basic physical properties of objects are inadequate (Hatfield 
2003:154). It is noteworthy that the transition between the two issues is marked by a clear 
change of question: ‘But the chief question at this point concerns the ideas which I take to be 
derived from things existing outside me: what is my reason for thinking that they resemble 
these things?’ (AT VII 38/CSM II 26).  
 
Second (ii), it is also important to note that there is no claim in the Meditations to the effect 
that the production of representational content of each category of ideas is confined to one 
faculty exclusively. This means, I suggest, that the standard taxonomy does not rule out a 
more elaborate causal story about the configuration of adventitious ideas. In the context of 
the argument of the Meditations, the standard taxonomy has the significant aim of tying 
certain common inclinations or ‘propensities’ of ours to a foundational metaphysical truth 
about the causal origin of ideas, that is, the existence and causal efficacy of the external world. 
This, in turn, points to God’s benevolence, as it is clear from the proof of Meditation Six.18 
That is to say, God would not create an illusory or redundant world. In sum, the standard 
taxonomy does not seem to be introduced as a detailed, naturalistic story about the 
configuration of each type of ideas. In this specific sense, one could even think that the 
definition of innateness is peculiar in the Meditations, not in the Comments. Descartes 
advances the partial causal story contained in the taxonomy for an important tactical reason 
in the itinerary of the Meditations which, at the same time, confirms their causal origins in 
                                            
18 ‘For God has given me no faculty at all for recognising any such source of these ideas; on the contrary, 
he has given me a great propensity to believe that they are produced by corporeal things. So I do not 
see how God could be understood to be anything but deceiver if the ideas were transmitted from a 
source other than corporeal things’ (AT VII 79-80/CSM II 55). 




three different faculties. This is something that does not change throughout the Cartesian 
corpus.  
 
Charitably, it is also the case that Descartes provide a few details of the naturalistic process of 
sensory perception in Meditation Six, and these are in consonance with his treatment of body-
mind interaction in other works. For instance, amid his argument for the union of the mind 
and the body, he writes that ‘any given movement occurring in the part of the brain that 
immediately affects the mind produces just one corresponding sensation (…) this motion, by 
way of the spinal cord, reaches the inner parts of the brain, and there gives the mind its signal 
for having a certain sensation…’ (ibid. 87-8/60). The Meditations, however, are not the place 
that Descartes envisaged for considering the intricacies of body-mind interaction (that is, 
sensory perception) and, consequently, the implications of the (PD). 
 
All in all, I believe that the analysis provided in this section provides a plausible reconciling 
answer for the presence of two different classifications of ideas in Descartes’ works. 
Furthermore, by interpreting Cartesian hyper-nativism as stemming from a question about 
the source of representational content of ideas, this reading preserves the first textual 
requirement sketched above. It was the following: 
 
(A) An interpretation of Descartes’ hyper-nativism should preserve a meaningful 
sense in which adventitious ideas are innate, that is, a sense that is not equivalent 
to ideas taken materially. 
 
Certainly, innateness as in (IN2) is not concerned with ideas taken materially, but objectively 
(insofar as they are about something). In this section I have offered an alternative reading of 
the taxonomy of ideas that Descartes presents primarily in the Meditations. This interpretation 
eliminates the alleged textual tension by showing that it is possible to encounter two coexisting 
classifications of ideas in the texts because there are two different causal questions 
underpinning them. After determining the rationale of the standard taxonomy, now I look in 
finer detail at the question about representational content behind Descartes’ hyper-nativism. 
While doing it, I address how this reading meets the second interpretative requirement. That 
is, I show that it preserves a non-trivial way in which external objects are genuine causes of 
sensory ideas.  





 SECTION 3. AN INNATENESS STRATEGY FOR A PROBLEM OF  
 REPRESENTATIONAL CONTENT 
 
 In the previous sections, we have seen that Descartes’ theory of ideas aims at 
answering, at least, two causal questions, and that the appearance of each question is 
dependent on textual context. I have focused on the taxonomy that is primarily presented in 
the Meditations in order to show that it is not established by a distinction of origins of 
representational content, but instead by a distinction between the faculties that initiate a 
causal process (the external world for adventitious ideas, the intellect for innate ideas, and the 
will for factitious ideas). The upshot of this is that the taxonomy of Meditation Three provides 
only a partial account of the causal process of the formation of ideas. What appears in the 
Comments, then, is a story about representational content that is in line with Descartes’ 
previous claims about mental activity in sensory perception. Given the (PD), the mind must 
operate as a source of representational content of sensory ideas. I finished the previous section 
by remarking that my reading conforms to the first interpretative requirement (A).  
 
In this final section, I look at the implications of the two definitions of innateness that emerge 
from a revised analysis of Descartes’ classifications of ideas. I intend to finish my interpretation 
by showing that it also preserves the second interpretative requirement (B). That is, I argue 
that, despite his qualified hyper-nativism, Descartes maintained the causal role of bodies in 
the production of sensory ideas. I will proceed in two stages, corresponding to two brief 
sections. First, I assess how to understand Descartes’ hyper-nativist claims within his standard 
taxonomy of the mental. I focus on a short exposition of the faculties of the mind. Second, I 
make a case for considering sensory ideas as ‘innate yet adventitiously conditioned’.  
 
 
3.1. FACULTIES OF MIND 
 
 A reconciling story for the two taxonomies of ideas has not gone without scrutiny in 
the literature. The view that Descartes introduced (at least) two meanings of innateness has 
been endorsed by some commentators in different ways. To my knowledge, Rodis-Lewis 




(1950:84) is once more the pioneer of the interpretation. Williams (1978) distinguished 
between a ‘strong’ and a ‘weak’ sense in which ideas can be innate. Clarke (1983:50-2) made 
a distinction (compatible with mine) between innate ideas1 that are ‘irreducible to the type of 
reality which triggers them’ and innate ideas2 that ‘are independent from experience’. 
Schmaltz (1997) has offered a similar distinction that has, nonetheless, more textual grounds 
than its predecessors. He claims that Descartes holds two compatible senses in which an idea 
can be innate: a ‘narrow’ sense and a ‘broad’ sense. On one hand, ideas are innate in the 
narrow sense if they derive from the intellectual faculty of mind instead of the sensory or 
volitional faculty. On the other, ideas are innate in the broad sense when they are produced 
by any mental faculty (1997:40). The broad sense is, then, what determines the hyper-
nativism of the Comments. I agree with Schmaltz’s classification on the whole. As a matter of 
fact, the two definitions of innateness that I have derived from the Meditations and the 
Comments respectively square well with what he calls ‘narrow’ and the ‘broad’ senses of 
innateness. Nevertheless, I do think that the grounds for the theory trace back, in fact, to a 
difference amongst the rationale behind each taxonomy, and this is something that Schmaltz 
does not refer to. These are, then, the two qualified definitions of innateness that Descartes is 
employing: 
 
(IN1) An idea is innate if the causal process that culminates in its formation is set 
off by the intellect. This conforms to a ‘narrow’ sense of innateness insofar as 
innateness is defined by opposition to external objects and to another faculty of 
the mind (i.e. the will).   
 
(IN2) An idea is innate if the total or partial source of its representational content 
is the mind. This definition matches with a ‘broad’ sense of innateness because 
it allows for an innate idea to be at least partially formed by any faculty of the 
mind. 
 
But what does it mean that, according to Descartes’ hyper-nativism, ideas are innate because 
they can be at least partially formed by any faculty of mind? First of all, note that the faculty 
of the intellect is not mentioned in the second definition, while it does appear in (IN1). While 
a distinction between faculties is what emerged from the analysis of the standard taxonomy of 
the Meditations, in the Comments the reference is to the mind in general. In order to 
understand these claims, we need first to look briefly at Descartes’ taxonomy of the mental.  





According to Descartes, the mind has only two faculties: the intellect and the will. While the 
function of the intellect is to become aware of ideas as mental contents (to ‘perceive’ ideas, in 
Cartesian terms), the will has the capacity to act upon these contents (for example, by 
declaring whether they are true or false).19 In turn, these faculties have other modes (or 
modifications of the attribute of thought). The intellect has four modes: pure intellect, sensory 
perception, imagination, and corporeal memory (see Fig.4 below). The will provides modes 
such as affirmation, negation, and others.20 Let us focus on the modes of the intellect. The 
main characteristic of the pure intellect is that its activity is completely independent from the 
body. It is, therefore, the mode of intellect that appears in (IN1). In the sense of innateness 
that structures moderate nativism, ideas are innate when their production process is set off 
precisely by the pure intellect. As a result, we can form a limited range of ideas, namely, the 
ideas of God, eternal truths, and fundamental logical axioms.  
 
Nevertheless, not all intellectual activity is of this sort. Descartes also derives from the general 
faculty of intellect three other modes that do require the presence of the body. In this regard, 
sensory perception, imagination, and corporeal memory are ‘special modes of thinking’ (MM 
AT VII 78/CSM II 54). Presumably, then, the doctrine leaves room for a special mode of 
thinking that also belongs to the mind in a qualified sense. It belongs to the mind as united 
to the body.21  
 
                                            
19 Meditation Four contains a clear exposition of the two faculties, in the context of determining the 
source of error: ‘All that the intellect does is to enable me to perceive the ideas which are subjects for 
possible judgments; and when consider strictly in this light, it turns out to contain no error in the 
proper sense of that term (…) the will simply consists in our ability to do or not do something (that 
is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid); or rather it consists simply in the fact that when the intellect 
puts something forward for affirmation or denial or for pursuit or avoidance, our inclinations are such 
that we do not feel we are determined by any external force’ (AT VII 56-57/CSM II 39-40, see also Pr 
I 32, 34). 
20 Pr I 32, AT VIIIA 17/CSM I 204 
21 This claim also appears clearly in some of Descartes’ correspondence. For instance, he writes to 
Guillaume Gibieuf: ‘I do not see any difficulty in understanding on the one hand that the faculties of 
imagination and sensation belong to the soul, because they are species of thoughts, and on the other 
hand that they belong to the soul only in so far as it is joined to the body’ (19th January 1642, AT III 
479/CSMK III 203).  




Figure 4. Descartes’ taxonomy of the mental 
 
Now, we know from the argument for hyper-nativism that Descartes believes that the ‘special 
mode of thinking’ that is sensory perception requires the contribution of the mind for forming 
the representational content of ideas. Otherwise, we could not account for the qualitative 
character of our sensory experience. In line with the above taxonomy of the mental, this means 
that the mind provides content, but not by virtue of the activity of the pure intellect. Hence, 
the kind of innate ideas involved in sensory perception are not the reduced group associated 
with moderate nativism. The sense of innate ideas at stake is (IN2). 
 
 
3.2. INNATE IDEAS AS ADVENTITIOUSLY CONDITIONED 
 
 Given all these points, what does one make of the role of the bodily cause? On one 
hand, the rationale identified behind the standard taxonomy of the Meditations does not 
prevent a more elaborate causal story for sensory ideas. It only tells us the beginning of that 
story —the production of adventitious ideas starts, genuinely, with an external object 
impacting the sense organs. On the other, what underpins Descartes’ hyper-nativist claims is 
a sense of innateness that can tell us a bit more about that causal story: the representational 
content of adventitious ideas comes (fully or partly) from the mind.  
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This points to a causal process in which bodies act as triggers rather than transmitters of ideas 
(Gorham 2000:362).22 A reading of the Comments as offering a version of a ‘triggering model’ 
has been endorsed, for example, by Williams (1978), Schmaltz (1997), and Rozemond 
(1999).23 In a triggering model, the role of the body is to explain the ‘occurrence of particular 
sensory ideas at a particular time. It explains why the mind’s disposition to form a particular 
type of sensory idea is activated at one time rather than another’ (Rozemond 1999:458). The 
view that the external object is simply a trigger for the mind’s own causal efficacy receives 
support from Descartes’ relatively frequent talk of brain states as ‘occasions’ for the mind to 
form an idea. Crucially, this is a point that appears in the Comments:  
 
The ideas of pain, colours, sounds and the like must be all the more innate if, on 
the occasion of certain corporeal motions, our mind is to be capable of 
representing them to itself, for there is no similarity between these ideas and the 
corporeal motions (AT VIIIB 359/CSM I 304, emphasis added) 
 
A triggering model is an attractive answer because it deals nicely with some of the varying 
terminology that Descartes employs for describing brain-mind interaction in sensory 
perception (for example, ‘occasion’ and ‘stimulation’). Besides, as we have seen, it fits well 
with the hyper-nativist claims of the Comments. If bodies are triggering causes of ideas in this 
sense, it means that the representational content of ideas is produced by the mind in full. 
Within triggering models, innate ideas, in the sense of (IN2), are called ‘adventitiously 
elicited’. Finally, this reading also complies with the second interpretative requirement that 
was singled out above: 
 
(B) An interpretation of Descartes’ hyper-nativism should keep at the same time 
the standard taxonomy, thereby preserving a genuine sense in which bodies are 
causes of adventitious ideas. 
                                            
22 Gorham claims that it is not clear why Descartes needs a triggering model at all to explain the time 
of occurrence of ideas. He claims that ‘this can be adequately explained simply by the fact that God 
has established a nomological correlation between brain states and the ideas that arise on their occasion’ 
(2000:363). I think that this reading is incorrect. It fails to acknowledge Descartes’ terminological 
effort in depicting brain-mind interaction as a process grounded on the powers of the human brain 
and the human mind. More technically, it does not identify the methodological policy of ‘Qualified 
Explanatory Naturalism’ that I presented in Chapter Two.  
23 Nevertheless, as we will see shortly, Rozemond (1998) also takes into consideration some Cartesian 
claims that suggest that sensation is more than bodies triggering minds.  





However, as I see it, the above version of a triggering model has a bit of a disappointing air. 
If bodies (and, by extension, brain states) are only contentless triggers, the presence of the 
external world (though not being redundant) is so minimally efficacious that one wonders 
whether that is what Descartes wants to be saying about God’s perfect Creation. This picture 
of sensory perception opens a gap between object, body, and mind that almost resembles the 
‘sailor in a ship’ scenario that Descartes warned against in Meditation Six: 
 
Nature also teaches me, by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, that 
I am not merely present in my body as a sailor is present in a ship, but that I am very 
closely joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body form 
a unit. If this were not so, I, who am nothing but a thinking thing, would not 
feel pain when the body was hurt, but would perceive the damage purely by the 
intellect, just as a sailor perceives by sight if anything in his ship is broken (AT 
VII 81/CSM II 56 emphasis added)  
 
Certainly, the notion of the ‘union of mind and body’ is rather obscure in Descartes’ works, 
but perhaps we can learn something from it about Descartes’ views on the status of sensation 
and the role of bodies. According to Descartes’ taxonomy of the mental (Fig.4 above), there 
are in the mind certain contents that seem to be bodily induced acts of the intellect, or acts of 
the intellect insofar as it is united to the body. Then, given that sensory ideas are these kinds 
of contents, it can be said that they belong exclusively to the metaphysical entity (the union 
of mind and body) that is the human being. For Descartes, sensory ideas, certainly, exhibit a 
representational content that cannot be fully accounted for by the motions in external objects. 
But at the same time, this type of representational content is exclusive to the unique type of 
interaction between a human body and a human mind. In other words, amongst possible 
qualitative products partially caused by bodies, it is a qualitative product unique to human 
beings. This is why, rather than ‘innate yet adventitiously elicited’, I am inclined to call 
sensory ideas ‘innate yet adventitiously conditioned’. The pattern of motions in the brain might 
not contribute to the actual content of ideas, but it might determine more than its time of 
occurrence. A body (by means of a human brain) elicits in a human mind a type of response 
that is peculiar to their interaction. This can be illustrated as in Fig.5 below. 
 




Figure 5. Sources of representational content 
 
Descartes is not very explicit about this matter. Nonetheless, there are a few meaningful 
passages that can at least give us a glimpse into it. In her monograph about Descartes’ dualism, 
Rozemond (1998), has devoted some attention to the topic of the ontology of sensation, while 
also pointing out that the issue is a bit muddled because of Descartes’ vagueness.24 In any case, 
she brings to the attention of the reader some passages that illustrate ‘Descartes’ dualistic view 
of sensation with a twist’, as she puts it (1998:187). Just above, in the quotation from 
Meditation Six, he hints at this notion by saying that if human beings were not a genuine 
union they ‘would not feel pain when the body was hurt, but would perceive the damage 
purely by the intellect, just as a sailor perceives by sight if anything in his ship is broken’ (AT 
VII 81/CSM II 56). Similarly, bodies could act simply on other beings —disembodied minds 
like angels, for example— but the qualitative result would also be different. Upon hearing a 
sound, for instance, an angel would form an adventitious idea the content of which would be 
motions of differently sizes particles. To this regard, Descartes writes (precisely) in a letter to 
Regius: ‘sensations such as pain are not pure thoughts of a mind distinct from a body, but 
confused perceptions of a mind really united to a body. For if an angel were in a human body, 
                                            
24 For example, she writes about ‘trialistic’ interpretations of the substantial union, according to which 
the special union of the human mind and the human body counts as a third substance. Cottingham 
has also provided grounds for this reading (1985, 2008). I do not focus on these accounts for the 
purposes of this project. Nonetheless, in my treatment of the status of secondary qualities in Chapter 



















he would not have sensations as we do, but would simply perceive the motions which are 
caused by external objects, and in this way would differ from a real man’ (January 1642, AT 
III 493/CSMK III 206). A human being, on the contrary, would experience a sound in the 
qualitatively human way —say, as a song as we know it.   
 
Before finishing, I shall note here again that the interpretation presented in this chapter does 
not constitute an explanation of sensory perception that is a replacement for the causal-
semantic model presented in Chapter Two. The designation of adventitious ideas as ‘innate 
yet adventitiously conditioned’ is a further characterisation (from the perspective of a 
taxonomy of ideas) of the sensory ideas that in a causal-semantic model are rightly recognised 
as semantic responses from the mind. Moreover, regarding this last section, a causal-semantic 
model could, on the face of it, accommodate better a sense in which bodily causes are not 
simply triggers that give the mind a ‘time’ for activating a specific instance of qualitative 
response. In a causal-semantic model, the state of the (human) brain is a natural sign. By 
standing in a sign-significatum relation with the object, a certain brain state is ‘meaningful’ 
for the mind. So the mind is not simply activated —the mind, first and foremost, interprets.  
 
Certainly, bodies are more ‘triggers’ than ‘transmitters’, especially if one bears in mind 
Descartes’ rejection of the standard Aristotelian-Scholastic theory of sensory perception. In 
this particular sense, Descartes was committed to eliminate the notion that bodies transmit 
actual immaterial forms of themselves (‘sensible species’) to perceivers. But with a different 
intention, he put forth a different sense of ‘transmission’ that was envisaged as purely 
naturalistic. In its corporeal part, we have seen that Descartes develops an early-modern, 
micro-corpuscular version of neural transmission of sensory inputs. For the mental phase of 
the process, the mind acts as an interpreter of that coded neural information. Descartes’ 
causal-semantic model provides a triadic picture that is able to capture better the fundamental, 











 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 In this chapter, I have offered an interpretation of Descartes’ claims in the Comments 
regarding the innateness of all ideas. Hyper-nativism has been proven to be compatible with 
the moderate nativism that is commonly associated with Descartes’ theory of ideas. My main 
point has been that Descartes introduces the category of innateness as a strategy for theorising, 
from within a theory of types of ideas, about the kind of mental content that appears in his 
theory of sensory perception as a result of the problem of dissimilarity (PD). In the Comments, 
the place that innateness occupies in the argument is what in other works (the Treatise on 
Light and the Optics prominently) was suggested by means of mental activity.  
 
We have seen that Descartes was oddly nonchalant in his suggestion of hyper-nativism. This 
is because the major claim concerning mental activity had already been suggested, and the 
Comments only provide a corollary that Descartes perhaps never fully developed: that of 
expressing the elusive doctrine of mental activity with the help of the theory of innateness. 
According to this development, the claim concerning the contribution of the mind to the 
representational content of ideas could alternatively be expressed as the claim regarding the 
innateness of adventitious ideas. This is, in a nutshell, Cartesian hyper-nativism. I have 
provided grounds for this reading by identifying a change of rationale in Descartes’ 
taxonomies of ideas. After presenting the different argument of the section, I have made a 
brief case for considering sensory ideas as ‘adventitiously conditioned’ rather than 
‘adventitiously elicited’. Although Descartes’ claims about the ontological status of sensation 
are by no means easy to disentangle, they are at least able to shed some light on a causal story 
for brain-mind interaction in which the mind is active in a meaningful senses. This causal 
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 0. INTRODUCTION 
  
In the three previous chapters, I have presented three different aspects of Descartes’ 
theory of sensory perception that lead separately, and to different degrees, to the conclusion 
that the mind is active in the sense of contributing to the representational content of ideas. 
In Chapter One, I offered an analysis of the terminological balance that Descartes carefully 
employs for describing the interaction of the brain and the mind. I argued that it points to a 
metaphysically interesting distinction between types of causes that strongly suggests the 
causal efficacy of the mind in sensory perception. In Chapter Two, I filled in the details of a 
causal model of sensory perception with a semantic approach in which the mind acts as a 
decoder. I concluded that Descartes’ identification of brain states as natural signs constitutes 
his most fruitful attempt at explaining the workings of sensory perception. In Chapter 
Three, I explored Descartes’ qualified hyper-nativism as a strategy for formulating the type 
of mental content that appears in a theory of sensory perception in which the mind is not a 
passive receiver of physical inputs.  
 
It is important to note that, aside from supporting the mental activity thesis, these three 
aspects have something else in common in their way of approaching the topic of sensory 




perception: they all focus on the perception of complete objects. This is, indeed, one of the 
ways in which Descartes himself addresses the issue of sensory perception. It is not, however, 
the only one. Descartes also persistently dealt with the sensory perception of the qualities 
that constitute those complete objects. It is not controversial to assert that, even though 
Descartes did not use the terms ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities, a similar difference 
between types of sensible qualities emerges from his texts. For example, we are told that 
certain sensible qualities of objects (such as size, shape, motion, etc.) are intrinsic properties 
of matter, whereas others (such as colours, smells, tastes, etc.) are products of the interaction 
of objects with a perceiver (that is, of the interaction between the extended and the thinking 
substance). This division, as we shall see throughout the chapter, was not unusual at the 
time. A version of it, tracing back to Aristotle, was commonplace amongst Scholastic 
thinkers, and it was progressively reshaped by the reforming aims of the natural philosophers 
of the seventeenth century with Galileo, Bacon, and Descartes in the lead.  
 
Crucially for this project, the way in which Descartes draws a distinction between types of 
qualities poses an important challenge to an interpretation of a theory of sensory perception 
along the lines of the mental activity thesis. Descartes often characterises ideas of shape, size, 
or motion (that is, ideas of primary qualities) as ‘clear and distinct’, whereas ideas of colours 
or smells (that is, ideas of secondary qualities) are deemed as ‘obscure and confused’. While 
the former seem to be perceived intellectually, the latter are subjected to the confused grasp 
of the senses. One interpretation of Descartes’ theory holds that sensory perception is 
fragmented into clear and distinct intellectual perception of primary qualities and obscure 
and confused sensory perception of secondary qualities. This reading has been labelled as the 
‘bifurcation reading’ by Simmons (2003), who has opposed it compellingly. 
 
The bifurcation reading seems to be supported by the texts, and it leads to a division of 
single acts of perception of objects that is not particularly satisfactory from a philosophical 
perspective. Most importantly, however, it poses a problem for the assessment of the 
Problem of Dissimilarity (PD) that I have previously presented. The phenomenon of 
dissimilarity, so I have contented, is constitutive of sensory perception, and it is the 
motivation for introducing the activity of the mind into the process. However, when taking 
the standpoint of the perception of qualities (and not entire objects), Descartes seems to 




maintain that ideas of primary qualities are not subjected to the phenomenon of 
dissimilarity, and therefore, do not require the contribution of the mind in such a way. This 
reading also finds further support in the fact that, when Descartes describes the (PD), he 
tends to focus almost exclusively on ideas of secondary qualities. If this is the case, the 
mental activity thesis could be simply considered as an ad hoc addition with the sole purpose 
of dealing with the puzzling nature of ideas of secondary qualities. It could not be 
considered, consequently, as an all-encompassing feature of a unified theory of sensory 
perception.  
 
This chapter is designed to find a way out of this textual tension and show that the way in 
which Descartes establishes the distinction between sensible qualities does not impede an 
interpretation of his theory of sensory perception in which there is a significant role for the 
causal efficacy of the mind. The implication of this argumentation is also, ultimately, that 
the Cartesian theory of sensory perception does not have, in this respect, a fragmented 
nature. The chapter is structured in three sections. In §1, I outline the distinction between 
primary and secondary qualities in the Early Modern context. I start to characterise the 
Cartesian position on the status of sensible qualities as opposed to a standard Aristotelian-
Scholastic doctrine that posits ‘real qualities’ (colour, heat, smell, and the like) as genuine 
properties present as such in physical objects. In §2, I present in detail the bifurcation 
reading, and I offer two arguments against it. The first clarifies the meaning of the ‘obscurity 
and confusion’ attributed to the grasp of the senses, and it concludes that, in fact, Descartes 
considered the (PD) a problem across the board (and not only for ideas of secondary 
qualities). The second establishes that, when Descartes ascribes ‘clarity and distinctness’ to 
the intellectual perception of primary qualities, he refers only to the properties of matter 
considered abstractly. Finally, in §3, I explore the rationale behind his distinction between 
types of qualities and I argue that the (PD) is not what distinguishes them. Overall, the 
activity of the mind is retained as a necessary feature for sensory perception in a model in 









 SECTION 1. THE EARLY MODERN DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRIMARY 
 AND SECONDARY QUALITIES 
 
The objects of sensory experience exhibit a variety of qualities to perceivers. When I 
perceive a nectarine, for example, I notice its round shape, its firm consistency, as well as the 
red and yellow tones of its waxy skin. A standard form of the Early Modern philosophical 
distinction between perceptible qualities would classify the traits of the nectarine into two 
groups. A quality such as shape would be considered fundamental or ‘primary’, and a quality 
such as colour would be considered derivative or ‘secondary’. The Early Modern natural 
philosopher would argue that this is because primary qualities exist in matter in a way that 
resembles our perceptions of them, and secondary qualities are presented in our perceptions 
in a way that is different from the way in which they exist in matter. Colour, for example, is 
now explained in terms of wavelengths of the electromagnetic field we experience as light, 
but the colour in our perception (what is called the phenomenal colour) is different from 
what is exhibited by the arrangements of matter in the physical world. Similarly, Descartes 
and other corpuscularians at the turn of the seventeenth century would say that colour is 
explained by the interaction of particles at the surface of objects with particles of light. 
Particles of objects impart spin to particles of light, and the variations in the resulting two 
types of particle motion is what we perceive as different colours (the rectilinear motion by 
which particles approach our eyes, and their spin i.e. the motion by which ‘they turn about 
their own centres’, DHB AT XI 225/CSM I 323)1. This physical process is dissimilar from 
the content of our perception of colour while varying with it. In this respect, secondary 
qualities depend on primary ones at least in the minimal sense that they track consistently 
their variations. Scholastic and Early Modern philosophers would agree on this point about 
perceptible qualities, while clashing over what this dependence amounted to.  
 
                                            
1 For instance, Descartes writes about the difference between blue and red in this manner: ‘If the 
speed at which they (material particles) turn is much smaller than that or their rectilinear motion, the 
body from which they come appears blue to us; while if the turning speed is much greater than the 
rectilinear motion, the body appears red to us’ (DHB, AT XI 225/CSM I 323, my clarification). 




A standard Aristotelian-Scholastic theory of matter featured a common-sense distinction 
between qualities that could be perceived by more than one sense (‘common sensibles’) and 
qualities that were exclusively perceived by one of the senses (‘proper sensibles’). Size and 
shape would be examples of the former, and colour and smell instances of the latter.2 
Descartes rehearsed uncritically this distinction at least twice: first in the Optics (‘regarding 
light and colour, the only qualities belonging properly to the sense of sight…’ D6 AT VI 
130/CSM I 167), and later in the Principles (‘characteristics like colour, sound and the rest, 
each of which is perceived not by several senses but by one alone; for the images of them 
which we have in our thought are always confused, and we do not know what they really 
are’, Pr IV 200, AT VIII 323-24/CSM I 286). This classification shares an intuition about 
types of qualities with the primary and secondary qualities distinction, and it also generates 
an approximately coextensive result (Simmons 2015:83). The common intuition refers to 
the fact that certain properties of objects exist in matter in a more fundamental way, whereas 
others exist insofar as there is a particularly suited sense to perceive them. Specific 
controversies aside, the members of the categories of primary and secondary qualities 
coincide with common and proper sensibles respectively. It is safe to say that Descartes 
inherited this common classification from his studies at La Flèche and that he used it merely 
as a tangential remark for complementing his account of vision. His corpuscular theory of 
matter (and in general the new mechanistic physical theory being developed at the time by 
Galileo, Isaac Beeckman3, and others) was set to eliminate accounts, like the Aristotelian-
Scholastic one, that exhibited little explanatory power. A classification of qualities in terms 
of the senses that perceive them does not take us very far in the knowledge of matter, and it 
does not seem to live up to the Early Modern scientific task of carving the natural world at 
                                            
2 Aristotle writes in On the Soul: ‘In dealing with each of the senses we shall have first to speak of the 
objects which are perceptible by each (…) one consists of what is perceptible by a single sense, the 
other of what is perceptible by any and all of the senses. I call by the name of special object of this or 
that sense that which cannot be perceived by any other sense than that one and in respect of which 
no error is possible; in this sense colour is the special object of sight, sound of hearing, flavour of taste 
(…) Common sensibles are movement, rest, number, figure, magnitude; these are not peculiar to any 
one sense, but are common to all’ (II.6/418a20-418a25). 
3 Descartes himself worked with Beeckman (1588-1637) from November 1618 to early 1619. 
Beeckman had been applying his micro-corpuscularianism to optics, hydrostatics, and acoustics, 
amongst other areas (Gaukroger 1995:72). He had a decisive influence in Descartes’ scientific 
trajectory as a micro-corpuscularian. 




its joints. The resulting lists of qualities might as well have had the same members 
respectively, but the way of arriving at the classification had to change.  
 
The Early Modern distinction between types of perceptible qualities oftentimes took the 
form of an a priori conceptual analysis concerning the intrinsic properties of matter i.e. the 
properties a body cannot be conceived as not having (Simmons 2015:83, Pasnau 2011:508). 
Specifically, Descartes’ understanding of physics as an experimental mathematical science is 
accompanied by the philosophical thesis that physics is ultimately grounded on 
metaphysical notions that are discovered innately.4 In Cartesian terms, the essence of body is 
discovered by the ‘natural light’ of the intellect. The ontology of Descartes’ mechanism 
characterised these fundamental (or primary) qualities as ‘modes’ of extension, that is, as 
ways in which the attribute of extension is manifested, and by which we become acquainted 
with extended substance (Pr I 51, AT VII 24/CSM I 210). Those modes include ‘size, (that 
is, extension in length, breadth and depth), shape, motion, position…’ (Pr I 48, AT VIIIA 
23/CSM I 208-9). Derivative (or secondary) qualities were then a result of interaction 
between the extended and the thinking substance. The passage from the Principles goes on 
to remark precisely this:  
 
We also experience within ourselves certain other things which must not be 
referred either to the mind alone or to the body alone. These arise (…) from 
the close and intimate union of our mind with the body. This list includes (…) 
all the sensations, such as those of pain, pleasure, light, colours, sounds, smells, 
tastes, heat, hardness…5  
                                            
4 At this point the Preface to the French edition of Principles comes inevitably to mind: ‘Thus the 
whole of philosophy is like a tree. The roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches 
emerging from the trunk are all the other sciences…’ (AT IXB 14/CSM I 186) 
5 Before Descartes, Galileo (1564-1642) had offered a similar a priori argument in The Assayer 
(1623). Although his corpuscularianism was far from being a purely kinetic theory (in the sense of 
reducing all phenomena of the natural world to motions of micro-corpuscles), he can be considered 
the forerunner of the sharp distinction between primary and secondary qualities: ‘Now I say that 
whenever I conceive any material or corporeal substance, I immediately feel the need to think of it as 
bounded, and as having this or that shape; as being large or small in relation to other things, and in 
some specific place at any given time; as being in motion or at rest; as touching or not touching some 
other body; and as being one in number, or few, or many. From these conditions I cannot separate such 
a substance by any stretch of my imagination (…) But that it must be white or red, bitter or sweet, noisy 
 





One of the upshots of this a priori approach within the mechanistic scientific framework is 
that, insofar as they depend on interaction between matter and mind for their existence, 
secondary qualities do not have a place in scientific explanation (Nolan 2011:2). For the 
new scientist, and particularly for a dualist like Descartes, facts such as the sweet taste of a 
nectarine when it is ripe, or the yellow and red tones of its skin, cannot be included in a list 
of objective facts about the natural world because they do not mirror, expressed in this 
manner, the properties of matter, but instead the properties of our sensory perception of it.6 
Certainly, that for the Early Modern natural philosopher the senses were considered a vital 
source of knowledge about the world is incontestable. One can take, as a plain example, 
Descartes’ physiology and theory of light, which were the result of painstaking observations. 
At the same time, however, the new scientific framework of mechanism broadly construed 
(the reduction of all natural phenomena to motion of micro-particles, either corpuscles or 
atoms, depending on the specific mechanistic theory) opened a breach between appearance 
and reality that deemed the senses a misleading source requiring intellectual assistance for 
achieving truths about the world.  
 
As we have seen before, Descartes’ mechanism and the metaphysics of it need to be 
understood under the light of the rejection of the Scholastic-Aristotelian common-sense 
inspired scientific approach according to which the senses are a reliable source in getting us 
acquainted with truths about the natural world. More particularly, one needs to read 
Descartes’ account of qualities as a rejection the ‘substantial forms’ and ‘real qualities’ of 
Scholastic natural philosophy. He considered them obscure, redundant, and explanatorily 
impotent as opposed to the quantitative reduction of mechanism, which exhibited the 
                                                                                                                            
or silent, and of sweet or foul odor, my mind does not feel compelled to bring in as necessary 
accompaniments’ (1957: 274, my emphasis) 
6 It is safe to say that this is one of the revolutionary ideas brought about by the seventeenth-century 
Scientific Revolution - an idea that has shaped scientific explanation to the present day. The thesis 
that the Scientific Revolution was primarily a revolution in scientific explanation has been explored, 
for instance, by Hatfield (1996). For the metaphysical grounding of Descartes’ physics, see Garber 
(1992). For a common, contemporary approach to the metaphysics of secondary/derivative qualities 
and their exclusion from scientific explanation, Stroud (2002) offers a comprehensive account. The 
scientist, Stroud writes, does not need the word ‘yellow’ in order to appropriately describe a lemon, 
but she only needs to refer to wavelengths of light. Descartes would subscribe this explanation.  




clarity and distinctness that belongs to mathematics. A particularly clear expression of this 
position appears in a letter to Regius:  
 
Substantial forms (…) were introduced by philosophers solely to account for 
the proper actions of natural things, of which they were supposed to be the 
principles and bases (…) But no natural action at all can be explained by these 
substantial forms, since their defenders admit that they are occult and that they 
do not understand them themselves. If they say that some action proceeds from 
a substantial form, it is as if they said that it proceeds from something they do 
not understand; which explains nothing. So these forms are not to be 
introduced to explain the causes of natural actions. Essential forms explained in 
our fashion, on the other hand, give manifest and mathematical reasons for 
natural actions (January 1642, AT III 506/CSMK III 208-9). 
 
Furthermore, the fable that Descartes presented in the Treatise on Light epitomises not only 
the a priori approach for determining the properties of matter, but also an anti-realist stance7 
concerning secondary qualities based on the mathematisation of the natural world that had 
started with Galileo. The premise of the Treatise on Light is precisely that the scientist needs 
only to posit matter and motion in order to explain all natural phenomena. Descartes invites 
the reader to imagine a different world that looks identical to the actual world (a world with 
‘real qualities’), but in which all natural phenomena should be, as far as possible, accounted 
for in the mechanistic terms that he presents in detail: 
 
For a while, then, allow your thought to wander beyond this world to view 
another, wholly, new, world (…) Now since we are taking the liberty of 
imagining matter as we fancy, let us attribute to it, if we may, a nature in which 
there is absolutely nothing that everyone cannot know as perfectly as possible. 
To this end, let us explicitly assume that it does not have the form of earth, fire, 
or air (…) nor does it have the qualities of having any taste, odour, sound, 
colour, light… (AT XI 31,33/G 21-22) 
 
The thought experiment results in the two worlds being indistinguishable from each other. 
As a consequence, and relying on the principle of parsimony, the mechanistic framework 
                                            
7 The anti-realist claim will be qualified in the upcoming paragraphs.  




emerges as a superior explanation in respect to the Aristotelian-Scholastic one (‘Nature 
always acts by the simplest and easiest means’, Descartes writes at the end of the Treatise on 
Man, AT X 201/G 168). This means that there is no need to postulate real qualities such as 
colour, smell, heat, cold, etc. as existing as such in objects, because the geometrically derived 
properties of matter are sufficient to capture everything that there is to say, scientifically, 
about sensory qualities.8 Amongst other prominent commentators, Garber has expressed this 
point accurately:  
 
The bodies that exist in the world are extended things and extended things 
alone, the objects of geometry made real; while they can be said to have broadly 
geometrical properties (…) they lack all of the sensory qualities like heat, cold, 
taste… (1992:63). 
 
It is important to note that the fact that Descartes was an anti-realist about secondary 
qualities does not amount to the claim that secondary qualities are non-existent or illusory. 
In order to understand the status of secondary qualities in Descartes (and in other 
rationalists such as Malebranche and Leibniz), one needs to read claims about the unreality 
of colours, sounds, and the like, as a rejection of the realitas attributed to the qualities of the 
Scholastics. It has been correctly pointed out by a few commentators that, when Descartes 
claims that the natural world lacks ‘real qualities’, or when he denies the ‘reality of sensible 
qualities’ he is making a point about their ontological status (that is, their degree of reality) 
instead of claiming that they don’t exist at all (Menn 1995, Clarke 2003, Hatfield 2005). 
‘Reality’ and ‘real’ refer, in those assertions, to a technical Scholastic term: the realitas of 
                                            
8 For example, after Mersenne had asked him about some specifics about his theory of matter, 
Descartes responds that his rejection of real qualities is due to two reasons: that they are (a) 
unintelligible and (b) unnecessary given the superiority of mechanistic explanations. ‘My principal 
reason for rejecting these real qualities is that I do not see that the human mind has any notion, or 
particular idea, to conceive them by; so that when we talk about them and assert their existence, we 
are asserting something we do not conceive and do not ourselves understand. The second reason is 
that the philosophers posited these real qualities only because they did not think they could otherwise 
explain all the phenomena of nature; but I find on the contrary that these phenomena are much 
better explained without them’ (To Mersenne, 26th April 1643, AT III 649/CSMK 216. For a 
similar assertion, see Pr IV 198, AT VIIIA 322-3/CSM I 285). 




something refers to its status as a res (Latin for ‘thing’).9 According to some of the 
Scholastics (Francisco Suárez included, who was amongst Descartes’ main sources for 
metaphysical terminology), for something to have the status of a res, that something could 
exist independently from the entity of which it was predicated (Clarke 2003:30). Thus in 
the Aristotelian-Scholastic theory (and following Aristotelian terminology) the yellow colour 
of the nectarine’s skin is a quality that exists in the object as a real accident of the category of 
quality that characterises non-essentially the form of nectarine. It is counted, in other words, 
as an additional component that is not reducible to the arrangements of matter that make 
up the nectarine. It is in this sense that is counted as a real quality: it is ‘as much of a thing’ 
as the size, shape, or any other property of the nectarine.10  
 
This translates into a theory of sensory perception in which, as we have seen before, an 
actual sample of a given property in objects (a form without matter, or ‘intentional species’) 
reaches the observer and informs their sensory organs. Sensory perception comes about 
when ‘the sensitive faculty of the soul becomes like the object perceived’ (Simmons 
1994:257). This account has at its core a teleological stance. Namely, that we are equipped 
with the sense organs that we do have because they are teleologically ordained to display the 
world as it is. In this account, a theory of perception is shaped around a similarity thesis 
between objects and ideas, and this is why entities such as real accidents, for instance, were 
                                            
9 He writes in the Treatise on Light: ‘those that the Schoolmen call (…) qualitas reales (their real 
qualities), in which I frankly confess I cannot find any more reality than in the others’ (AT XI 40/G 
27). One can also find this technical term in Descartes’ usage of the notions of formal and objective 
reality in the Meditations. They are an obvious case of the use of ‘reality’ as meaning ontological 
status.  
10  For the purposes of this dissertation, I can only present here a cursory treatment of the 
Aristotelian-Scholastic theory of qualities and its differences with Early Modern theories. I add here a 
brief qualification about them. As stated above, there is an area of agreement between Scholastic and 
Early Modern accounts of types of perceptible qualities. Namely, that some qualities are derivative or 
secondary in the sense that they depend for their occurrence on fundamental or primary ones. This 
has been called the ‘supervenience thesis’ concerning perceptible qualities (Pasnau 2011:465) insofar 
as it accommodates reductionist and non-reductionist explanations under the claim that there is no 
change in secondary qualities without a change in primary qualities. In the Aristotelian-Scholastic 
tradition, the supervenience thesis features ‘prime matter’ (as the substratum of all changes), shaped 
by primary qualities (hot, cold, wet, and dry) that give rise to the four elements (earth, air, fire, and 
water), which are the ‘building blocks of the natural world’ (Pasnau 2011:462).  




needed in explanation.11 This standpoint was to be progressively banished by the new 
scientific models of the seventeenth century on the basis of experimentation, and assisted by 
philosophical claims about its incorrect direction of fit (that is, claims about the perceiver 
making the world a certain way).12 In this last respect, Descartes and others can be read as  
also charging the standard Aristotelian-Scholastic theory with anthropomorphising nature 
by confining the natural world to pre-made notions derived from the human mind (Ott 
2009:41).  
 
For Descartes, on the contrary, nothing is added to the ontology of the natural world over 
and above the arrangements of particles of matter. What we refer to as the colour, smell, or 
taste of a piece of fruit are not real accidents, but modes of extension (Sixth Replies, AT VII 
434/CSM II 293). It is in this sense that these qualities are not ‘real’ in Descartes’ picture of 
the natural world.13 Descartes’ iconic example of the blind man that perceives the properties 
of an object with a stick is set to demonstrate precisely this: ‘the differences a blind man 
notes between trees, rocks, water and similar things by means of his stick do not seem any 
less to him than the differences between red, yellow, green and all the other colours seem to 
us. And yet in all those bodies the differences are nothing other than the various ways of 
moving the stick or of resisting its movements’ (Op, AT VI 85/CSM I 153).  
 
                                            
11 Although this is not everything that there is to say about the Aristotelian-Scholastic theory, it is 
nonetheless something that Descartes considered crucial to it: ‘But the principal argument which 
induced philosophers to posit real accidents was that they thought that sense-perception could not be 
explained without them’ (Sixth Set of Replies, AT VII 435/CSM II 293)  
12 As Gaukroger (1995:283) points out, paradigmatic cases for explaining why the Aristotelian 
teleological model based on a similarity thesis started falling apart at the beginning of the seventeenth 
century came from developments in the field of optics. In the influential Ad Vitellionem 
Paralipomena (1604), Kepler demonstrated, for instance, that the optical image is formed in the 
retina and not in the crystalline humour, and that the image is inverted. The driving force in 
experimentation was getting right the physical and physiological parts of the story, with 
considerations about the function of perception depending on those instead of the other way around.  
13 Pasnau (2011) offers a helpful characterisation of this change in the ontology of qualities during 
the Early Modern period. Certain properties ceased to be considered as ‘things’ in objects, and they 
start to be regarded as ‘events’. This transition (both in ontology and in physics) is clear, for instance, 
in the new kinetic theory of heat developed by Bacon, Galileo, and Descartes.  




This results into a theory of perception that will attempt to incorporate and explain the gap 
between appearance and reality, as much as possible, in a mechanistic way. It is particularly 
clear from the treatment of heat in the Treatise on Light (AT X 7-10/G 6-8), of colour in the 
Meteorology (D8, AT VI 325-337/G 85-92), and of heaviness14 in the Treatise on Light (AT 
X 11-16/G 9-12) and the Sixth Set of Replies (AT VII 441-2/CSM II 297-8) that Descartes 
is not denying that these qualities are actual properties of things, but rather that their nature 
(what ultimately constitutes them) cannot be deciphered from our sensory experience of 
them (Hatfield 2005:43). The natural world is made up of objects that are extended but not 
hot, heavy, scented, or coloured in the way in which those qualities appear as a result of the 
object affecting a specific perceptual apparatus (Nolan 2011:3). In other words, to say that 
the flesh of a nectarine is yellow amounts to saying that it consistently appears yellow to 
perceivers under normal conditions. We have already seen that, in the Cartesian theory, this 
process is described as a law-like interaction between brain and mind, and that it is only 
when restricting the focus to the mental domain that it is adequate to talk about qualities (as 
opposed to quantities), since it is beyond the scope of mechanistic explanations.15  
 
This illuminates a further point about the distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities. What we have come to designate secondary qualities are, in fact, perfectly proper 
components of the world in the sense that there is nothing inherently substandard about 
them (Simmons 2015, Smith 1990). It is our sensory experience of them that introduces an 
ambiguity. It is upon reflection of our perceptions in relation to the mechanistic picture of 
the world that we arrive at a distinction between primary and secondary status.16 Descartes’ 
position on this issue can be spelled out by means of three main considerations: 
 
                                            
14 It is sometimes translated as ‘gravity’, from the original Latin ‘gravitas’ (AT VII 439/CSM II 296)  
15  To be precise, three phenomena are for Descartes beyond the scope of his mechanistic 
explanations: consciousness, sensory perception, and meaningful use of language.  
16 Simmons puts it concisely: ‘That there is an ontological difference between a kumquat’s shape and 
its colour does not suggest itself to perceptual experience: both look to be out there in the kumquat. 
Arguments for distinguishing their ontologies therefore did not typically rely on introspecting 
perceptual experience. They piggybacked on arguments for the mechanical hypothesis itself’ 
(2015:83) 




(1) First, all that there is in the natural world is motion of differently-sized particles, but 
from this state of things, and given the presence of a perceiver (that is, a mind), it is 
correct to identify certain properties as having a different status because they are 
mind-dependent. They do not belong, as such, to the physical and ontological 
descriptions of the natural world, but they do have a place in the true ontology of 
reality insofar as they belong to the thinking substance as united to the body (i.e. the 
human being). It is only in this sense that Descartes can be considered a realist 
about secondary qualities. 
 
(2) Second, the Cartesian mechanistic model is, therefore, not equivalent to claiming 
that the content of our ideas of secondary qualities is illusory or superfluous, because 
it is the natural by-product of the mind-body union. Despite the elusive problem of 
dissimilarity between ideas of secondary qualities and their physical causes, they are 
subject to the functional argument for survival that brings in an all-powerful, 
benevolent God. Descartes made frequently the point that, despite dissimilarity, it is 
evident that our perceptions are fitted for tracking consistently the states of the 
world, and in this sense they are ‘sufficiently clear and distinct’ (AT VII 83/CSM II 
57).  
 
(3) Third, even though ideas of secondary qualities co-vary successfully with their 
causes, and even though Descartes offers an argument (even if faulty) for their 
functionality, there is a sense in which, for him, they are potentially problematic. 
Since a difference in the ontological status of qualities is not the type of information 
that is available by introspection into our sensory perceptions, ideas of secondary 
qualities make perceivers prone (but not irremediably subject) to a common mistake 
of judgment made ‘from childhood onwards without any rational basis’ (AT VII 
83/CSM II 57). This refers to the judgment that ‘all the objects of our sense-
perception are things existing outside our minds and closely resembling our 
sensations, i.e. the perceptions that we had of them.’ (Pr I 66, AT VIIIA 32/CSM I 




216).17 Descartes made this point frequently, and he offered plenty of examples for 
illustrating it. In the crucial first chapter of the Treatise on Light (AT X 6/G 5), he 
presents, amongst others, the case of dissimilarity between the touch of a feather and 
the tickling sensation that it produces (an example that had already been used by 
Galileo almost ten years before).18 
 
Finally, these points also shed light on Descartes’ mindful use of language when addressing 
ideas of secondary qualities. He often precedes them with a cautious remark about language 
use: ‘what we are calling colour’ (Pr I 70, AT VIIIA 34/CSM I 218 my emphasis), ‘<We call 
these qualities hardness, heaviness, heat, etc.>’ (Pr IV 191, AT VIIIA 318/CSM I 282 my 
emphasis)19, ‘the light in bodies we call luminous’ (AT VI 84/CSM I 153 my emphasis), ‘the 
properties in external objects to which we apply the terms light, colour, smell…’ (Pr IV 198, 
AT VIIIA 322/CSM I 285). These remarks are supposed to capture the dissimilarity 
between ideas and their physical causes, while making a general point about ordinary 
language also supported by the claims above.20 Namely, there is no inadequacy in addressing 
certain motions of particles as ‘colours’, ‘smells’, etc. if one accepts, at the same time, the 
dissimilarity thesis (‘when we say that we perceive colours in objects, this is really just the 
                                            
17 I think that Menn (1995:199) is right in connecting this issue with the notion of ‘material falsity’. 
It is not always clear what Descartes means when he says that sensory ideas can be materially false in 
the Meditations. Menn suggests that the clue is found in the Fourth Set of Replies, where Descartes 
writes that ‘some ideas are materially false’ in that ‘they provide the judgment with material for error’ 
(AT VII 231/CSM II 161). The ‘material’ that they provide is an idea that does not resemble its 
physical causes. They present colour, heat, odour, etc. as if they were, as such, things in the natural 
world. This seems to be what Descartes has in mind when he writes that some ideas ‘represent non-
things as things’ (‘non rem tanquam rem’, MM AT VII 43/CSM II 30). 
18 Galileo offers in The Assayer a similar thesis: ‘a feather drawn lightly over any part of our bodies 
performs intrinsically the same operations of moving and touching, but by touching the eye, the 
nose, or the upper lip it excites in us an almost intolerable titillation, even though elsewhere it is 
scarcely felt. This titillation belongs entirely to us and not to the feather’ (1957:275). 
19 Following the practice of the CSM, angle brackets indicate differences and additions to the original 
texts in translations that were authorised by Descartes. In this case, this is an addition in the French 
translation of the Meditations produced in 1647 by Louis-Charles d’Albert, Duc de Luynes.  
20 This point is succinctly made in the Principles: ‘The fourth cause of error is that we attach our 
concepts to words which do not precisely correspond to real things’ (Pr I 74, AT VIIIA 37/CSM I 
220) 




same as saying that we perceive something in objects whose nature we do not know’ Pr I 70, 
AT VIIIA 34-5/CSM I 218).21 
 
In this section, I have presented an overview of the distinction between perceptible qualities 
in the Early Modern period, and I have started to characterise the Cartesian theory. In what 
follows, I tackle the implications of the distinction for Descartes’ theory of sensory 
perception. I concentrate on the issue of whether it is possible to integrate a distinction of 
perceptible qualities with the thesis that the mind is (or rather, needs to be) active in sensory 
perception due to an all-encompassing Problem of Dissimilarity (PD) between mechanistic 




 SECTION 2. SENSIBLE QUALITIES AND THE BIFURCATION READING 
  
So far we have looked at an overarching characterisation of the Early Modern 
distinction between perceptible qualities. Even though Descartes does not allude to the types 
of perceptible qualities with a clear division of terms, his way of treating the issue seems to 
reveal a genuine difference in kind between them. At this point, a main question arises: what 
is the implication of this division for a unified theory of sensory perception, especially one in 
which the mind is active in the sense of contributing to the representational content of 
ideas? The integration, in a unified theory of sensory perception, of a genuine distinction 
between qualities with the thesis of the activity of the mind in sensory perception has to 
outlive two related textual threats: 
 
                                            
21 That Descartes was set to clarify this systematic ambiguity in the use of the terms for secondary 
qualities has been pointed out by Pasnau (2011) and Nolan (2011). Pasnau shows, importantly, that 
an eminent Cartesian like Malebranche merited Descartes with having clarified the discussion 
precisely in that respect: ‘Only since Descartes do we respond to these confused and indeterminate 
questions -whether fire is hot, grass green, sugar sweet, and so on- by distinguishing the equivocation 
of the sensible terms that express them’ (Search After Truth VI.2.2) 




(1) First, Descartes’ almost exclusive emphasis on ideas of colour, taste, sounds, and the 
like precisely when presenting the (PD) could give the impression that, if there is a 
problem to account for in a description of the cognitive structure of sensory 
perception, this problem only affects ideas of secondary qualities. This would lead to 
the conclusion that there is a fundamental difference between the perception of 
different qualities and that, presumably, the activity of the mind is only invoked 
(perhaps in a rather ad hoc manner) to account for the mysterious nature of ideas of 
secondary qualities. It would seem, therefore, that a unified theory of perception in 
which the mind is active due to the (PD) is not a plausible interpretation given this 
division.  
 
(2) Second, this defeatist reading would also be supported by Descartes’ insistence on 
the ‘clarity and distinctness’ of our perception of primary qualities (the 
geometrically derived properties of bodies) while deeming our ideas of secondary 
qualities as ‘obscure and confused’. It would appear that, for the former, the activity 
of the mind would then not be necessary. The view that Descartes’ theory splits 
perceptual cognition between the (clear and distinct) intellectual perception of 
primary qualities and the (obscure and confused) perception of secondary qualities 
has been labelled as ‘bifurcation reading’ by Simmons (2003). She has identified it 
as an erroneous, rather habitual trend in the Cartesian scholarship. I will follow her 
designation throughout the section.22  
 
In this section I will contend that the Cartesian distinction between types of perceptible 
qualities does not obstruct the mental activity thesis and, consequently, it is possible to 
reconstruct a unified theory of sensory perception. I arrive at this conclusion by ruling out 
                                            
22 For the line of thought that I will present in this section, I am indebted to Simmons’ compelling 
case against the bifurcation reading (2003). Her position is my starting point, although I eventually 
differ from it in the argumentation. If I have read Simmons correctly, her rejection of the bifurcation 
reading aims ultimately at the claim that Descartes’ account of the cognitive structure of sensory 
perception is shaped by the collaborative activity of the senses and the intellect for both ideas of 
primary and secondary qualities. A crucial component of her view —the nature of constructive 
judgments— comes from an analysis of the distinction between three grades of sensory perception 
that Descartes advances in the Sixth Set of Replies (AT VII 436-9/CSM II 294-5).  




the bifurcation reading. That is to say, I argue that it is a mistake to attribute to Descartes 
the view that certain particular qualities are perceived more clearly than others and that the 
(PD), as presented in Chapters 1 and 2, does not square with a distinction between primary 
and secondary qualities. The upshot of this argumentation is that dissimilarity between ideas 
and their physical causes remains a challenge across the board (that is, for both types of 
qualities), and the activity of the mind remains, likewise, a plausible Cartesian answer. In 
the following paragraphs, I lay out these textual tensions in more detail and, after that, I 
start the argumentation against the bifurcation reading (in §2.1 and §2.2). 
 
Certainly, it cannot be denied that, throughout his works, Descartes draws a distinction 
between the perception of primary and secondary qualities (although he does not use these 
terms). His way of creating lists of qualities reveals a contrast, but it is not immediately clear 
what is the criterion behind the classification. Again, one possible answer is that the criterion 
is the way in which a quality is perceived. Primary qualities are perceived with clarity and 
distinctness, and secondary qualities are perceived with obscurity and confusion. This is 
supported by the fact that, in Descartes’ texts, the general rationalist thesis that sensory 
perception is a dubious source of knowledge coexists with his claims about our ability to 
apprehend certain properties of bodies with clarity and distinctness. 
 
This criterion fits well with a standard version of the Early Modern distinction between 
primary and secondary qualities based on a relation of similarity/dissimilarity between ideas 
and their physical causes. It fits well because Descartes’ use of the terms ‘clarity and 
distinctness’ and their counterparts ‘obscurity and confusion’ attached to primary and 
secondary qualities respectively, admits of a natural reading in terms of similarity and 
dissimilarity. That is, an idea of a primary quality is clear and distinct because it gives 
accurate information about its physical cause, and this is because it is similar to it. An idea of 
a secondary quality is obscure and confused because it does not provide accurate 
information about its physical cause, and this is because it is completely dissimilar to it. The 
bifurcation reading seems to be supported by theses laid down in two of Descartes’ 
philosophical pinnacles: the Meditations and the Principles. There, he often opposes the clear 
and distinct perception of size, shape, motion, and position to the obscure and confused 
perception of colour, light, sounds, smells, etc., which are qualities that ‘must be referred to 




the senses’. The following passages are frequently used in support of the bifurcation reading. 
They are from Meditation Three and Part I of the Principles respectively: 
 
As to my ideas of corporeal things, (…) I notice that the things which I 
perceive clearly and distinctly in them are very few in number. The list 
comprises size, or extension in length, breadth and depth; shape, which is a 
function of the boundaries of this extension; position, which is a relation 
between various items possessing shape; and motion, or change in position (…) 
But as for all the rest, including light and colours, sounds, smells, tastes, heat 
and cold and the other tactile qualities, I think of these only in a very confused 
and obscure way… (AT VII 43/CSM II 29-30) 
 
This will be specially clear if we consider the wide gap between our knowledge 
of those features of bodies which we clearly perceive (…) and our knowledge of 
those features which must be referred to the senses (…) To the former class 
belong the size of the bodies we see, their shape, motion, position, duration, 
number and so on (…) To the latter class belong the colour in a body, as well 
as pain, smell, taste and so on. (Pr I 69 AT VIIIA 33-4/CSM I 217) 
 
The title of principle I 69 —‘We know size, shape and so forth in quite a different way from 
the way in which we know colours, pains, and the like’— could not be more clear, so it 
seems, about a bifurcation in the perception of sensible qualities and, in turn, about the 
superior epistemic status of our ideas of primary qualities. On the one hand, the association 
of primary qualities with clarity and distinctness suggests that the intellect is involved in the 
perception of such qualities. This divided picture is completed, on the other hand, by claims 
about secondary qualities belonging (or being ‘referred to’) the senses and to the ‘mind-body 
union’. This seems to constitute a hybrid account of the perception of sensible qualities that 
is not particularly gracious from a philosophical perspective —perhaps not from a 
physiological perspective either, since it divides the cognitive structure of particular acts of 
perception. Given that external objects exhibit a variety of characteristics to perceivers, what 
does it mean that we get acquainted with some of them clearly and distinctly and by means 
of the intellect, and with others obscurely and confusedly and by means of the senses, that 
is, due to the mind-body union? This section is designed to disentangle this interpretative 
issue.  
 




I believe that the bifurcation reading is incorrect. The fragmented character of the theory is 
merely additional support for an alternative interpretation (since it is possible, as a matter of 
fact, that Descartes would have offered a fragmented, philosophically untidy account). The 
main reason for rejecting the bifurcation reading comes from a distinction between the 
scope of sensory perception and the scope of the pure intellect that has ample support by 
textual evidence. In short, the distinction will show that a clear and distinct intellectual 
perception is possible for both primary and secondary qualities, and that, similarly, an 
obscure and confused sensory perception is the case for both primary and secondary qualities. 
So the bifurcation reading expresses an adequate intuition (that perception of qualities can 
occur in different ways), but it draws the division in the wrong place. I agree with Simmons 
in that the actual division is between sensory and purely intellectual perception 
(2003:551).23  
 
This means that there is still a fragmentation in the theory but, importantly, this 
fragmentation does not pose the problem of dividing single acts of perception. It is, rather, a 
description of the types of information that we can acquire from the world, and of the ways 
in which we can manage it. In the first section (§2.1) I show that, when Descartes describes 
sensory perception as obscure and confused, he has in mind both primary and secondary 
qualities. In the second section (§2.2) I revisit an argument that was first laid out by Wilson 
(1991,1993) and that, I believe, has not been sufficiently emphasised in assessments of 
Descartes’ theory of perception. The argument is for the claim that, when Descartes writes 
about the clear and distinct perception of primary qualities, he refers to the properties of 
matter in general as opposed to the properties of a specific object perceived in a specific act 
of sensory perception.  
 
 
                                            
23 I share with Simmons the above motivation for dismissing the bifurcation reading, but I will take a 
slightly different route in the argumentation. 






2.1. PERCEPTUAL ERROR AND THE ‘TRUE NATURE OF BODIES’ 
 
Let us start with the first part of the argumentation. The first textual fact to 
acknowledge is that Descartes contemplates perceptual error regarding the macroscopic 
features of objects for both primary and secondary qualities. He provides some examples of 
perceptual error concerning primary qualities in Meditation Six, in the context of describing 
how sensory perception as such can make us fall into an error of judgment: ‘that stars and 
towers and other distant bodies have the same size and shape which they present to my 
senses’ (AT VII 82/CSM II 57). He makes the point again in the Sixth Set of Replies, this 
time with the example of the apparent shape of a stick that is submerged in water: ‘when 
people say that a stick in water “appears bent because of refraction”, this is the same as 
saying that it appears to us in a way which would lead a child to judge that it was bent’ (AT 
VII 438/CSM I 296). In these cases, the information about primary qualities (size and 
shape) provided strictly by the senses culminates in ideas of minuscule stars, a square tower, 
and a bent stick. These ideas of primary qualities misrepresent the macroscopic features of 
those objects.  
 
Nonetheless, the characterisation of sensory perception as obscure and confused includes, 
but is not exhausted by, the consideration of perceptual circumstances such as these, i.e. 
circumstances that we can classify as perceptual errors. Descartes intended obscurity and 
confusion as describing a more fundamental complexity of sensory perception considered 
across the board. Namely, (at least within a mechanistic, micro-corpuscular model) sensory 
perception fails to informs us about the ‘true nature of bodies’ (Pr I 73, II 5)24. When 
perceiving primary qualities, we are not mistaken in identifying in our ideas of them 
properties that are contained within the definition of matter, such as size and shape. But in 
the Cartesian picture of the natural world, matter is homogeneous and its essence is 
                                            
24 A similar remark about the senses is found in Meditation Six: ‘But I misuse them by treating them 
as reliable touchstones for immediate judgements about the essential nature of the bodies located 
outside us; yet this is an area where they provide only very obscure information’ (AT VII 83/CSM II 
57-8). 




extension, and differences between bodies arise from the specific arrangements and motions 
of their microscopic parts. Importantly, we do not get acquainted with these specific 
arrangements and motions by means of the senses. Descartes restated this point frequently 
in his treatments of sensory perception, making therefore a case for considering it as one of 
his chief concerns with the theory beyond cases of error and illusion in the the perception of 
macroscopic features of objects.  
 
Cases of perceptual error could add to the obscurity and confusion that belongs to sensory 
perception, but they don’t suffice for making a case about sensory perception being like that. 
Rather, they seem to highlight the inconsistent reliability of the senses as an epistemic 
source. The senses ‘sometimes deceive us’, Descartes writes in the Meditations and in the 
Discourse, and that is why, according to his hyperbolic doubt, we cannot take them on board 
in the quest for indubitable truths that culminates with the discovery of the cogito (DM, AT 
VI 31-2/CSM I 126-7). In the presence of a more fundamental, inherent complexity in the 
very way in which the senses get us acquainted with the world, the fact that the senses 
deceive us sometimes about the macroscopic features of objects does not operate as a 
particularly consequential point within Descartes’ taxonomy of the mental and his treatment 
of body-to-mind interaction.25 While the senses deceive us sometimes about round towers 
and gigantic stars, they inherently present the natural world in a way that does not inform us 
about the ultimate causes of our perceptions, that is, the true nature of bodies, except 
‘occasionally and accidentally’ (Pr II 3 AT VIIIA 41/CSM I 224). 
 
Consider the following example concerning primary qualities that illustrates Descartes’ 
point in contemporary terms. We experience the hardness of a block of ice (solid water) as 
very different from the consistency of liquid water. But by relying on the senses (whether 
touch or sight, for example), one can only obscurely and confusedly perceive the ways in 
                                            
25 Again, it has weight, however, as a phenomenon that casts doubt on the reliability of the senses 
and therefore rules them out as a source of indubitable knowledge in the first stage of the method of 
doubt: ‘I thought it necessary to do the very opposite and reject as if absolutely false everything in 
which I could imagine the least doubt, in order to see if I was left believing anything that was entirely 
dubitable. Thus, because the senses sometimes deceive us, I decided to suppose that nothing was 
such as they led us to imagine’ (DM, AT VI 31-2/CSM I 126-7). 




which matter is arranged so to compose a solid or a liquid body. At the level of what 
Descartes would call the ‘true nature of body’, the hardness that the block of ice has to 
touch is the result of the fact that the orientation of the hydrogen bonds causes molecules to 
be pushed farther apart, thus lowering its density (the amount of matter contained). Given 
that Descartes contended that the world is a plenum, he could say that a solid body contains 
more subtle matter filling the gaps between molecules than a liquid one. Under ideal 
perceptual circumstances, one would not only form a sensory idea that does not represent 
clearly and distinctly the arrangement of primary qualities in the block of ice, but the 
perception could also prompt the false judgment that Descartes kept warning us about (that 
is, that the world resembles our sensory perceptions of it). This threat is emphasised for the 
case of secondary qualities, but it is not exclusive to them. 
 
Crucially, the fact that sensory perception does not provide us with information about the 
nature of objects puts the perception of primary and secondary qualities on a par. There is 
‘nothing’, Descartes writes categorically in the Principles, ‘whose true nature we perceive by 
the senses alone’ (Pr I 73 AT VIIIA 37/CSM I 220 emphasis added).26 Following one of his 
examples concerning a secondary quality, it is certainly puzzling that we hear a sound as a 
result of vibrating particles forming longitudinal waves: ‘if the sense of hearing transmitted 
to our thought the true image of its object, then instead of making us think of the sound, it 
would have to make us think about the motion of the parts of the air that are vibrating 
against our ears’ (TL AT X 5/G5). But it is no less puzzling than the inescapable fact that we 
experience a three-dimensional world upon receiving motion patterns that create a 
correspondent two-dimensional pattern at the internal cavities of the brain.27  
                                            
26 This can be seen as connected to another of his well known anti-empiricist remarks: ‘only those 
who really concentrate and meditate and withdraw their minds from corporeal things, so far as is 
possible, will achieve perfect knowledge of them’ (Second Set of Replies, AT VII 157/CSM II 111). 
27 A similar point has been made by Hatfield (2005). Besides, as we have seen in previous chapters, 
Descartes includes in the process of sensory perception as a whole a brain state in the form of a 
structural (or isomorphic) representation. This physiological model based on motion 
correspondences included, therefore, a fundamental dissimilarity between objects and their corporeal 
representations. This dissimilarity was meticulously examined by the optical accounts at the time, 
starting with Kepler’s discovery of the function of the ‘crystalline humour’ in the eye (to refract the 
rays of light in such a way as to cause them to reassemble at a single point on the retina and 
 





It is now a good time for bringing into the argumentation the problem that worried 
Descartes in the context of sensory perception, that is, the Problem of Dissimilarity. What 
these considerations and examples show, I believe, is that Descartes identifies the (PD) as a 
complexity of sensory perception across the board. He did not single out the problem as a 
puzzling feature that belongs exclusively to the perception of colours, tastes, smells, and 
other secondary qualities. This gives support to the interpretation that the (PD) is Descartes’ 
chief concern in the treatment of sensory perception as a whole and that, by the same token, 
introducing mental activity across the board is Descartes’ intended solution to it. I will come 
back to this towards the end of the chapter. 
 
In conclusion, in this brief section about perceptual error, I have pointed out that Descartes 
considers sensory perception as obscure and confused across the board  (for both types of 
qualities) because it fails to inform us about the true nature of body. This is true of the 
perception of primary and secondary qualities, and it is, simply, what sensory perception is 
like. This constitutes the first step in ruling out the bifurcation reading and in advancing, 
therefore, a unified account of Descartes’ theory of sensory perception.  
 
Nevertheless, a pressing question remains at this point. Charitably, one main reason for 
defending the bifurcation reading comes from passages in which Descartes connects the 
clarity and distinctness that belongs to the intellect to the perception of primary qualities, 
but not secondary qualities. The commitment to a mechanistic physiology makes clear that 
there is no bifurcation in different ways of perceiving qualities. However, this aspect of the 
theory seems to coexist in Descartes’ texts with claims suggesting that primary qualities are 
perceived, at least partially and as opposed to secondary qualities, by means of the intellect. 
We have seen instances in the passages quoted above in which Descartes also attaches the 
adjectives ‘clarity and distinctness’ to the perception of those qualities. I deal with this 
question in what follows. 
 
                                                                                                                            
producing a two-dimensional, inverted image of the object). I am indebted to Simmons (2015:85) 
for understanding the details of Kepler’s thesis in the Ad Vitellionem Paralipomena (1604). 





2.2. THE PROPERTIES OF MATTER ‘GENERALITER SPECTATA’ 
 
The aim of this section is to conclusively rule out the bifurcation reading as a way of 
understanding Descartes’ theory of the cognitive structure of sensory perception. As 
outlined above, this involves dealing with the following tension: Descartes considered 
sensory perception of all qualities as subjected to the fundamental dissimilarity expressed by 
the (PD), and that results in an account in which sensory perception is defined as obscure 
and confused across the board. If this is the case, how does one square it with passages that 
suggest that the intellect is responsible for a clear and distinct perception of primary qualities 
in objects?  
 
Before going any further, I outline some aspects of Descartes’ taxonomy of the mental as a 
preliminary remark (Fig.4 below)28. This will help in making the interpretation clearer. 
According to Descartes, the mind has only two faculties or modes, that is, two main ways in 
which thought is manifested. These are the intellect and the will. The function of the 
intellect is to ‘perceive ideas’, in the sense of presenting and being aware of diverse mental 
contents. The will has the function of acting upon those contents, for instance by affirming 
or denying their truth.29 In turn, these two faculties or modes have further particular modes, 
which indicate the different cognitive faculties. The intellect provides four modes: pure 
intellect, sensory perception, imagination, and corporeal memory. The will has further 
modes such as affirmation, negation, and others (Pr I 32, AT VIIIA 17/CSM I 204). There 
is an important point to be made about the modes of the intellect. The peculiarity of the 
                                            
28 Figure 4, and the corresponding explanation of Descartes’ taxonomy of the mental, have appeared 
in Chapter Three also for clarificatory purposes. I reproduce the figure once more to provide a 
succinct explanation of Descartes’ view that puts the following arguments in context. 
29 Meditation Four contains a clear exposition of the two faculties, in the context of determining the 
source of error: ‘All that the intellect does is to enable me to perceive the ideas which are subjects for 
possible judgments; and when consider strictly in this light, it turns out to contain no error in the 
proper sense of that term (…) the will simply consists in our ability to do or not do something (that 
is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid); or rather it consists simply in the fact that when the 
intellect puts something forward for affirmation or denial or for pursuit or avoidance, our 
inclinations are such that we do not feel we are determined by any external force’ (AT VII 56-
57/CSM II 39-40, see also Pr I 32, 34 for a similar account). 




pure intellect is that its activity is entirely independent from the body (technically, its 
individual perceptions do not have corresponding brain states). The pure intellect is the 
faculty fitted for the perception of metaphysical truths, and its ‘clear and distinct’ 
perception, therefore, becomes in Descartes the ‘mark of truth’ (Hatfield 2016). However, 
not all intellectual activity is of this kind. Note that Descartes adds three more modes of 
intellect that require the body and, in that respect, are what he calls ‘special modes of 
thinking’ (MM AT VII 78/CSM II 54). While pure intellectual perception is a type of 
perception shared with disembodied minds (angels and God, in the Cartesian picture), 
sensory perception, imagination, and corporeal memory are ‘special’ because they belong to 
the mind as united to the body (they are bodily induced acts of intellect). In other words, 
they belong exclusively to the metaphysical entity that is the human being. As such, they 
tend to present ‘obscure and confused’ content that is, nevertheless, necessary for survival 
(MM AT VII 82-4/CSM II 57-8). 
 
Figure 4. Descartes’ taxonomy of the mental  
 
After this brief overview of Descartes’ taxonomy of the mind, we can move onto the 
argument of the section. The overview will assist in answering the question presented above: 
is it possible to reconcile Descartes’ appeal to the (PD) across the board with his claims 
about the intellectual, clear and distinct, perception of primary qualities? Is there a 
significant way in which the perception of primary qualities can be said to be more 
intellectual than the perception of secondary qualities? I defend that it is possible to 
reconcile the tension and that, in all significant senses, the perception of primary qualities 
remains on a par with the perception of secondary qualities.  
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The starting point of my defence is found in an argument by Wilson (1993, 1991) whose 
consequences, I believe, have not been emphasised enough in analyses of Descartes’ theory 
of sensory perception —particularly in defences of a unified theory. In short, the argument 
states that when Descartes speaks about the clarity and distinctness with which the intellect 
perceives primary qualities in objects, he is concerned with the properties of matter 
considered ‘abstractly’ or ‘in general’, and not with the particular properties of an object in a 
particular act of perception. This also entails that, in terms of the faculties involved, claims 
about primary qualities being intellectually perceived are therefore concerned with the 
activity of the pure intellect rather than with the act of intellect that Descartes calls sensory 
perception. I will use Wilson’s argument as the first step for showing that (as mentioned 
above) the division that Descartes draws in his picture of human perception is between 
purely intellectual perception of both primary and secondary qualities and sensory 
perception of both primary and secondary qualities.  
 
Let us start with the argumentation. In ‘Descartes on the Perception of Primary Qualities’ 
(1991), Wilson maintains that Descartes’ view on the perception of primary qualities differs 
from Locke’s (who is often credited with the most qualified view on the subject during the 
Early Modern period) in one important respect. Whereas Locke held that particular sensory 
ideas of primary qualities resemble the ‘concretely realized qualities of particular objects that 
are sensed’ (Wilson 1991:27), Descartes stated that our particular ideas of primary qualities 
do not resemble their physical causes in particular instances of sensory perception (as 
defended in §2.1 above). Now, the other side of this claim is that ideas of primary qualities 
can only be said to resemble their physical causes when considered ‘abstractly’ or ‘in 
general’, that is, detached from specific instances of sensory perception of objects. This is the 
same as to say that, when the pure intellect (as a mode of cognition opposed to sensory 
perception) reflects on the nature of body in general, it arrives at clear and distinct ideas of 
primary qualities (i.e. qualities that all bodies have, that is, qualities that belong to the a 
priori characterisation of matter). Crucially, the representational content of these ideas of 




primary qualities formed by the pure intellect does resemble, according to Descartes, the 
properties of matter out there in the physical world.30 
 
There is textual evidence for this reading of Descartes’ claims about the clear and distinct 
intellectual perception concerning only the properties of matter considered abstractly or in 
general. The first passages to take a closer look at are those containing the proof of the 
existence of body in the Meditations and the Principles. This is from Meditation Six:  
 
So I do not see how God could be understood to be anything but a deceiver if 
the ideas were transmitted from a source other than corporeal things. It follows 
that corporeal things exist. They may not all exist in a way that exactly 
corresponds with my sensory grasp (senso comprehendo) of them, for in many 
cases the grasp of the senses is very obscure and confused. But at least they 
possess all the properties which I clearly and distinctly understand (intelligo), 
that is, all those which, viewed in general terms (generaliter spectata) are 
comprised within the subject-matter of pure mathematics. (AT VII 80/CSM II 
55, Latin terms added) 
 
What we see in this passage is that, after presenting the core of the proof (that God is not a 
deceiver and therefore our ideas of external objects come, indeed, from external objects),31 
Descartes restates the familiar problem of dissimilarity, crucially, without making a 
distinction between types of qualities. Rather, he is qualifying sensory perception in general 
(as ‘obscure and confused’ given a lack of similarity across the board), and later contrasting 
                                            
30 If this interpretation is correct, then Descartes’ theory could be considered as no less sophisticated 
than Locke’s.  
31 The argument for the existence of body relies on a number of theses presented throughout the 
Meditations. Most evidently, it relies on the argument for the existence of an all-powerful, benevolent 
God in Meditation Three. But it is also dependent, as Garber, for instance, has pointed out, on the 
doctrine that the mind has only two faculties (intellect and will) and thus that all modes of mind 
must be either modes of the intellect or modes of the will (1992:71). The combination of these 
claims facilitates the first step of the proof, in which Descartes locates, by elimination, the origin of 
those ideas outside the res cogitans: ‘Now there is in me a passive faculty of sensory perception (…) 
but I could not make use of it unless there was also an active faculty, either in me or in something 
else, which produced or brought about these ideas. But this faculty cannot be in me, since clearly it 
presupposes no intellectual act on my part, and the ideas in question are produced without my 
cooperation and often even against my will. So the only alternative is that it is in another substance 
distinct from me (…) This substance is either a body (…) or else it is God’ (AT VII 79/CSM II 55). 




it with the results of intellectual activity in general. This is confirmed by Descartes’ 
qualification of the approach taken as ‘general’, presumably meaning that it concerns 
abstract principles and not concretely realised variations in matter. In this passage, what the 
meditator ‘clearly and distinctly’ understands is what matter is ‘generaliter spectata’ (AT VII 
80). ‘Generaliter spectata’, matter is extension in length, breadth, and depth, and these 
properties are understood under the principles of ‘the subject matter of pure mathematics’.32  
 
It is important to note, as Wilson does as well (1991:28), that the text from Meditation Six 
goes on to introduce a ‘particular’ approach to the examination of external objects as 
opposed to the earlier, general characterisation. Descartes gives the example of the sun being 
a specific size and shape, and he indicates that the subject lacks clarity: 
 
What of the other aspects of corporeal things which are either particular (for 
example that the sun is of such and such a size or shape), or less clearly 
understood, such as light or sound or pain, and so on? Despite the high degree 
of doubt and uncertainty involved here… (MM AT VII 80/CSM II 55, my 
emphasis)  
 
The analysis of these passages parallels the development of the proof of the existence of body 
found at the beginning of the second part of the Principles. Here, Descartes rehearses the 
argument again (he locates by elimination the origin of ideas of external objects outside of 
the cogito, and then he invokes an all-powerful, benevolent God). What he ‘clearly and 
distinctly’ perceives, again, is a general characterisation of matter ‘which is extended in 
length, breadth, and depth’ (Pr II 1, AT VIIIA 40/CSM I 223). Most importantly, the 
article finishes with a remark that would contradict all of Descartes’ treatments of sensory 
perception if he weren’t dealing here with the purely intellectual (and not sensory) 
apprehension of the properties of objects. For he writes:  
 
We appear to see clearly that the idea of it (matter) comes to us from things 
located outside ourselves, which it wholly resembles. (ibid. clarification and 
emphasis added) 
                                            
32 See §1 in this chapter for a qualified explanation of Descartes’ notion of physics as an experimental 
mathematical science.  





Now, given the omnipresent problem of dissimilarity, here Descartes must surely be 
referring by ‘it wholly resembles’ to the purely intellectual perception of objects. Lack of 
similarity between external objects and their corresponding sensory ideas is, indisputably, a 
Cartesian thesis. Although he writes here that ‘the idea of (matter) comes to us from things 
located outside ourselves’ (and that could imply that the idea is not formed by the pure 
intellect), Descartes it not saying that the idea of matter that we get by means of the senses 
‘wholly resembles’ the properties of matter. The fact that this passage occurs within the 
proof of the existence of body puts his words under a different light. Rather, the passage 
condenses the issue of the causal origin of ideas. First, Descartes restates that the propensity 
to believe that there is a physical world out there is truthful, and thus that the physical world 
(and neither the meditator, nor God) is the causal origin of sensory ideas (‘the idea of it 
comes to us from external things’). Second, what we ‘see clearly’ is the purely intellectual 
idea of matter which, crucially, is what the meditator had to start with, right before 
engaging in the proof. The meditator finds that the clear and distinct purely intellectual idea 
of matter (as something extended in length, breadth, and depth) corresponds, and it is 
similar to something existing the external world (a world that, according to the Cartesian 
picture, is made of the ‘objects of geometry made real’ (Garber 1992:63)). 
 
These considerations lead us back to the issue of the representational content of ideas. While 
(as we have seen) the representational content of sensory ideas is dissimilar from particular 
external objects, and that makes them obscure and confused, the representational content of 
intellectual ideas is similar to external objects insofar as they depict the general properties of 
matter. That makes them clear and distinct. This description fits well not only with 
Descartes’ taxonomy of the mind as showed above, but also with his treatment of the notion 
of the objective reality of ideas. As we have seen before, objective reality refers to the 
property that ideas have by virtue of their capacity of representing something. As a genuine 
way for things to be in the mind (that is, as a genuine location in the ontological scale), 
objective reality, Descartes writes, needs a cause: ‘the mode of being by which a thing exists 
objectively <or representatively> in the intellect by way of an idea, imperfect though it may 
be, is certainly not nothing, and so it cannot come from nothing’ (AT VII 41/CSM II 29). 
The cause of an idea, therefore, is what fixes its objective reality, that is, the status of their 




representational content.33 This doctrine can assist further the distinction between faculties 
established in this section in the following ways: 
 
(1) On one hand, specific external objects fix the objective reality of sensory ideas 
(regardless of them being of primary or secondary qualities). Because of the nature 
and limitations of the ‘grasp of the senses’, those ideas end up being ‘obscure and 
confused’ representations of objects.34 For example, since external objects have been 
proved to exist as genuine causes of our ideas of them, the idea of a particular 
sequoia has its representational content (and thus its objective reality) fixed by that 
particular sequoia, and mediated by the channels of perceptual information that are 
the human senses. The representational content of the idea presents a sequoia of a 
certain height and width, of a certain hardness to touch, of a certain brown and 
green tones in its trunk, branches, and leaves. Again, sensory ideas can be said to 
misrepresent the nature of their external causes, but they track them effectively for 
purposes other than attaining the the truths of metaphysics.  
 
(2) On the other hand, the objective reality of the clear and distinct idea of the 
properties of matter is fixed by the pure intellect, insofar as those properties are 
understood under the principles of mathematics and thus discoverable a priori. By 
reflecting upon the clear and distinct idea of matter, the perceiver understands that 
the ‘true nature’ of a sequoia is not transmitted though the senses. She understands, 
for instance, that what she calls the ‘green needle-like leaves’ or the ‘solid trunk’ of 
the sequoia are, in fact, arrangements and motions of particles of matter.  
 
                                            
33 This is, furthermore, what enables Descartes to construct the cosmological proof of the existence of 
God.  
34 These ideas would be, strictly speaking, ‘misrepresentations’, given that they are obscure and 
confused representations. It seems to me that, for Descartes, misrepresentations (sensory ideas of 
external objects) count as representations of their causes. They don’t represent them by resembling 
them, but that is, precisely, the very point of Descartes’ theory of sensory perception as revolving 
around the (PD).  




In summary, I take the passages presented in this section to support the claim that, when 
Descartes ascribes clarity and distinctness to ideas of external objects, he is referring to the 
properties of external objects in general (that is, to the properties of matter). This mental act 
belongs to the pure intellect. Conversely, ideas of external objects are obscure and confused 
when referred to the sensory perception of concrete objects. The formation of such ideas 
constitutes a mental act that belongs to the intellect as united to the body (see Fig.4 above). 
This enables a reading of sensory perception as obscure and confused across the board (for 
both primary and secondary qualities) that is free of textual tension.  
 
In turn, this rules out an interpretation of Descartes’ theory of the cognitive structure of 
sensory perception along the lines of the bifurcation reading. An alternative bifurcation 
emerges, but it is placed between the type of information that the different faculties provide, 
rather than between the qualities perceived within individual acts of perception. This means 
that what cuts sharply along the way in which we get acquainted with the world is not a 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities, but a distinction between the activity 
of the pure intellect and the activity of the intellect as united to the body (i.e. sensory 
perception). Primary qualities are perceived clearly and distinctly as properties of matter 
(‘generaliter spectata’) by the pure intellect, and they are confusedly and obscurely perceived 
in particular instances of perception by the intellect as united to the body (that is, sensory 
perception). The same goes for secondary qualities (Fig.6 below). In §3, I will discuss the 
characterisation of ideas of secondary qualities as clearly and distinctly perceived by the 
intellect and as obscurely and confusedly perceived by the senses. I finish the present section 
with a brief terminological note.  
 





















2.2.1. A terminological note 
 
Finally, it is worth making a minor terminological point that could assist this 
interpretation to some extent. Let us take it as an observation. For the portrayal of sensory 
perception, the expression employed in Meditation Six is ‘senso comprehendo’, (AT VII 80) 
which certainly can be translated as ‘the grasp of the senses’ (CSM II 55) meaning ‘what falls 
under their scope’ in general. This contrasts, in the same passage, with ‘intelligere’ as the 
verb chosen for describing the clear and distinct perception of the properties of matter 
which, I believe, conveys an intellectual activity with no trace of a sensory component. This 
would mean that Descartes is describing here what the intellect does when acting alone. And 
we know that the activity of the pure intellect is concerned with attaining abstract, general 
truths.  
 
It could be objected to this that Descartes’ use of terminology can be somewhat erratic, so 
one should not read too much into his use of ‘intelligere’ as referring to the understanding, 
or intellection, of abstract truths. Nevertheless, a strong motivation for this terminological 
remark is Descartes’ persistent use, within the closed context of the Meditations, of ‘intelligo’ 
for the clear and distinct apprehension of the pure intellect. Meditation Two provides a few 
good examples of this use. There, the meditator delves into the nature of the mind after 
having casted doubt on the existence of body. The meditator finds that she can only be 
certain about her own existence as a ‘thinking thing’. It is at this point of the method of 
doubt, in which body is not part of the picture (and therefore sensory perception is not 
either), that Descartes expresses several times the sole activity of the intellect with 
‘intelligere’. For these three passages, I have added in brackets the Latin terms originally 
employed: 
 
I do not yet have a sufficient understanding (nondum vero satis intelligo) of 
what this ‘I’ is, that now necessarily exists. (AT VII 25/CSM II 17) 
 
If I had tried to describe the mental conception I had of it (of body) I would 
have expressed it as follows: by a body I understand (intelligo) whatever has a 
determinable shape and a definable location… (AT VII 26/CSM II 17 
clarification added) 





But what then am I? A thing that thinks (…) Is it not the same ‘I’ who is now 
doubting almost everything, who nonetheless understands some things (nonihil 
tamen intelligo), who affirms that this one thing is true (…)? (AT VII 28/CSM 
II 19) 
 
In summary, reading Descartes’ texts while taking into consideration his taxonomy of the 
mind makes the bifurcation reading untenable. In this section I have showed that Descartes 
reserves the pair ‘clarity and distinctness’ for the activity of the pure intellect, regardless of 
the type of quality involved. In a nutshell, there is nothing particularly intellectual about the 
perception of primary qualities as opposed to secondary qualities. I now move on to 




 SECTION 3. AN ALTERNATIVE CRITERION FOR A DISTINCTION  
 BETWEEN SENSIBLE QUALITIES 
 
 Even after having established that the bifurcation in Descartes’ theory is to be found 
between the sensory and the intellectual perception of the same qualities, it cannot be 
denied that clarity and distinctness are most frequently attributed in the texts to ideas of 
primary qualities. Consequently, one could still wonder whether this interpretation is 
tenable. We have seen that ideas of primary qualities can also be obscure and confused, but 
what it is for an idea of a secondary quality to be clear and distinct? In this final section, I 
start by assessing this question (§3.1). After that, I resume the issue of the rationale behind 
Descartes’ apparent distinction in kind between sensible qualities, and I pursue an 
alternative interpretation that does not base the difference between primary and secondary 
qualities on a criterion of similarity and dissimilarity with external causes (§3.2). I conclude 
that this argumentation provides decisive evidence for a reading of Descartes’ theory of 
sensory perception in which the presence of the (PD) across the board leads to the need for 
the activity of the mind in the formation of sensory ideas. 
 
 





3.1. CLEAR AND DISTINCT PERCEPTION OF SECONDARY QUALITIES 
 
The first part of the Principles provides, again, the key for understanding Descartes’ 
position on the perception of qualities. Articles 66-69 in Book I involve the possibility of a 
clear apprehension of ideas of secondary qualities. Under the title of ‘How sensations, 
emotions, and appetites may be clearly known, despite the fact that we are frequently wrong 
in our judgements concerning them’,35 article 66 specifies the following condition: 
 
These may be clearly perceived provided we take great care in our judgments 
concerning them to include no more than what it is strictly contained in our 
perception (Pr I 66, AT VIIIA 32/CSM I 216) 
 
Descartes is introducing here an idea that has been mentioned in passing before,36 referring 
to the fact that incorporating the notion of secondary qualities in philosophical explanation 
needs to be done with great caution. The condition for their clear and distinct apprehension 
is restated a few lines ahead:  
 
In order to distinguish what is clear in this connection from what it is obscure, 
we must be very careful to note that pain and colour and so on are clearly and 
distinctly perceived when they are regarded merely as sensations or thoughts 
(ibid. Pr I 68, 33/217) 
 
This means that the talk of ideas of secondary qualities remains adequate only insofar as one 
understands, at the same time, that there is nothing in the external world that is similar to 
such ideas. The caution that Descartes recommends is exemplified, as we have seen before, 
by the use of careful expressions such as the following: ‘what we are calling colour’ (ibid. I 
70, 34/218), ‘<We call these qualities hardness, heaviness, heat, etc.>’ (ibid. IV 191, 
                                            
35 Descartes often uses ‘sensation’ and ‘sensory perception’ interchangeably. Sometimes, the term 
‘sensation’ seems to be reserved for sensory ideas of secondary qualities in general. This is the case of 
this passage, where the example given, a few lines ahead, is one involving colour: ‘on seeing a colour, 
for example, we supposed we were seeing a thing located outside us which closely resembled the idea 
of colour that we experienced within us at the time’ (Pr I 66, AT VIIIA 32/CSM I 216). 
36 Mainly, towards the end of §1 in this chapter.  




318/282), ‘the properties in external objects to which we apply the terms light, colour, 
smell…’ (ibid. IV 198, 323/285), ‘the light in bodies we call luminous’ (Op, AT VI 
84/CSM I 153). 
 
For elucidating the scope of Descartes’ claims about the clarity and distinctness of secondary 
qualities, I will resume here the brief analysis of the status of secondary qualities given at the 
end of §1 in this chapter. There, I mentioned briefly how Descartes’ verdict on the topic is 
embedded in his task of clarifying a systematic ambiguity in the use of terms like ‘colour’, 
‘smell’, ‘taste’, and so on. Pasnau (2011) has appropriately labeled the two aspects of this 
ambiguity as ‘physical designation’ and ‘phenomenological designation’ of secondary 
qualities. I will follow this terminology from here onwards.37 Let us start with the analysis of 
Descartes’ theory in these terms. For each designation of ideas of secondary qualities 
(physical or phenomenological), I provide a brief three-fold description: (a) what does the 
designation amount to, (b) where can we find it in the texts, and (c) what does it mean, 
under such designation, that an idea of a secondary quality is clear and distinct. 
 
 
3.1.1. The physical designation 
 
(a) On one hand, the physical designation of sensations (‘heat’, ‘colour’, ‘smell’, etc.) 
indicates the nature of their physical causes, as well as the effects that these causes 
bring upon other physical objects (the human senses included). In the Cartesian 
theory, the causes of sensations are different arrangements and motions of micro-
corpuscles of matter as well as the corresponding patterns impressed on the sense 
organs and transmitted to the brain. In this respect, the theory is a reductive one: 
the physical designation of sensations is nothing over and above these arrangements 
                                            
37 Pasnau is mainly concerned with the evolution of the distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities in the Early Modern period. He assesses a possible oscillation between realism and anti-
realism in Descartes, but he does not deal with his account of the structure of sensory perception. I 
am thus borrowing a useful distinction that he makes for clarifying Descartes’ position, in this case 
for the different purpose of showing what it means for an idea of a secondary quality to be clear and 
distinct.  




of matter. Consequently, the passages in which Descartes emphasises the 
reducibility of sensations to the properties of matter should be read under the 
physical designation, that is, the inquiry about their physical causes independently 
of the presence of a perceiver. At stake under this designation is what constitutes 
what we call ‘heat’, ‘colour’, ‘smell’, etc. in the physical world. 
 
(b) In the texts, we encounter the physical designation in the reduction of secondary 
qualities to primary ones as one of the aspects of the micro-corpuscular reduction 
that constitutes the programme of Cartesian physics.38 It is, for instance, the overall 
approach taken in the Treatise on Light and the Optics. In his treatment of fire, he 
exemplifies the reductive view of qualities as follows: ‘I ask you to consider whether 
this (the motions of micro-particles) is not also sufficient for us to understand how 
the flame provides us with heat and light (…) the flame will need possess no other 
quality, and we shall be able to say that it is this motion alone that is now called 
‘heat’ and now ‘light’, according to the different effects it produces’ (AT X 9/G 8 
clarification added). Similarly, he remarks that colour in bodies is ‘nothing other 
than the various ways in which the bodies receive light and reflect it against our 
eyes’ (Op, AT VI 85/CSM I 153).  
 
(c) From the perspective of this designation, and given the reductive view, the appeal 
the clarity and distinctness of secondary qualities is then equivalent to that of 
primary qualities. Secondary qualities, in their physical designation, are clear and 
distinct because their ‘true nature’ (following Descartes’ frequent expression) is a 
reduction to the general properties of matter that the pure intellect (as opposed to 
the senses) can apprehend (as explained throughout §2 above). For instance, we 
clearly and distinctly apprehend (physical) heat when what is referred by the term 
‘heat’ is a certain rapid motion of particles.  
 
 
                                            
38 For a general exposition of the Cartesian project, see §1 of the present chapter, as well as Chapter 
One.  





3.1.2. The phenomenological designation 
 
(a) On the other hand, the phenomenological designation of sensation captures the 
sorts of effects that the above arrangements of matter bring about in (human) 
perceivers. For instance, upon perceiving an obsidian, the ‘phenomenal black’ of my 
experience of it is different from that which has set off the process (certain 
arrangements of matter) and ultimately caused the phenomenology of such 
experience. At stake under this designation is the status of sensations as 
phenomenally considered. It is important to detect this shift between perspectives in 
the texts in order to avoid reading Descartes as presenting a muddled account. 
When the human being enters the picture, the phenomenological designation 
sometimes takes over the physical one. That is to say, when the focus is on the 
experience that perceivers have of the natural world, Descartes puts aside the issue of 
the micro-corpuscular reduction and contends that sensations should be considered 
as thoughts.  
 
(b) In those works and passages that are not centred around the scientific programme of 
micro-corpuscularian reduction, Descartes can be sometimes seen as taking the 
perspective of the phenomenological designation. This is why in the Principles we 
are told that ‘pain and colour and so on are clearly and distinctly perceived when 
they are regarded merely as sensations or thoughts’ (Pr I 68, AT VIIIA 33/CSM I 
217), and this is why this claim is not incompatible with saying that we can 
apprehend those pains and colours clearly and distinctly as motions of particles 
when using the physical designation.  
 
In these contexts, metaphysical considerations arise regarding the status of such experiences 
as products of the union of mind and body. For example, to his list of ‘the ultimate classes 
of things’ in the Principles, he adds sensations as ‘things which must not be referred either to 
the mind alone or to the body alone. These arise (…) from the close and intimate union of 
our mind with the body’ (ibid. Pr I 48, 23/209). We had already come across this verdict 
concerning sensations: according to Descartes, they are the genuine products of the union of 




the mind and body and, as such, they have a place in the true ontology of the world. The 
‘phenomenal black’ of my experience of the obsidian is the genuine, regular, and concurrent 
result of the ‘physical black’ of the obsidian out there. One could even add that it is the 
‘intended’ result given the ultimate appeal to God’s ordination in establishing the psycho-
physical laws that constitute sensory perception. 
   
(c) From the perspective of the phenomenological designation, clarity and distinctness 
belong to sensations only when no judgments are attached to them about 
resemblance with their external causes. Sensations ‘may be clearly perceived 
provided we take great care in our judgments concerning them to include no more 
than that of which we have inner awareness’ (ibid. Pr I 66, 32/216). This refers to 
the fact that, by introspection of a sensation (that is, by inspecting that of which we 
have this ‘inner awareness’), we cannot gather anything about its physical causes. 
Any other information that we might feel inclined to attach to sensations is what 
Descartes commonly refers to as the mistaken judgments that we have been 
accustomed to make since childhood (i.e. that the phenomenal content of sensation 
resembles its physical causes).  
 
To make this sort of judgment would not only be an unjustified move from an epistemic 
point of view (since we simply do not know whether sensations might or might not 
resemble their physical causes), but also, given Descartes’ micro-corpuscularianism, it would 
be a mischaracterisation of the ontological map of the world. Recall that, by disregarding 
dissimilarity as well as the limitations of introspection, the threat of ‘material falsity’ appears. 
In other words, we could be misrepresenting ‘things as non-things’. This means that we 
would be misplacing the phenomenal content of sensation as a ‘real quality’ in the physical 
world (perhaps as supervening on primary matter following the Aristotelian-Scholastic 
model that Descartes wants to replace). In sum, sensations can also be apprehended with 
clarity and distinctness when we consider them without judgment, that is, as unprocessed 
modes of mind.  
 
 





3.1.3. Consequences of a reading of designations 
  
These two perspectives —the physical and the phenomenological— coexist in the 
texts and generate different claims that could, in a first instance, be read as pertaining to 
different positions concerning qualities.39 Claims made under the physical designation could 
be seen as clashing with Descartes’ type of anti-realism about qualities. For example, in the 
wax thought experiment in Meditation Two, Descartes states that colour, taste, and smell 
do not ‘belong’ to the wax.40 Similarly, in the Principles, he declares that a stone (or any 
body) lacks colour, hardness, and heat.41 In light of the distinction between designations, 
however, we know that (in spite of the brevity of some his explanations) Descartes is 
referring here to qualities considered phenomenally. Certainly, ‘phenomenal smell’ does not 
belong to the physical wax and ‘phenomenal heat’ does not belong to the physical stone.42 
But this does not mean that the phenomenological experience of sensible qualities amounts 
                                            
39 I think that Nolan (2011) and Wilson (1992) have mischaracterised Descartes’ position to some 
extent precisely because of this, although their verdicts differ. While Nolan defends a nominalist 
reading of Descartes on secondary qualities, Wilson identifies conflicting views within the texts. On 
my reading, there is more than a nominalist stance in Descartes’ view on secondary qualities, and the 
seeming conflict can be explained away by distinguishing the use of the two designations. 
40 ‘The wax was not after all the sweetness of the honey, or the fragrance of the flowers, or the 
whiteness, or the shape, or the sound (…) Let us concentrate, take away everything which does not 
belong to the wax, and see what is left…’ (MM, AT VII 30-1/CSM II 20) 
41 ‘We first of all exclude hardness, since the stone is melted or pulverized it will lose its hardness 
without thereby ceasing to be a body; next we will exclude colour, since we have often seen stones so 
transparent as to lack colour; next will exclude heaviness, since although fire is extremely light it is 
still thought of as being corporeal; and finally we will exclude cold and heat and all other such 
qualities, either because they are not thought of as being in the stone, or because if they change, the 
stone is not on that account reckoned to have lost its bodily nature’ (Pr II 11, AT VIIIA 46/CSM I 
227)  
42 Cottingham has made a similar point in his analysis of Descartes’ arguments for the non-inherence 
of colour: ‘a sensible property, such as redness, construed as a disposition to set up certain types of 
motion, may genuinely inhere in objects. What is denied is the inherence of redness qua redness - 
redness construed as a certain sort of sui generis quality supposed to inhere in objects in a way that 
exactly matches our sensory awareness of it’ (1989:238). The aim of Cottingham’s paper is to 
delineate a concept of inherence that Descartes could have held. For that, he rightly examines some 
aspects of the problem of dissimilarity (as it is illustrated by the quotation), but he does not analyse 
the possibility that Descartes’ position extends to all qualities. This makes him mischaracterise some 
aspects of the theory, as I specify elsewhere.  




to nothing, not even to an unwanted perceptual delusion that reveals the inherently faulty 
nature of human beings. 
 
Furthermore, if one disregards the distinction of designations in the texts, Descartes could 
be read as putting forward a sort of anti-realism about qualities that emphasises a total 
disconnection between what happens in the world and what happens in the mind as a result. 
This could pave the way for strong occasionalism as the type of causal transaction between 
external objects and ideas that would be undesirable given Descartes’ general theory (as 
presented throughout Chapters One, Two, and Three).   
 
In this section I have showed that in Descartes’ theory for the cognitive structure of sensory 
perception there is a place for ideas of secondary qualities considered clearly and distinctly. 
First, insofar as they are physical occurrences reducible to primary qualities, they are clear 
and distinct in the technical sense of being apprehended by the pure intellect as 
characterisations of matter considered in general. This is the same sense in which ideas of 
primary qualities are apprehended with clarity and distinctness. Second, as genuine mental 
occurrences connected with physical states by means of psycho-physical laws, they can be 
said to be clear and distinct in a more flexible sense. Descartes means, I believe, that we can 
understand clearly the phenomenology of sensation when we detach from it judgments 
about similarity with external objects, which are epistemically unjustified and ontologically 
faulty. In summary, this completes a unified picture of the cognitive structure of sensory 
perception in Descartes. 
 
In the following, final section of this chapter, I will deal with a loose end of this proposal. I 
am aware that one might readily object that if ideas of primary and secondary qualities are 
genuinely on a par, as I have argued throughout this chapter, it makes no sense to have 
focused on a special formulation of the problem (the distinction between designations) 
devised only for ideas of secondary qualities. In other words, if ideas of primary and 
secondary qualities are equally affected by the (PD), it is an inconsistency to attribute a 
disjunction between physical and phenomenological perspectives only to ideas of secondary 
qualities. This is why, I believe, the most important upshot of the argumentation presented 
in this section is that the distinction between physical and phenomenological perspectives 




should be applied to both types of qualities. There is no ‘phenomenal black’ in the obsidian 
out there and, similarly, there is no ‘phenomenal size and shape of the sun’ in the sun out 
there.43  
 
If this is true, at least two pressing questions arise. (1) First, if Descartes held, in fact, that all 
qualities are subjected to the same bifurcation between clear and distinct perception by the 
pure intellect and obscure and confused perception through sensory perception, why did he 
emphasise much more consistently the (PD) for the case of sensations (ideas of secondary 
qualities)? (2) Second, even if the first question can be successfully resolved (and I think it 
can), a distinction between types of qualities transpires from the way in which Descartes 
presents the topic of the perception of qualities. They are often listed separately, and assessed 
in different sections in works in which thematic divisions are used (like the Principles). Why 
make a division if qualities are equally affected by the (PD)? I think that it is charitable to 
assume that, if dissimilarity between ideas and their physical causes is not what cuts across 
between types of qualities, there needs to be another reason that justifies Descartes’ split 
exposition of the topic. I address these questions in the following section.  
 
 
3.2. THE CRITERION FOR A DISTINCTION OF QUALITIES 
 
We have seen that, along general lines, Descartes’ doctrine is that ‘all variety in matter 
(…) depends on motion’ (Pr II 23, AT VIIIA 52/CSM I 232), and that ‘there is nothing 
whose true nature we perceive by the senses alone’ (ibid. Pr I 73, 37/220). At the same time, 
however, it is a textual fact that, in his account of sensory perception, Descartes entertained 
the (PD) with special emphasis for the case of ideas of secondary qualities. This association 
                                            
43 The allusion of the sun refers to the crucial example in Meditation Three: ‘I think I have 
discovered a great disparity <between an object and its idea> in many cases. For example, there are 
two different ideas of the sun which I find within me. One of them, which is acquired as it were 
from the senses and which is a prime example of an idea which I reckon to come from an external 
source, makes the sun appear very small. The other idea is based on astronomical reasoning, that is, it 
is derived from certain notions which are innate in me (…) and this idea shows the sun to be several 
times larger than the earth. Obviously both these ideas cannot resemble the sun which exists outside 
me…’ (AT VII 39/CSM II 27) 




is not exclusive, as I have showed in previous sections. Indeed, it is also a textual fact that he 
contemplated some cases involving primary qualities, and it is most important to note how 
the whole theory is modelled around a notion of the ‘true nature’ of bodies as something 
that only the pure intellect can grasp.  
 
Nevertheless, even taking this into account, it is unmistakeable that a distinction between 
types of qualities emerges from the texts. The rationale behind this distinction is unclear 
given what I take to be Descartes’ position i.e. that ideas of primary and secondary qualities 
are on a par from a cognitive point of view, and that, therefore, dissimilarity is a problem for 
both of them. In this section I will asses Descartes’ tendency to highlight the (PD) for 
secondary qualities, and I will suggest an alternative criterion for a distinction between types 
of qualities.  
 
Descartes did not provide a systematic treatment of the distinction between qualities. I 
believe, nonetheless, that it is possible for the interpreter to reconstruct a plausible story 
that, on one hand, fits well with Descartes’ omnipresent concern about the (PD) and, on the 
other, accounts for some problematic features unique to ideas of secondary qualities. In 
short, I will contend that the rationale behind the distinction of qualities is a difference in 
the way in which ideas of them misrepresent their physical causes. I will rely on some of the 
insights by Simmons (2003) and Hatfield (2005) that I will point out accordingly. 
 
The first step in the argumentation is that if ideas of primary and secondary qualities are on 
a par from a phenomenological point of view, then this means, in a consistent account, that 
the criterion for a distinction between qualities should be phenomenologically irrelevant. 
That is to say, there should not be anything discoverable by introspection (by ‘inner 
awareness’ of the sensation, as Descartes would say) that would, in fact, reveal the 
distinction in question. The second step in the argumentation is simply to recall that, for 
Descartes, both ideas of primary and secondary qualities misrepresent (though they 
accurately track) their physical causes. From these standpoints, I think that the most fruitful 
approach is to examine in finer detail how sensory ideas misrepresent bodies and whether 
they all misrepresent bodies in the same way. 
 




Let us take the example of the idea of the sun that Descartes puts forward in Meditation 
Three. The sensory idea of the sun ‘makes the sun appear very small’ (AT VII 39/CSM II 
27). Most importantly, the sensory idea of the sun does not convey anything about the 
arrangements and motions of matter that constitute it and make it appear as a round, solid, 
luminous star. The ‘phenomenal sun’ has, for instance, a different size and width than the 
actual sun. Perhaps, depending on the perceptual conditions, our sensory idea misrepresents 
the sun as a circle, or as an oval, when it is in fact an almost perfect gigantic sphere. 
Similarly, the ‘phenomenal sun’ exhibits a variety of colours. For example, my idea of the 
sun at sunset presents it in orange tones when, in fact, there is no such thing as ‘phenomenal 
colour’ in the absence of a human perceiver of the sun. Note, however, the following 
difference.44 The general quality that is misrepresented in the former case (width, for 
instance) constitutes a misrepresentation of the sun, and the sun only. Width is a property 
that objects can have, and it is possible that there is some object out there that is a circle, or 
an oval instead of a sphere. The sun does not have the width presented phenomenally, but 
has some width or other independently of the perceiver, even if that width is only present at 
a micro-corpuscular level. In contrast, the general quality that is misrepresented in the latter 
case (colour), misrepresents the sun, but not only the sun. It constitutes a misrepresentation 
(that is, an obscure and confused representation) of what matter is like as a whole. There is 
no (phenomenal) orange in the sun at sunset, just as there is no (phenomenal) orange 
anywhere else in the physical world. Colour, under its phenomenological designation, is 
simply not the type of quality that bodies have independently of perceivers.  
 
I believe that this is the rationale behind Descartes’ distinction between types of qualities. 
This distinction along the lines of conceivability of qualities as existing in physical objects 
provides a charitable, plausible reading of Descartes’ position throughout the texts. Under 
this reading we can have a more qualified understanding of some of Descartes’ remarks 
about perception of primary qualities, such as the following from the Principles: 
 
 
                                            
44 This difference has been stated by Simmons (2003:570) with slightly different implications. I 
detail this in the upcoming paragraphs.  





The mind perceived sizes, shapes, motions, and so on, which were presented to 
it not as sensations but as things, or modes of things, existing (or at least capable 
of existing) outside thought…’ (Pr I 71, AT VIIIA 36/CSM I 219, my italics) 
 
There are many other features, such as size, shape, and number, which we 
clearly perceive to be actually or at least possibly present in objects…’ (ibid. I 70, 
34-5/218, my italics) 
 
This interpretation has two main advantages in respect to a traditional interpretation of the 
separation between qualities in terms of resemblance/lack of resemblance between ideas and 
their specific physical causes. First (1), it offers a way of establishing the distinction between 
types of qualities that maintains a dissimilarity between specific ideas and their specific 
physical causes as a perceptual occurrence for all qualities (not only secondary). Second (2), 
it captures, at the same time, a way in which ideas of secondary qualities are more 
problematic, thus justifying Descartes’ tendency to treat them separately and list them 
frequently when the (PD) appears.  
 
Furthermore, I think that the reading also explains one particularly obscure expression of 
Descartes in the Comments. In the midst of his most explicit account of hyper-nativism,45 
Descartes declares that ‘ideas of pain, colours, sounds, and the like must be all the more 
innate’ (AT VIIIB 359/CSM I 304 my italics).46 In the context of the Comments, it is clear 
that dissimilarity is taken as a main motivation for the need of mental activity in sensory 
perception, but it is not clear where this distinction between types of qualities comes from, 
given that dissimilarity is a problem across the board.47 In light of the interpretation 
presented in this section, we can understand that it is because ideas of secondary qualities 
misrepresent the properties of matter (and not only of a given specific object of perception) 
that Descartes declares that they must be innate with greater reason. ‘All the more innate’ 
                                            
45 This is explained at length in Chapter Three. 
46 The original Latin reads: ‘Ac tanto magis innatæ esse debent’ 
47 Recall that in the same text Descartes affirms, for instance, that ‘there is nothing in our ideas which 
is not innate to the mind’ (CB, AT VIIIB 358/CSM I 304). 




expresses, even if not in a technical manner, that it is beyond doubt that the mind needs to 
be doing some work in their case.  
 
Before going any further, it should be said that Simmons (2003) has offered a similar 
interpretation, although she has argued for it, broadly, from the notion of material falsity. 
The scope of her proposal, then, ends up being different. If I have read it correctly, 
Simmons’ position is that the reason that Descartes has for emphasising the further 
complexity of qualities such as colour is that they provide more material for error. This 
means that, for the case of ideas of secondary qualities, to follow the habitual, erroneous 
tendency of assuming that ideas of sensory objects resemble their physical causes48 would 
make us fall into the kind of category mistake that Descartes calls material falsity. To make a 
judgment about similarity would be wrong for both types of qualities, but in the case of 
secondary qualities, the error would be more serious. She puts it as follows: ‘projective 
judgments about secondary qualities, therefore, lead us into error not only about the 
particular properties of bodies, but also about the very nature of body in general’ 
(2003:570).  
 
This is certainly the right conclusion regarding the scope of material falsity. But I have 
argued for a claim that is slightly more fundamental. The threat of material falsity varies 
with the types of qualities precisely because a distinction between qualities is determined by 
the fact that, while they all misrepresent the nature of bodies, they misrepresent it to 
different degrees. To those acts of sensory perception (recall, bodily induced acts of the 
faculty of intellect), the faculty of the will might or might not attach a projective judgment 
that mischaracterises the nature of one or all objects. In other words, a distinction of types of 
qualities does not depend on whether a specially misled judgment is made, but it precedes 
such a judgment: it is a fact about the nature of sensory perception itself.  
 
                                            
48  Simmons (2003:553) calls this type of judgment about the materials given by the senses 
‘projective’, and she distinguishes it from the ‘constructive’ kind. The former indicates the erroneous 
tendency to judge that our sensory perceptions resemble their physical causes. The latter refer to the 
kinds of judgments that collaborate in constructing the phenomenological experience of the world 
that we have as embodied beings (that is, as minds united to bodies in an essential manner). 




As a final point, I mentioned before that if it is true that primary and secondary qualities are 
on a par from a phenomenological perspective, a consistent theory should include a 
rationale for the distinction of qualities that does not play a role in Descartes’ 
phenomenology of sensation. Therefore, an important feature the reading presented in this 
section is that it provides a distinction between qualities that does not have a place in the 
phenomenology of sensation. Note that the different degree to which ideas of primary and 
secondary qualities misrepresent the physical world is simply irrelevant from a 
phenomenological point of view. It is simply not something that is revealed when 
‘attending’ a sensory idea, as Descartes would put it. Let us now unpack this claim a bit 
more.  
 
We know that, within the Cartesian theory, sensory ideas are described as the regular effects 
of physical objects and their corresponding brain states in the mind. When those effects are 
ideas of secondary qualities, it is common perhaps to assume that what characterises them is 
that they do not provide any information about their physical causes. That is to say, what 
the perceiver is aware of phenomenally does not ‘reveal anything about either the brain state 
or the micro properties of distant things’ (Hatfield 2005:43). This does not render the 
connection between objects and ideas irremediably unintelligible for the natural philosopher 
(who can, in principle, discover natural ordination), but it certainly makes it opaque for the 
perceiver.  
 
The different arguments that I have presented throughout this chapter have culminated in 
the claim that ideas of primary qualities do not provide any information about their specific 
causes either. The natural philosopher, in this case, is the one who seeks knowledge of the 
correspondences between objects, brain states, and ideas. Hatfield (2005) has made the 
point that the theorist, and not the perceiver, is the one who can, in principle, detect the 
difference between qualities. The theorist understands that the fact that sensory perception, 
in its physical phase, depends on patterns of motions transmitted from the object through 
the nerves and to the brain, means that ideas of primary qualities misrepresent the object but 
not the (motion-reducible, geometrically derived) properties of matter. In principle, by 
getting to know certain rules of ‘misrepresentation’, the theorist could infer objects and 
brain patterns from ideas, and she would arrive at the conclusion that ideas of primary 




qualities misrepresent their specific physical causes, but they involve qualities that objects 
can have. The same method goes for ideas of secondary qualities, with the different 
conclusion that they involve qualities that physical objects cannot have. In principle, then, 
the theorist could look into the pattern imprinted in the brain and infer the presence of an 
object or other. But for both primary and secondary qualities, she would have to know 
about the psycho-physical laws that constitute sensory perception. Sensible qualities are, 
across the board, phenomenologically opaque. 
 
Recall, before wrapping up this topic, Descartes’ emphasis on the fact that the relation 
between the brain and the mind in sensory perception does not involve an inspection of 
brain states ‘as if there were yet other eyes within our brain with which we could perceive it’. 
(Op AT VI 130/CSM I 167)49 . Aside from being a straightforward criticism of an 
Aristotelian-Scholastic account of sensory perception, this also adds to the Cartesian theory 
the claim that epistemic access to brain states is simply not something that is available to the 
perceiver qua perceiver. Even when there is some sort of similarity (in terms of traceable 
motion patterns that exhibit properties that matter can have), this has no bearing on the 
perceptual process. Descartes is also clear about this particular point in the same textual 
context, without making a distinction between qualities: ‘we must not think that it is by 
means of this resemblance that the picture (the isomorphic representation in the brain) 
makes us sense these objects’ (ibid. 130/167 clarification added).50  
 
The irrelevance of resemblance (since we cannot access it in any case) is further emphasised 
by some of Descartes most anti-empiricist remarks in the Principles, such as the following: 
‘sensory perceptions (…) do not, except for occasionally and accidentally, show us what 
                                            
49 He had also written a few paragraphs before: ‘we must take care not to assume -as our philosophers 
commonly do- that in order to have sensory perceptions the soul must contemplate certain images 
transmitted by objects to the brain’ (Op, AT VI 112/CSM I 165). 
50 The CSM translation reads ‘the picture causes our sensory perception of these objects’, whereas the 
original French reads ‘ce soit par le moyen de cette ressemblance qu'elle fasse que nous les sentons’. 
Following the point made in Chapter One about the significance of the absence of the word ‘cause’ 
in descriptions of brain-mind interaction, I have altered the translation to ‘make us sense’.  




external bodies are like’ (Pr II 3, AT VIIIA 41/CSM I 224).51 I believe that this quotation 
illustrates well the finesse of Descartes’ view: similarity can certainly occur in the process of 
sensory perception, but it is not, nevertheless, a causal factor. It is not common, it happens 
by chance, and it is, at any rate, irrelevant to the perceiver.52 
 
In conclusion, in this final section I have established that the distinction of particular 
sensible qualities that transpires from Descartes’ texts does not have a rationale based of their 
similarity or dissimilarity with external causes. The criterion for a difference of qualities 
arises from an analysis of the nature of misrepresentation in sensory perception, and it 
hinges on the matter of conceivability. Most importantly, this reading provides a way of 
making sense of Descartes emphasis on the (PD) in the case of ideas of secondary qualities 
that does not, at the same time, obstruct a unified theory of sensory perception with a 





In this final chapter, I have developed a line of thought to the effect that an 
approximation to the Cartesian theory of sensory perception from the viewpoint of the 
analysis of sensible qualities (and not complete objects) also supports the thesis of the 
activity of the mind. The different arguments offered support the position that the  weight 
                                            
51 This point is somewhat surprisingly missed by Cottingham in his account of Descartes on colour. 
There, he uses this same passage to claim that it only concerns ideas of secondary qualities. There is 
nothing in the context of this passage suggesting this association. Cottingham writes: ‘the conclusion 
that we are invited to draw is that sensory perceptions like those of colour ‘do not tell us except 
occasionally and accidentally what bodies are in themselves’ (1989:232). 
52 It is important to note that, if ideas of primary qualities misrepresent only the particular cause of an 
idea, but not the properties of matter in general, it is possible, at least in principle, that in some case, 
by chance, a combination of arrangements and motions of matter generates an idea that represents 
the general properties of matter and also happens to represent the properties of its particular cause. In 
light of Descartes’ affirmations, this fortuitous event would not say anything about either the process 
of sensory perception or the phenomenology of sensation. Simmons (2003) has made a similar point 
concerning projective judgments. Even in cases where an idea resembles in some sense its physical 
cause, we would be assuming (projecting) similarity between object and idea for the wrong reasons. 
Those judgments, though correct, would be a matter of epistemic luck (2003:570). 




of the (PD) structures the different aspects of Descartes’ account of perception, the 
distinction between qualities included. As we have seen throughout this dissertation, the 
(PD) determines Descartes’ carefully balanced causal narrative (as developed in Chapter 
One), it prompts a causal-semantic model for brain-mind interaction that builds-in the 
phenomenon of dissimilarity and that it is concerned with the interpretative activity of the 
mind (as presented in Chapter Two), and it presses Descartes to take an innateness strategy 
to account for a different, complex type of mental content that differs from his standardly 
considered innate ideas (as explained in Chapter Three). In Chapter Four I have stressed 
that ideas of primary and secondary qualities are equally subjected to the phenomenon of 
dissimilarity.  Rather than resulting in a major inconsistency, Descartes’ opposition between 
the clarity of intellectual perception and the obscurity of sensory perception has revealed a 
refined account of the cognitive structure of sensory perception. In the picture of sensory 
perception that comes into view, incorporating now an examination of particular qualities of 















This dissertation is shaped around a defence of the position that, in Descartes’ theory 
of sensory perception, the mind is active in the sense of contributing to the representational 
content of ideas. In this regard, the work that has been presented here counters a pervasive 
reading of Descartes according to which the mind is a passive receiver from inputs of the 
environment. As a historical inquiry, this project aims at revising a specific aspect of the 
European early-modern history of ideas. In an account of the genesis of the concepts that have 
determined the modern and contemporary understanding of perception, Descartes is 
commonly associated with an unrefined dualism that does not spark much interest to the 
current philosopher. The work that Descartes put into the theory of sensory perception, 
however, is rather remarkable. Not only did he devise a complex mechanistic physiology for 
it throughout his works on natural philosophy, but he also strived to provide a naturalistic 
and metaphysically interesting theory for the production of mental content in sensation. 
Throughout this project, I have offered four main lines of argument (one for each chapter) 
that support the view that Descartes summoned the mind for a substantial task in sensory 
perception. While sustaining the mental activity thesis, these four argumentative lines have 
themselves modelled a specific theory of the activity of the mind. I summarise here the four 
conclusions that they have provided. 
 
The first chapter supplies a theoretical framework. I identify the Problem of Dissimilarity 
(PD) between mental representations and mechanistic explanations as Descartes’ main 
concern about sensory perception, as well as his chief motivation for introducing mental 
activity. In Descartes’ descriptions of the qualitative gap of sensory perception, we observe a 
carefully established terminological equilibrium in the way he writes about types of causal 
transactions. I concluded that Descartes’ choice of words reveals the presence of a cause of a 
non-efficient kind that appears consistently for accounting for the qualitative character of 
sensory perception. The second chapter furnishes this scheme with a textually plausible causal-
semantic model. In this model, brain states are assimilated to natural signs of external objects. 
An important upshot of this reading is that it incorporates well both the (PD) and the 
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resultant activity of the mind that Descartes seem to suggest in different manners throughout. 
In this picture, sensory ideas are semantic responses that are formed by virtue of the pre-
cognitive interpretative activity of the mind.  
 
The third chapter integrates Descartes’ claims about the innateness of all ideas into the theory 
of sensory perception. This is an important piece of a defence of a mental activity reading 
because Descartes invoked the category of innateness to formulate the type of mental content 
that is produced by the mind in sensory perception, and that cannot be identified with its 
bodily causes. The conclusion is that hyper-nativism (that is, the thesis that in a way all ideas 
are innate) amounts to Descartes’ endorsement of mental activity from the standpoint of a 
theory of types of ideas. An important piece of this vein of thought is that it provides a 
reconciliation of the different (and seemingly clashing) taxonomies of ideas advanced by 
Descartes.  
 
Finally, the fourth chapter aims at the resolution of a glaring textual tension. For doing that, 
it shifts the perspective to that of the perception of sensible qualities of objects. The way in 
which Descartes often characterises ideas of primary qualities —as clearly and distinctly 
perceived by the intellect— appears to compromise a reading of sensory perception as 
incorporating mental activity. It would seem that causal-semantic model that incorporates 
mental activity as a result of the (PD) is envisaged for dealing only with the puzzling nature 
of secondary qualities. Nevertheless, the analysis of Descartes’ distinction between types of 
qualities shows that there is no such bifurcation in specific acts of sensory perception. This 
argument completes a unified picture of Descartes’ theory of sensory.  
 
In the course of these argumentations, I have witnessed the opening of new paths of research 
that I inevitable could not take up. For example, the role of God and the status of natural 
ordination within a causal-semantic model remain as a topic to explore in more depth. Also, 
the presence of Descartes’ qualified explanatory naturalism across is worth investigating 
properly. On the face of it, it seems to be a promising way to understand Descartes’ dualism 
in consonance with his experimental natural philosophy. Lastly, I have given only a cursory 
treatment of the ontological status of sensation, which appears as one of Descartes’ the most 
ambiguous (yet forward) proposals. 
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At any rate, these open paths for investigation reveal the potential of the history of philosophy. 
In this dissertation, I have also attempted to show the value and the scope of historically 
grounded philosophy, as well as the constructive, worthwhile exercise of taking an alternative 
path. The causal-semantic model of sensory perception, together with its inseparable 
companion of mental activity, have illustrated, I believe, the possibility of rediscovering small 
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